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Abstract 
 
Recent psychological and cognitive research has explored the evolutionary origins of 
human religiosity.  In this thesis, I explore the historical origin and social function of 
supernatural expertise.  I define supernatural expertise as the act of acquiring and 
expressing supernatural knowledge.  I critique several recent theories from 
evolutionary psychology and cognitive science by assessing the extent to which they 
can explain supernatural expertise. 
 
Costly signalling theory is the view that religious costs are adaptations that signal the 
cooperative intent of individuals.  This theory cannot account for supernatural 
expertise as expressions of supernatural knowledge are typically linguistic, and one 
can verbally misrepresent one’s supernatural beliefs. 
 
Sexual selection theory explains how physiological or psychological traits can 
become exaggerated over time if they are preferred by mating partners.  Sexual 
selection can explain an increase in the cognitive capacities necessary for the 
acquisition of supernatural knowledge.  However, it cannot account for the complex 
nature of supernatural information. 
 
Cognitively optimal theory predicts that the religious information which persists 
within human populations should be easily transferred and recalled.  The theory 
cannot account for any supernatural information which requires considerable effort to 
acquire. 
 
 ii 
The modes theory explains religion in terms of memory systems and the social 
arrangements that humans have developed to mediate the exchange of religious ideas.  
These result in two modes of religiosity.  The doctrinal mode of religiosity explains 
why supernatural experts exist, but not how supernatural expertise originated. 
 
I conclude by arguing for an innovative theory for supernatural expertise.  I employ 
cognitively optimal theory to explain why some supernatural concepts are difficult to 
recall.  I explain the signalling function of supernatural expertise in terms of the costly 
effort invested in the acquisition of supernatural information.  I propose that sexual 
selection for the cognitive capacities to acquire supernatural knowledge has enhanced 
the ability to acquire such information; this necessitates an increase in the complexity 
of supernatural information which ensures cooperative commitment remains a 
predominant motivation for the acquisition of supernatural knowledge, in spite of 
enhanced cognitive ability.  I discuss several social conditions that result from the 
doctrinal mode of religiosity and how they solve cooperation problems in dense 
populations. 
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Chapter 1. Supernatural expertise and the evolutionary paradigm 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
I open this thesis with the same question that I proposed in the first lecture of a third 
year Religious Studies class at the beginning of 2009, “Why do people have 
religion?”  The history of sociology is riddled with attempts to answer to this 
question.  For David Hume, religion resulted from a “passion for surprise and 
wonder” (1776).  For Karl Marx, religion is an oppressive tool concocted by a 
conspiracy of a ruling class (Marx & Engels 1888/1976).  For Edward Tylor, religion 
is a product of intellectual curiosity (1871).  For Sigmund Freud, religion is a 
psychological tool enabling the repression of guilt (1913/1938, 1927/1964).  For 
Emile Durkheim, religion is the objectification of social order through a network of 
symbols (1915/1995). 
 
This thesis approaches this question, not from any of the above perspectives, but from 
a biological perspective.  I open by overviewing Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution 
(1859/1968).  I define the evolutionary paradigm as the method of studying biology, 
psychology and sociology from a Darwinian perspective.  To clarify, human 
physiology and psychology are the product of evolution, as is the human brain.  The 
process of evolution has endowed the human brain with the ability to experience 
consciousness, and this consciousness enables us to engage in complex social 
behaviour and to practice religion.  Thus the theory of evolution can help to foster a 
better understanding of human psychology, sociality, religiosity and other aspects of 
human nature. 
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Research has been conducted examining many aspects of religion from an 
evolutionary point of view, including ritual (Sosis 2003; Whitehouse 2004), religious 
emotion (Bulbulia 2004a), belief (Boyer 2001), and doctrine (Whitehouse 2004), as 
well as consideration of whether religion can be sexually attractive (Miller 2001).  
This thesis focuses on one aspect of religion, specifically, the acquisition and 
expression of complex knowledge regarding the gods and other supernatural beings or 
forces.  Throughout this thesis, I call this behaviour supernatural expertise, and I 
define a supernatural expert as a person who possesses such expertise.  That is, a 
person who engages in the acquisition and expression of complex supernatural 
knowledge.  Supernatural expertise is interesting from an evolutionary perspective 
because unlike other human needs such as the desire to eat, sleep, have sex, etc., the 
desire to acquire supernatural knowledge does not appear to be explainable in terms 
of biological impulses. 
 
After explaining the evolutionary paradigm, this chapter continues with a brief 
introduction to the fields of evolutionary biology, cognitive science, evolutionary 
psychology and religious studies.  I then define supernatural expertise in more detail 
and explain the necessity of studying supernatural expertise from an evolutionary 
perspective.  The chapter proceeds by considering common objections to the 
evolutionary study of religion, and concludes with an overview of the chapters to 
come. 
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1.2 The evolutionary paradigm 
 
Few would dispute that life is one of the most interesting properties of the universe.  
Not only for its peculiarity in comparison to more common celestial phenomena, such 
as inter-galactic void or stellar bodies, but also for the ability of life to evolve, adapt, 
and ultimately survive in a diverse variety of terrestrial environments and ecological 
niches.  Mountain tops, city dumps, animal excretions, and even your intestines, are 
all rich environments in which complex ecologies exist.  Ironically, this great triumph 
is surpassed only by the monumental failure of the vast majority of living forms to 
survive and reproduce.  A single sunfish can lay up to 300 million eggs at once, a 
giant puffball will produce 7 trillion spores in its lifetime, and a human male will 
ejaculate 200 million sperm during a single copulation.  The vast majority of these 
forms will fail to mature and those that do mature will likely fail to survive to 
adulthood and successfully reproduce.  Even within our own species, for which recent 
technologies have made it possible for most children to survive to adulthood in some 
geographical locations, those fortunate enough to be born in these locations can only 
survive at the expense of the lives of countless other organisms.  Given that almost all 
life seems to be exceptionally good at dying, the tiny iota of forms that do survive 
must be the greatest experts at living. 
 
The 19th century naturalist Charles Darwin developed the theory of natural selection 
(1859/1968) to account for similar observations.  Darwin identified three mechanisms 
of natural selection.  First, variation is the principle that most living things differ from 
each other in some manner.  Second, the mechanism of competition states that living 
things will constantly be struggling with one another to survive.  Third, inheritance is 
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the observation that offspring inherit the vast majority of their parents’ traits.  From 
these three mechanisms Darwin deduced the theory of natural selection, which states 
that those few organisms that are uniquely skilled to survive the competition for 
existence will pass the variations that enabled them to do so onto subsequent 
generations.  This results in a gradual accumulation of infinitesimally small 
variations, which the theory maintains is responsible for the significant changes to 
species over vast geological epochs. 
 
Darwin himself overviewed his theory in his book entitled The Origin of Species 
(1859/1968), and the theory is sometimes thought of as serving no purpose other than 
to explain the origins of life, with little application to the contemporary world.  
However, I suggest that an evolutionary study of human psychology is relevant.  
Darwin himself understood that his theory had wide ranging applications.  He wrote, 
“in the distant future I see open fields for far more important researches.  Psychology 
will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental 
power by gradation” (Darwin 1859/1968).  To clarify his point, life can be explained 
as the product of both chance and a universal set of laws (Edis 2002; Edis 2004; 
Monod 1971).  To illustrate, in evolutionary terms we understand life to be the 
product of natural selection acting upon random variations.  We can likewise 
understand human intelligence to be the product of laws and chance (Edis 2004).  
Thus, a better understanding of human culture, religion, and behaviour will be gained 
when we understand the nature of the laws governing the origins of the human mind, 
as well as the limits of randomness to which these laws are subject. 
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1.3 Evolutionary biology 
 
In brief, natural selection is the process during which intergenerational change occurs 
via the differential survival ability of varying replicators.  Although the process can be 
summarised in a single sentence, it has lead to as many different outcomes as there are 
individual organisms in the world.  Each replicator in existence, whether it be an 
organism, a replicating cell in an organism, or a self replicating group of organisms 
(such as an ant colony) represents a different outcome of the evolutionary process.  In 
biology, genetically similar organisms are grouped into species, genus and other 
levels of taxonomical classifications (Mayr 2001). 
 
Many traits possessed by species can be explained in reference to an evolutionary 
trend, that is, an identifiable process of development which occurs when natural 
selection interacts with particular variations in a certain manner.  Examples of 
evolutionary trends include the handicap principle and the ratchet effect.  These 
theories are analysed in chapter 2.  Other evolutionary trends include coevolution, 
where two species evolve side by side (such as a predator and its prey), or genetic 
drift, where change occurs without conveying an advantage or disadvantage to the 
changing organism (such as varying eye shapes in different human racial groups) 
(Richerson & Boyd 2005). 
 
Further, almost all physiological and psychological traits can be classified as either an 
adaptation or a spandrel.  If we think of natural selection as a process that generates 
apparent design, an adaptation would be a purposeful component of that design, 
whereas a spandrel would be a side effect of a purposeful or group of purposeful 
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components.  For a trait to be considered an adaptation, two conditions must be met.  
First, a biological adaptation must be an emergent property from physiological and/or 
psychological systems (Andrews, Gangestad, & Matthews 2002).  Second, the 
adaptation should be able to function with a reasonable level of efficiency (Williams 
1966).  An example of an adaptation in our own species would be our tendency to 
prefer environments or homes that offer visibility and privacy (Appleton 1975).  Since 
we evolved in a competitive predator rich landscape, these environments would have 
endowed our ancestors with a strong survival advantage, thus selection targeted this 
preference.  It should also be noted that adaptations are not limited to individual 
organisms but can likewise be possessed by a group of individuals (Wilson 2002).  
That is, no individual within the group can be said to possess the adaptation and the 
adaptation belongs to the group as a whole, such as the pollen processing function of a 
beehive.  No individual bee can manufacture honey alone; the adaptation belongs to 
the group. 
 
A spandrel is an accidental byproduct of an adaptation, named after spandrels in 
cathedrals which are typically decorated with beautiful artwork.  An architectural lay 
person may conclude that the spandrel was placed in the cathedral deliberately for an 
artistic purpose.  However, she would be mistaken.  A spandrel may appear to be part 
of the design, but in reality it is the effect created when two archways are placed side 
by side.  A spandrel is the side effect of an archway.  In biology, a spandrel is a trait 
that may appear to be a part of an organism’s design, but in fact has not been targeted 
by natural selection (Gould & Lewontin 1979).  Spandrels can be either advantageous, 
disadvantageous, or neither.  An example of a positive spandrel would be literacy.  
Literacy is, at best, a four thousand year old technology.  Human brains were not 
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designed to be literate, but it seems that almost all human beings can become literate 
after several years of training.  Literacy is a spandrel (a side effect) of the human 
ability to use language and recognise symbols.  An example of a disadvantageous 
spandrel would be ingrown toenails.  Toenails are an adaptation designed to protect 
toes.  They are not designed to become ingrown.  Ingrown toe nails are a spandrel of 
the particular way in which toenails are adapted to grow. 
 
I now turn to examples of the manner in which evolutionary theory has been applied 
to understand human origins and human nature and the relevance of these examples to 
this thesis.  Due to the many observable differences between human beings and other 
animals, humans have occasionally been considered as being separate from the 
primate order (Strier 2002) and animal kingdoms.  However, we share many traits 
with other animals (Foley 1995), indicating common descent with the animals with 
which we share traits.  For example, we share a number of habits with apes (Dunbar 
2004), such as social culture (Sapolsky 2006).  Human culture accumulates through 
the human ability of imitation, an ability that we share with chimpanzees (Tomasello 
& Carpenter 2005).  Further, it is not only the great apes with whom humans share 
traits, for example it is known that some other animals experience rudimentary 
emotions (Lazarus 1991; Maynard Smith & Harper 2003).  In section 2.2.5, I discuss 
the relationship between emotions and morality.  Notably, evolutionary theory has 
been applied to show how morality can evolve to prevent violence (de Waal 1996), 
and how human violence had its origins in a primate context (Wrangham & Peterson 
1996). 
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1.4 Cognitive science 
 
The study of human cognition is referred to frequently throughout this thesis.  
According to cognitive science, the human brain performs a computational function 
(Tooby & Cosmides 2005), which accepts input in the form of sensory information 
and processes that information to produce output in the form of behaviour (Pinker 
1995).  Cognitive capacities are embedded in the human brain (Whitehouse 2000) and 
are utilised in the processing of this information. 
 
The human brain develops with age, with different components of the brain maturing 
at different stages of development.  For example, the temporal cortices of the brain 
attain maximum volume at age 16 (Giedd, Blumenthal, Jeffries, Catellanos, Liu, 
Zijdenbos, et al. 1999).  As the different parts of the brain develop, the manner in 
which the brain processes environmental information also develops (Kolb, Forgie, 
Gibb, Gorney, & Rontree 1998), until the brain attains maximum volume at age 17 
(Giedd, Blumenthal, Jeffries, Catellanos, Liu, Zijdenbos, et al. 1999).  For example, 
during the adolescent stage of the brain’s development, people will display stronger 
reactions to environmental stimuli.  For instance, social interest heightens and 
symbolic reasoning increases.  This may be due to specific brain components which 
grow during adolescence, such as the amygdala (Spear 2000).  This suggests a strong 
connection between the biological composition of the brain and human behaviour. 
 
Our behaviour is produced by nearly universal innate cognitive capacities embedded 
in the human brain.  For instance, people hearing the same music typically share the 
same heart rate, respiration rate, and emotions (Harrar & Harrar 1977).  This suggests 
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that different brains possess a similar cognitive capacity to respond to music.  The 
only reason I do not claim that all human cognitive capacities are completely 
universal is because the brains of some severely mentally handicapped persons 
operate differently, for example the brain’s limbic system functions differently in 
psychotic patients (Hare 1999; Kapur 2003).  Examples of cognitive capacities which 
emerge from the brain’s biological composition include an awareness of space and 
time (Levinson 2003), the ability to acquire language (Pinker & Bloom 1990), 
knowledge of predator/prey interaction (Barrett 2005) which was essential 
information during our species’ evolution, and the ability to experience emotion 
(Damasio 1999).  Although the role of emotion is sometimes neglected in 
psychological theories of religion (Hill 1995; Watts 1996; Watts & Williams 1988), I 
discuss it in sections 2.2.5 and 2.2.8 because of a close link between emotion and 
cognition (Epstein 1994) which affects behaviour.  For example, certain emotions 
function to temporarily enhance awareness (Hattfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; 
Levenson 1999). 
 
The cognitive capacities of the human brain are implemented within the brain’s 
physical and chemical structure.  For example, certain chemicals, such as dopamine 
and endorphins, have been shown to alter behaviour by elevating attention and 
emotion (Damasio 1999).  Also, people are known to respond strongly to pain, hunger 
and sexual desire, in part, because of our dopamine reaction to these states (Berridge 
& Robinson 1998; Horvitz 2000).  Sensory inputs can also alter the brain’s chemical 
state, with stress and some forms of pain such as dehydration and exposure to extreme 
hot or cold, leading to an increase of endorphins (Henry 1982; Prince 1982).   
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As per the convention in cognitive science, throughout this thesis I treat the human 
brain as an information processing device.  This device interacts with body and 
culture to process sensory input and produce behavioural output.  All human brains 
share a similar design.  This design is the product of natural selection, a topic I turn to 
in the next section. 
 
1.5 Evolutionary psychology 
 
The hominid genus has evolved gradually over the past two million years, with homo 
sapiens emerging around 150,000 years ago.  The environment in which our species 
evolved is known as the environment of evolutionary adaptation, or EEA for short.  
During this time, natural selection has been acting upon human psychological traits 
and cognitive capacities.  For this reason, we can treat all human psychological traits 
as being an emergent property of cognitive capacities that evolved during the EEA 
(Barrett 2004b; Mithen 1996). 
 
A number of predictions can be made from this observation.  Our brains are designed 
to promote survival within the set of environments in which our ancestors lived 
during the past two million years (Lazarus 1991).  For this reason, our brains are 
adapted to make rational decisions regarding our most basic survival needs (Bulbulia 
2004a), such as the sourcing of food, shelter, warmth, etc.  The human brain therefore 
possesses a preference for information that promotes the likelihood of one’s survival 
(Tooby & Cosmides 1992). 
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One example of a cognitive adaptation which promotes our chances of survival are 
our environmental preferences.  As discussed earlier, humans prefer environments 
that offer visibility and privacy (Appleton 1975).  This preference, along with other 
environmental preferences, is common to many different human cultures (Herzog, 
Herbert, Kaplan, & Crooks 2000).  Environmental preferences are often unconscious 
(Korpela, Klemettila, & Hietanen, 2002; Ulrich 1983; Zajonc 1980), and these 
unconscious preferences have been targeted by natural selection (Kaplan 1992; 
Orians, & Heerwagen 1992; Silverman & Choi 2005).  There is also evidence to 
suggest that humans are cognitively adapted to adopt specific survival strategies in 
certain environments (Kaplan & Kaplan 1989). 
 
The manner in which the brain responds to environmental inputs is determined by 
specific psychological mechanisms (Kenrick, Maner, Butner, Li, Beker, & Schaller, 
2002; Rozin, Kurzer, & Cohen 2002; Tooby & Cosmides 1990).  The cognitive 
capacities of the human brain are modular (Mithen 1996), that is, they are divided into 
specific mechanisms, each of which is designed to perform a certain task.  These 
psychological mechanisms evolved during the EEA (Boyer 2001) to help solve 
environmental problems that our ancestors had to cope with.  One example of a 
psychological mechanism unique to human evolution is our ability to use fire without 
being afraid of it.  This mechanism is separate from another mechanism common to 
other animals which endows us with a fear of uncontrollable fire (Fessler 2006).  This 
thesis follows the recent practice of explaining human behaviour in terms of 
psychological mechanisms which evolved during the EEA. 
 
 
 12 
1.6 Religious studies 
 
Although we can understand behaviour as being determined by a Pleistocene-
designed human brain, the cultural context in which a person exists is also relevant as 
cultural information constitutes an environmental input which the brain must process.  
There is much literature stressing the importance of taking culture into consideration 
when studying humans (Clark 1997; Clark & Chalmers 1998; Deacon 1997; Hutchins 
1995; Richerson & Boyd 2005; Rowlands 2003; Tomasello 1999; West-Eberhand 
2003).  The prominent aspect of human culture examined within this thesis is religion.  
Religions are, of course, a very diverse phenomenon and have been classified as 
assuming a number of different forms, such as individualistic, shamanic, communal, 
and ecclesiastical (Wallace 1966).  There are however some elements common to 
many religions, such as a focus on salvation (Weber 1923/1978). 
 
Since the concept of religion is sometimes regarded as being a western political 
construct (Smith 1982), any discussion of religion requires a definition of what is 
meant by the term religion.  Indeed, it is not uncommon for people in the western 
world to have opinions, sometimes strong opinions, about what religion is or what it 
ought to be.  For purposes of this thesis, I set aside such folk definitions and instead 
employ Justin Barrett’s definition of religion as “a shared system of beliefs and 
actions regarding supernatural agency” (2000).  Much scholarship concerns itself with 
methodologies to help understand the origin of religion, such as the view that an 
understanding of this origin can be gained through the study of ancestral cultures 
(Harrison 1909) or the view that religion results from emotionally charged symbols 
(Tooby & Cosmides 2001).  These views are helpful.  However, accounting for all 
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religion with a single explanation is problematic when we consider the multiplicity of 
religious experience.  Research concerning the scope of the diversity of religious 
experience (Hill & Hood, Eds. 1999a; Hill & Pargament 2003) justifies the view that 
a variety of explanations for religiosity are necessary.  Further, some people explicitly 
choose a belief in religion (James 1907/2003) and would not consider themselves to 
believe for reasons such as those previously mentioned.  Nevertheless, in the tradition 
of cognitive science and evolutionary psychology, we can treat religion as a cognitive 
capacity, or the product of a set of cognitive capacities, that have evolved during our 
species’ evolutionary history.  Religion can be considered separate from the many 
forms which it assumes (Tiele 1897), and the essence of religious forms that I am 
concerned with in this thesis is the psychological mechanism or set of mechanisms 
which, by design or accident, produce the many forms of religiosity. 
 
Despite the many diverse forms that religion assumes in different societies, there is 
evidence demonstrating that systems of belief regarding supernatural agency are 
universal to all human cultures (Brown 1991; Murdock 1965).  According to the many 
criteria that must be met before claiming that a behaviour or trait is universal (Brown 
1991; Norenzayan & Heine 2005), shared systems of belief can be considered a 
human universal for many reasons.  For instance, in a study of 186 human societies, 
shared supernatural beliefs were found to be present in every one (Johnson 2005; 
Murdock & White 1969).  Additionally, religious practices motivated by shared 
supernatural beliefs have been found to be common, with 70% of cultures practising 
rites of passage for adolescents (Lutkehaus & Roscoe, Eds. 1995).  The evidence 
demonstrates that a belief in supernatural agents is common to all cultures (Bering 
2006a; Tremlin 2006), and possibly to all individuals, with those professing no belief 
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in the supernatural devoting themselves to quasi-magical abstractions (Bulbulia 
2004a). 
 
1.7 Cognitive science and religion 
 
Given the universality of religiosity, the origin or cause of religious concepts and 
practices is of great interest.  The search for this cause is the focus of the cognitive 
science of religion (Barrett 2000).  Given the pan-human design of the brain, there is 
evidence showing that religion draws on specific cognitive systems built into the brain 
(Persinger 1987), and that the brain produces representations of supernatural agents 
and forces (Boyer 2001).  Cognitive science concerns itself with how these 
understandings are being produced.  To utilise the understanding of the brain as a 
computer, our brains are sourcing certain information from the environment as input, 
processing that information to generate belief, and producing religious behaviour as 
an output.  Accordingly, the cognitive science of religion concerns itself with 
explaining religiosity in computational terms (Gibson 2005). 
 
There is much evidence to show that there is a relationship between religion and the 
brain.  One study argued that a dedicated system within the temporal cortex enables 
persons to experience the presence of God (Persinger 1987).  Additionally, several 
experiments have been conducted in which religious participants have engaged in 
religious practice while neural images of their brain patterns were observed (Azari, 
Nichel, Wunderlich, Niedeggan, Hefter, Tellmann, et al. 2001; Beauregard & 
Paquette 2006).  These experiments show that multiple areas of the brain are utilised 
during mystical experiences, (Beauregard & Paquette 2006) and that the brain’s 
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dorsolateral prefrontal cortices are activated during the recitation of scriptural 
passages (Azari, Nichel, Wunderlich, Niedeggan, Hefter, Tellmann, et al. 2001).  
These neural activities function to stimulate certain emotional responses (Newberg & 
d’Aquili 1998).  Further, where emotional states are accompanied by a release of 
endorphins, this creates an experience which can sometimes be attributed to 
supernatural influence (Frecska & Kulscar 1989), cementing religious belief.  We 
observe that religious practice activates specific systems in the brain, which invoke 
specific emotional responses which can strengthen a belief in religiosity, motivating 
repeat religious behaviour. 
 
There is likewise evidence to demonstrate a relationship between the brain’s chemical 
structure and religiosity.  It has been shown that certain drugs, which can either 
enhance or reduce levels of dopamine in the brain, can also increase or decrease levels 
of religiosity (Nichols & Chemel 2006).  Further the DRD4 gene, which is known to 
be related to dopamine levels within the brain, likewise corresponds to a higher level 
of religiosity (Comings, Gonzales, Saucier, Johnson, & MacMurray 2000).  It is also 
interesting to note that people suffering from Parkinson’s disease display lower levels 
of religiosity (McNamara, Durso, Brown, & Harris 2006), which may be related to the 
fact that dopamine levels in Parkinson’s sufferers are 40% lower than those of non-
sufferers (Agid, Jovoy-Agid, & Ruberg 1987). 
 
Cognitive science has had many useful applications and has helped to gain a better 
understanding of specific religious behaviours.  For example, cognitive science has 
been used to demonstrate that the psychological states which the brain experiences 
during firewalking are the same as those experienced at rave parties, and further that 
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these states can be drug induced (Greenfield 2000).  It has also been applied to studies 
involving meditation by monks (Newberg, Alavi, Baime, Pourdehnad, Santanna, & 
d’Aquili 2001), and the prayer of nuns (Beauregard & Paquette 2006).  The 
knowledge that religious belief is produced in the human brain has proved practical, 
which is my reason for utilising such research throughout this thesis. 
 
1.8 Evolutionary psychology of religion 
 
Just as cognitive science concerns itself with how the brain generates religious belief 
and behaviour, the study of the evolutionary psychology of religion concerns itself 
with why the brain produces religion.  Or more specifically, why the brain has 
evolved the particular structure discussed that is responsible for religiosity.  Despite 
attempts to abandon evolutionary approaches to cultural and sociological studies 
(Sharpe 1986), the theory of evolution has influenced the scientific study of religion 
for a long time (Harrison 1909).  So much so that without Darwin’s theory, a 
scientific understanding of religion would be impossible (Marett 1912; Sharpe 1986).  
A number of publications overviewing the variety of research conducted within this 
field are available (see Atran 2006; Barrett 2000; Bering 2006b; Boyer 2003; Bulbulia 
2004b, 2007; Dow 2006; Sosis & Alcorta 2003). 
 
Utilising this approach, the study of the origin of religion need no longer concern 
itself with the religions of ancestral cultures (a view expressed by Harrison 1909), but 
instead with the evolution of religious cognition (Marett 1909).  I define religious 
cognition as the brain’s tendency to produce religious belief and output religious 
behaviour in response to the environmental stimuli that the brain encounters.  In order 
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to consider whether this trait can evolve in a Darwinian sense, we must identify 
whether the three mechanisms of Darwinian evolution, being variation, competition, 
and inheritance, apply to religion.  First, it has been shown that there are differences 
in the religious attitudes and behaviours of different individuals (Koenig & Bouchard 
2006).  Second, there is evidence to support the hypothesis that belief and worldview 
can provide advantages in competitive contexts (Covey, Merrill, & Merrill 1994; 
Waitley 1979; Wind, Crook, & Gunther 2005).  Two examples include the stress 
relief that can be gained from meditation (Benson 1976; Lazar, Bush, Gollub, 
Fricchoine, Khalsa, & Benson 2000), or the relationship between spirituality and 
mental health (Hill & Pargament 2003).  There is also evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that religiosity is inheritable (D’Onofrio, Eaves, Murrelle, Maes, & Spilka 
1999; Koenig & Bouchard 2006).  There are two conclusions that can be drawn from 
these facts.  One is that any differences in religious behaviour which provide a 
competitive advantage will be inherited by subsequent generations, allowing the 
Darwinian evolution of religious cognition to take place; this is an adaptationist 
perspective.  Another is that religious cognition is a side effect of another cognitive 
trait (Boyer 1994), and that any inheritable differences in religious cognition are a 
byproduct of the inheritable differences of the trait that produces it; this is a 
spandrelist account. 
 
However, as discussed earlier, it is difficult to justify a single explanation for 
religiosity given the diverse scope of religious behaviour and experience.  For this 
reason, the dissection of religion into constituent components for the purposes of 
studying the evolutionary history of each one is possible (Bering 2005).  Therefore, 
the study of the evolutionary psychology of religion has identified a number of 
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different evolutionary processes for the purposes of explaining different aspects of 
religion (Alcorta & Sosis 2005).  Several publications present a system of 
classification for the variety of different evolutionary accounts of religion (see Atran 
& Norenzayan 2004; Dennett 2006; Wilson 2005), some of which are identified in 
section 1.11.  As with any good scientific field, these hypotheses are empirically 
testable (Atran & Norenzayan 2004; Wilson 2005).  Both theoretical and empirical 
research has lead to a generally accepted hypothesis concerning the origin of religion 
(see Atran 2002; Boyer 2001; Dawkins 2006; Dennett 2006; Mithen 1996). 
 
1.9 Supernatural expertise 
 
I define supernatural expertise as the acquisition and expression of complex 
knowledge regarding the gods and other supernatural beings or forces, and I define a 
supernatural expert as a person who possesses such expertise.  I treat the acquisition 
and expression of supernatural knowledge as a practice or ritual that some religious 
persons engage in.  Supernatural reality may include beings or forces such as Amida, 
Krishna, God, Zeus, karma, Christ and num.  Thus a lama, shaman, psychic and most 
other religious elites would be considered a supernatural expert according to this 
definition.  In this regard, expert supernatural discourse differs from other religious 
discourse in that other religious discourse is not dependent upon expertise.  My 
definition of supernatural expertise does not include rational discussions of the 
supernatural beliefs of others; for example, a buddhologist explaining the nature of 
Avalokiteshvara in Tibetan Buddhism is expressing sociological and anthropological 
knowledge regarding the beliefs of Buddhists; but this knowledge is not necessarily a 
part of her personal supernatural beliefs. 
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In previous publications I referred to supernatural expertise as theology, which I 
defined in a manner identical to the definition of supernatural expertise presented here 
(Bulbulia & Mahoney 2008; Mahoney 2008).  A recent body of literature which 
references one of my publications (Mahoney 2008) also uses the term theology in this 
manner (see Bulbulia 2009; Bulbulia & Mahoney 2008; Bubulia & Frean, in press; 
Chesswas, unpublished).  This has caused some confusion given that theology is 
ordinarily understood as “an historical body of systematic reflection on religious and 
spiritual matters by an elite group of specifically trained scholars” (Morris 2010, 
personal communication).  This thesis does identify specific cognitive and 
opportunity costs that supernatural experts must incur during the acquisition of 
complex supernatural knowledge, costs which may or may not occur during formal 
training.  It also explains how systematic reflection on religious and spiritual matters 
can generate increasingly more complex supernatural information.  However, 
although I maintain that the conventional definition of theology is compatible with my 
definition of supernatural expertise, I recognise that centuries of use has endowed the 
word theology with numerous connotations.  Therefore, throughout this thesis I have 
elected to replace the term theology from my previous work with the new term 
supernatural expertise, to avoid the problems that arise from invoking these 
connotations.  However, for purposes of compatibility, whenever the term 
supernatural expertise is invoked herein it should be regarded as interchangeable with 
the manner in which the term theology has been applied in my previous publications. 
 
Although supernatural expertise is not universal, the vast majority of human beings, 
both contemporarily, historically, and even traditionally, have believed in the 
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existence of supernatural beings or forces (Boyer 2001; Tremlin 2006).  Those who 
claim otherwise are often devoted to quasi-magical abstractions such as “freedom”, 
“justice”, or “progress” (Bulbulia 2004a).  Belief in such entities typically entails an 
interest in numerous supernatural questions, such as: “Who are the gods?”,1 “What is 
the nature of the gods?”, “What is my relationship with the gods?”, “How do I alter 
this relationship?”, etc.  The fact that almost everyone wonders about these questions, 
sustains a body of religious elites who acquire an expert level of supernatural 
knowledge.  This thesis addresses the issue of why shared systems of supernatural 
beliefs are elaborated upon by complex bodies of supernatural knowledge.  It does not 
attempt to account for the near universal human interest in supernatural questions, 
rather it accounts for the few individuals whose desire to acquire supernatural 
knowledge motivates them to successfully emerge as supernatural experts.  Given that 
supernatural experts are not present in every society, this thesis only concerns itself 
with the phenomenon of supernatural expertise, where it occurs. 
 
Despite the near universal human interest in supernatural questions, it is perplexing 
that answers to such questions are typically portrayed in esoteric language that 
appears to be finely configured in such a way so as to be incomprehensible to most 
and understandable only to an elite few.  Although the scope and extent of 
supernatural commitment is not the topic of this thesis, I illustrate this point with two 
examples.  First, consider the following quotation: “The second Guardian of the Faith 
has faithfully appointed his successor and the Guardianship continues to exist as a 
living Institution … with the assurance that the highest institutions of the … 
Administrative Order have been preserved intact and uncorrupted in their divinely-
                                                 
1
 I use the word “god” to refer to any supernatural being or force. 
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conceived perfection and glory for both the believers of this day and for future 
generations … in the ages to come of the [current] Dispensation” (Marangella 1998). 
 
This quotation was written by Joel Marangella, the leader of a religious sect he 
founded in the late 1960s called the Orthodox Bahá’í Faith.  This statement is 
impossible to understand without contextual knowledge of the phrases: “second 
Guardian of the Faith”, “Guardianship”, “living Institution”, “highest institutions”, 
“Administrative Order”, “intact and uncorrupted”, “divinely-conceived perfection and 
glory”, “ages to come”, and “[current] Dispensation”.  Furthermore, a member of the 
mainstream Bahá’í World Faith would likely struggle to contextually comprehend the 
first, third, and sixth of these phrases, unless they were familiar with the supernatural 
beliefs of this particular sect.  Most, if not all, Orthodox Bahá’ís would be familiar 
with this terminology and thus able to accurately recognise this quote as evidence for 
Joel Marangella’s claim to be God’s current representative; as for the rest of us, the 
quotation is nonsensical. 
 
Second, I presented another example from a very different religious tradition in a 
recent paper (Mahoney 2008), in which I challenged my reader to “try to decipher the 
following quotation from a Gnostic Christian gospel: ‘All natures, starting from the 
revelation of chaos, are in the light that shines without shadow, and in joy that cannot 
be described, and in unutterable jubilation.  They ever delight themselves on account 
of their unchanging glory and the immeasurable rest, which cannot be described 
among all the aeons that came to be afterward, and all their powers.’ (Soph. Jes. Chr. 
113.19-114.8, Robinson 1990). 
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“This quotation is typical of the language employed in a scripture called The Sophia 
of Jesus Christ.  As this scripture was unearthed in Egypt 62 years ago,2 having been 
buried since the fourth century (Robinson 1990), any theological baggage implicit in 
the discourses of groups that recognised this scripture has been long forgotten.  I 
therefore suggest that no living person could justifiably claim to fully understand all 
of the theology in this text” (Mahoney 2008).  It seems that wherever there is 
supernatural information, there is also terminology and metaphor that can only be 
understood by a select group of people. 
 
Contrast supernatural rhetoric with a more rational statement,3 such as the fact that 
there is an axe murderer standing behind you.  This is an example of what I would call 
biologically strategic information.  By this I mean information that can help you 
survive and ultimately reproduce in the real world. 
 
What is even more perplexing is that there is evidence to show that many people who 
learn complex supernatural concepts and explicitly claim to believe in them, do not 
implicitly believe in them (Slone 2004).  That is, they will claim to hold beliefs but 
their actions will speak differently.  This has been confirmed by experiments 
involving the use of implicit association tests (IATs), (for examples see Gibson 2005) 
in which participants’ reaction times are measured to assess the speed at which they 
cognitively process information; these tests are an alternative to self-report measures, 
                                                 
2
 Note that I am quoting from a paper that I wrote in 2007, it would now be accurate to say that the 
scripture was unearthed 66 years ago. 
3
 I define rationality as self correcting domains of reason based upon empirical foundations.  The 
example given, of an axe murderer standing behind you, is empirically testable; whereas the claim that 
an incorporeal demon is present in the room with you is not.  For this reason, this thesis does not 
examine theories which maintain that religion is an intellectual response to one’s environment.  Indeed, 
these theories have been superseded by more current theories (for an example, see Foster & Kokko 
2009). 
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in which participants are asked to state explicitly what they believe (Gibson 2006).  
Despite arguments that self-report measures are reliable (Hill 2005),  IAT results 
often differ from the results of self-report measures (Gibson 2006). 
 
One experiment confirming a conflict between explicit and implicit belief involved 
questioning participants about God’s characteristics then requiring them to recall a 
narrative about God to assess whether they implicitly thought of God as possessing 
the characteristics that they attributed to Him (Barrett & Keil 1996).  The experiment 
showed a difference in the attributes people believed God to possess and the manner 
in which they talked about God.  For example, participants who described God as 
being capable of performing multiple tasks at once, typically talked about Him as if 
He was performing specific tasks sequentially.  Further, control conditions for this 
experiment indicated that participants were capable of conceiving of God in non-
anthropomorphic terms, but did not do so. 
 
There are several other examples distinguishing explicit from implicit belief.  One 
includes the fact that many non-theist Theravada Buddhists, who claim not to believe 
in a personal god, will worship and pray to Buddha as if he is a god (Slone 2004).  
Second, some persons who claim to deny a belief in luck and magic will often act as if 
they do believe in magic (Slone 2004; Subbotsky & Quinteros 2005).  Lastly, 
Calvinists who claim to believe that all fate is predestined by God, typically act as if 
they have the ability to influence their own future (Slone 2004).  These examples 
show that people can hold theologically incorrect beliefs (Slone 2004), even though 
they may deny such a claim. 
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Supernatural expertise is perplexing for two reasons.  One, the acquisition of 
biologically non-strategic information is useless in an evolutionary context.  Two, 
many supernatural experts don’t act or think in accordance with the supernatural 
information that they acquire. 
 
1.10 The evolutionary paradigm does not predict supernatural expertise 
 
Contemplate the implications that the evolutionary paradigm bears upon our species.  
Natural selection has operated for two hundred thousand years of homo sapiens’ 
evolution, two million years of hominid evolution, one hundred and sixty million 
years of mammalian evolution, and eight hundred million years of animal evolution, 
out of a total three and a half billion years of evolutionary history; during which, at 
every generation, our ancestors flourished in spite of whatever difficulties plagued 
them at the time, and did so while countless others failed.  One could predict that, by 
inheriting the survival expertise of many millions of years of successful reproducers, 
the primary governing principle by which all human beings operate should be the 
biologically rational strategy of maximising individual reproductive potential at all 
costs. 
 
Indeed, there is a lot of evidence to suggest that our species is biologically 
conditioned to survive (Balling & Falk 1982), particularly as regards the kinds of 
information that humans are interested in.  People possess a cognitive bias toward 
information that they perceive as relevant (Sperber 1985, 1996; Sperber & Wilson 
1986).  This makes good evolutionary sense as good information allows people to 
make better judgements, which can endow persons with a competitive advantage over 
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others (Waitley 1979; Wind, Crook, & Gunther 2005).  For this reason, humans are 
adapted to prefer information that promotes the likelihood of their survival (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1992). 
 
Yet few people would consider themselves to be biologically rational.  However, for 
the sake of conjecture, let us try to imagine how a biologically rational agent might 
behave.  Such an agent would only be interested in biologically strategic information 
that could enhance their reproductive potential.  This information might include: 
where the cleanest water holes are, what berries are safe to eat, which weapons are 
best for hunting megamammals, the cooperative reputations of potential exchange 
partners, the reproductive history of possible mates, etc. 
 
Against the evolutionary backdrop, the acquisition of supernatural knowledge is 
mystifying.  Given that the human mind is designed to source relevant information 
from the environment (Sperber 1985, 1996; Sperber & Wilson 1986), for the purpose 
of obtaining benefits within the natural material world (Stark 1999; Stark & 
Bainbridge 1987), one would not expect a biologically rational agent to be interested 
in: how reincarnation works, memorising the entire Qur’an, how to reconcile the 
doctrines of anatta and rebirth, which mantras invoke which deities, how to read an 
extinct language, the nature of the trinity, etc.  Nevertheless, there are those who 
devote their lives to the acquisition of this knowledge. 
 
If the evolutionary paradigm is taken at face value we could conclude that agents 
prone to gossiping about non-utilitarian information should be selected out in favour 
of strictly rational agents adapted to focussing all time, effort and resource on 
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studying biologically strategic information.  Just as our bodies are adapted to resist 
invasion by dangerous organisms, our minds should be adapted to resist the invasion 
of ideas which would distract us form our biological interests; yet these predictions of 
the evolutionary paradigm do not conform to some of the most basic observations 
about the supernatural information that humans are interested in.  Either the theory of 
evolution requires refinement or supernatural expertise is not what it seems, or 
perhaps both. 
 
1.11 Chapter overview 
 
The first chapter of this thesis introduces the field of evolutionary psychology and 
identifies that supernatural expertise, as a feature of human behaviour, does not 
correspond to the behaviours that we might expect to observe given the evolutionary 
paradigm.  Subsequent chapters of this thesis will examine specific evolutionary 
theories of religion.  Although there are a variety of adaptationist and spandrelist 
theories of religion, I focus only on those which are necessary to support the model of 
supernatural expertise that I argue for in my final chapter.  I will test the accuracy of 
each theory discussed by assessing the extent to which it can account for supernatural 
expertise. 
 
The second chapter will examine two adaptationist theories of religion.  These 
theories argue that religion is a biological adaptation.  First, I will examine costly 
signalling theory (Bulbulia 2004a, Sosis 2003), which maintains that religious 
tendencies were selected because they, at least prehistorically, enhanced cooperation 
between individuals.  Second, I will assess whether supernatural expertise can be 
 27 
explained in terms of sexual selection (Miller 2001), an evolutionary mechanism 
which preserves traits, not because they are necessarily environmentally adaptive, but 
because they are appealing to mates. 
 
The third chapter will examine two spandrelist theories of religion.  These theories 
maintain that religion is not an adaptation, but a byproduct of cognitive systems which 
evolved to perform functions unrelated to religion.  First, the chapter will examine 
cognitively optimal theory (Boyer 2001), the view that religion consists of ideas 
which are configured in such an appealing manner that religion propagates itself on 
the basis of this appeal.  Second, I will examine the modes theory of religion 
(Whitehouse 2004).  This theory maintains that human cognition has evolved in such 
a way so as to cause some concepts and experiences to be more memorable than 
others.  This results in certain social arrangements developing around the exchange of 
certain information.  The theory holds that religion is the collection of these ideas and 
arrangements. 
 
In the final chapter I draw upon my assessment of these theories in an attempt to 
construct a coherent and complete explanation for supernatural expertise.  The theory 
I argue for is controversial in that it incorporates elements form both adaptationist and 
spandrelist theories of religion, approaches that have previously been considered 
incompatible.  I demonstrate how cognitively optimal theory can be applied to 
identify the precise manner in which the acquisition of complex supernatural concepts 
is costly.  I employ elements of both costly signalling theory and sexual selection 
theory to account for the emerging complexity of the content of supernatural belief 
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systems.  I conclude by arguing that my theory resolves a number of questions that are 
left unanswered by the modes theory of religion. 
 
1.12 Scope and objections 
 
At this point it is necessary for me to clarify the scope of this thesis and respond to 
some possible objections to my methodology.  There are three areas in which the 
scope of this thesis requires clarification.  First, this thesis focuses on the acquisition 
and expression of supernatural information, as this information stands in clear contrast 
to the kind of perceptually accurate information that biologically rational agents 
should be interested in.  I accept that some information can be based upon 
perceptually accurate observations yet still appear to be biologically non-strategic.  
Examples of such information include sports statistics, Star Trek trivia, and 
evolutionary psychology.  However, regardless of whether such interests have 
biological bases, I focus solely on supernatural information. 
 
Second, this thesis does not present a complete theory of social dominance.  Although 
I examine the manner in which supernatural experts acquire social prestige, I accept 
that social prestige is earned via numerous other methods and that many supernatural 
experts have acquired their elite positions via multiple means, of which the expression 
of their complex supernatural knowledge was only one.  However, my treatment of 
prestige will focus solely on the manner in which it is earned via supernatural 
expertise. 
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Third, as supernatural knowledge is primarily expressed through spoken and written 
language, this thesis will address issues relevant to linguistic communication.  
However, it follows from the second point above that this thesis does not present a 
complete theory of the relationship between language and prestige.  Further, it follows 
from the first point, that I will not examine the relationship between prestige and non-
supernatural discourse. 
 
I also wish to respond to four objections.  First, given that the most popular and 
developed approaches to religious studies are sociological, anthropological and 
political in nature; the evolutionary approach may seem perplexing and inefficient.  
For this reason, this thesis examines several evolutionary theories of religion for the 
purpose of determining the efficiency of the evolutionary approach.  However, I 
respond to this objection by highlighting the facts that evolutionary theory has proved 
effective in understanding the nature of many other organisms and human animals are 
equally as much the product of natural selection as all other species.  In my view, the 
suggestion that our species is somehow special in that evolutionary scrutiny doesn’t or 
shouldn’t apply to us is a dangerous error.  The presumption that humans are 
somehow separate from the very natural processes that brought us into existence 
could be used as a means to justify the false belief that humans are above, 
independent of, or outside of nature.  Thus, I encourage my reader to share my pride 
in this attempt to understand supernatural expertise in terms of evolutionary 
dynamics. 
 
Second, given that non-evolutionary approaches to religious studies are typically 
riddled with specific examples in the form of case studies to illustrate an argument, 
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my reader may further object that evolutionary approaches are not ordinarily 
illustrated with examples.  Instead, evolutionary approaches to religious studies 
typically argue for models which account for general observations about religious 
behaviour in terms of evolutionary dynamics.  Indeed, the evolutionary model 
constructed in this thesis is argued for in reference to scientific developments within 
the evolutionary psychology of religion, but not by illustration with specific instances 
of supernatural belief. 
 
My reader should note that the usefulness of evolutionary models is not in their 
application to specific observations, rather their value is in providing “thought-
provoking scenarios that illustrate a general problem that would be easy to miss in 
more complicated scenarios, despite being present there too” (Kokko 2008a).  Testing 
general evolutionary models by comparing them with specific observations is highly 
problematic given that one could be accused of using only the special examples which 
confirm the model, while neglecting to discuss disconfirming examples (Wilson 
2005). 
 
Evolutionary models need not be applied to any specific examples to be of value 
(Maynard Smith 1982).  Indeed, this thesis would have been of little value had it 
presented a discussion of certain varieties of supernatural belief, as the possibility of 
bias in the selection of these cases would significantly confound the thesis.  The value 
of this thesis is in its critique of the body of literature within the evolutionary 
psychology of religion for purposes of developing a general model to account for the 
acquisition and expression of complex supernatural knowledge.  One need not 
understand how to play a symphony by Tchaikovsky to appreciate the complexity of 
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doing so; likewise I suggest that one need not be made to understand a specific 
example of complex supernatural knowledge to appreciate that acquiring such 
knowledge is a difficult task, requiring considerable opportunity costs with no 
obvious utility.  For these reasons I conclude that it is not necessary to include 
specific case studies of supernatural experts or examples of supernatural belief in this 
thesis.  Indeed, selected examples and cases should not be included, as this would 
confound the thesis. 
 
Third, some may object that my method is reductionist as it may appear to imply the 
possibility of a single biological explanation for a diverse variety of complex 
phenomena.  In my view, this objection is based upon a flawed understanding of the 
evolutionary paradigm which foremost stipulates the mechanism of variation; a 
principle that renders obsolete universal explanations for behaviour, as these 
explanations must by definition ignore variations between individuals.  Furthermore, 
having read my chapter overview section, my reader will realise that my thesis does 
not argue for a universal explanation, but examines a collection of conflicting 
theories. 
 
Fourth, my reader may presume that my method will naturally result in the conclusion 
that all supernatural belief is false or even foolish.  To this I respond that I am aware 
that the only reason I have the ability to experience romantic love is because my 
thalamus and paraventricular nucleaus secretes the chemical oxytocin, yet I do not 
believe that the experience of romantic love is less meaningful for me than it is for a 
person who is ignorant of this fact.  Biological explanations for powerful emotions do 
not in any way invalidate emotional experiences.  Correspondingly, I see no reason to 
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recognise any association between biological explanations for supernatural knowledge 
and the validity, or necessity, of supernatural speculation. 
 
1.13 Conclusion 
 
Confronted with the evolutionary paradigm, the supernatural interests that so many 
members of our species possess are perplexing.  This is not a trivial problem.  On one 
hand we have the theory of evolution, which is the predominant scientific explanation 
for the origin of our species.  On the other hand we have some of the most basic 
observations that can be made about the kinds of information that humans are 
interested in.  Our theory does not predict our observations.  Either the theory of 
evolution is wrong or we are observing the world incorrectly.  Both of these 
possibilities constitute a serious error.  To date, there has been no evolutionary theory 
of religion developed which specifically focuses on supernatural expertise.  Therefore, 
this thesis critiques a variety of theories within the field of the evolutionary 
psychology of religion in an attempt to reconcile this discrepancy between the theory 
of evolution and our observations of human behaviour. 
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Chapter 2. Adaptationism 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines a collection of theories which argue that religiosity is a 
component of the brain’s design.  The theories differ in regard to the evolutionary 
process that has given rise to religiosity, and the biological function that religiosity 
evolved to perform.  Regardless of the nature of this function, we know that for a trait 
to be considered an adaptation it must perform its purpose with a high level of 
efficiency (Williams 1966).  For this reason, adaptationist theories of religion 
maintain that the many religions accomplish the same goals, albeit perhaps in slightly 
different ways (Wilson 2002).  Adaptationism predicts that these goals should be 
implemented by way of universals inherent in the design of religiosity.  The 
requirements for claiming that a human trait is universal are well documented (Brown 
1991; Norenzayan & Heine 2005), and there is evidence to suggest that religious 
universals are biologically advantages (Reynolds & Tanner 1985).  Religion is 
presented as an adaptation in a variety of literature (for examples see Bering 2006a; 
Bloom 2004).  One view is that religion is designed to benefit the individual 
(Reynolds & Tanner 1985), and another is that religion performs social functions to 
benefit a group (Wilson 2002).  Other views maintain that only some components of 
religiosity are adaptive, such as ritual (Macalister 1882). 
 
There are a number of facts supporting the hypothesis that religion is a component of 
our biological design.  One example is the fact that there are genes which appear to 
increase religiosity (Hamer 2004).  Second, people are motivated to minimise any 
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doubts they may experience as regards their religion (Hill & Hood 1999b).  Lastly, 
religiosity appears to improve health (Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, Eds. 1995).  Even if 
religion is disadvantages in some circumstances, it can still be considered an 
adaptation.  To illustrate, schizophrenia could have been selected if the genetic alleles 
which cause schizophrenia are beneficial to family members in which schizophrenic 
symptoms are not manifest (Shaner, Miller, & Mintz 2004).  So it is still possible for 
religion to be an adaptation even if it benefits only a small number of persons. 
 
One example of an adaptationist theory of religion is the view that religion evolved to 
help people cope with anxiety (Atran 2002; Atran & Norenzayan 2004).  There is 
some empirical evidence to support this theory.  Specifically, an experiment in which 
participants were asked to rate the power of God.  The group of participants who had 
been primed with a story about the death of a child rated God as being more powerful 
than the control group (Atran & Norenzayan 2004).  This suggests that people adopt 
stronger mental images of the supernatural when dealing with sad and high anxiety 
events. 
 
Returning to the topic of this thesis, supernatural expertise is difficult to understand 
from an adaptationist perspective.  This is because the human mind is designed to 
source information that improves one’s chances of survival (Tooby & Cosmides 
1992) in the material and natural environment (Stark & Bainbridge 1987; Stark 1999).  
Information regarding who the gods are and what the gods are doing does not appear 
helpful in an ancestral context.  Therefore this chapter seeks to test a variety of 
adaptationist theories regarding the origin of religion by examining the extent to 
which they can explain supernatural expertise. 
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2.2 Costly signalling theory 
 
Costly signalling theory (Bulbulia 2004a; Sosis 2003) maintains that human 
religiosity is a biological adaptation selected for the purpose of securing cooperation 
(Bulbulia 2004a, 2004b; Cronk 1994).  This section opens by identifying aspects of 
human religiosity that appear to be universal across religions and cultures.  
Specifically, I examine belief in supernatural reality and the ritual behaviours that are 
adopted relevant to these beliefs.  I then overview relevant aspects of game theory and 
the biology of animal signalling, before relating these to religious universals in order 
to demonstrate how these universals can secure cooperation.  I conclude with an 
evaluation of the extent to which costly signalling theory explains supernatural 
expertise. 
 
2.2.1 Pan-human religion 
 
Belief in supernatural agents can be considered a human universal (Atran & 
Norenzayan 2004; Tremlin 2006), according to the criteria for documenting 
universals (Brown 1991; Norenzayan & Heine 2005).  But, perhaps no aspect of 
human behaviour contradicts predictions of the evolutionary paradigm more so than 
our religions.  My cat appears to respond only to tangible and material objects, plants, 
and animals; whereas my sister spends a great deal of her time interacting not only 
with these, but also with invisible beings that I’ve never seen.  Other predators 
conserve energy to stalk prey but humans often prostrate frequently before symbols 
and iconography, burning calories which are essential for predation.  Consider also 
 36 
fasting, celibacy, female circumcision, etc.  We observe that wherever there is 
religion, there are behaviours which contradict our biological interests. 
 
A second apparent universal feature of religiosity is a belief in some kind of 
supernatural consequence linked to social behaviour.  Among the Abrahamic 
religions, this manifests as a belief in heaven and hell.  God is believed to be a judge 
who will send the deceased to one of these realms based upon how good or evil they 
were while alive.4  Among the eastern religions, this manifests as a belief in karma, 
the view that good persons will be rewarded in their next life by being born as a king 
or a god, whereas bad people will be punished by being born as a goat or a blade of 
grass.  In some ancient religions, such as that of the ancient Israelites, good and bad 
deeds were believed to be rewarded and punished before death.  Again, wherever 
there is religion, there is belief in supernatural causation. 
 
Costly signalling theory maintains that these universals are biologically beneficial 
(Reynolds & Tanner 1985).  This would suggest that natural selection has targeted a 
tendency for humans to believe and act in these ways.  If true, the hypothesis indicates 
that religion is part of our pan-human design. 
 
2.2.2 Cooperation dilemmas 
 
Given that the second mechanism of evolution is competition, which states that 
varying individuals must be in competition with each other for natural selection to 
                                                 
4
 The reader may object that in Protestant Christianity, salvation is attained via faith and not through 
good works.  I note that among Protestants, good deeds are seen to be indicative of faith (few 
Christians, if any, would maintain that Adolf Hitler’s never renounced Catholic faith was sufficient to 
save him). 
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occur, explaining the evolution of altruism is problematic.  Humans have evolved 
violent tendencies (Wrangham & Peterson 1996), though most of us do a very good 
job of controlling them.  Although aggression can be biologically beneficial in that it 
is helpful in securing resources necessary for survival and reproduction (Tooby & 
Cosmides 1988), it is often considered unacceptable.  This is true among foraging 
cultures (Boehm 2000; Brown 1991), as well as modern societies.  Somewhat 
ironically, it is this tendency toward non-cooperative behaviour that may have lead to 
the evolution of altruism (de Waal 1996). 
 
To illustrate, the benefits of paying our taxes are bridges, tap water, and hospitals.  
However, we each stand to benefit more by using these goods without paying; but if 
all fail to pay, the goods secured by cooperation disappear. 
 
This is an example of a prisoner’s dilemma situation, a hypothetical scenario designed 
to illustrate typical cooperation dilemmas.  The situation is as follows.  Two criminals 
are arrested for being accomplices in a crime that carries a penalty of ten years.  
However, prosecutors only have sufficient evidence to jail each of them for one year, 
so the prosecutors visit each prisoner separately and offer them the same deal: “If you 
privately testify against your accomplice, which will provide sufficient evidence to 
jail your accomplice for the full ten years, you will receive a one year reduction on 
your own sentence.”  A testifying prisoner will always receive their one year 
reduction, regardless of whether or not their accomplice also chooses to testify. 
 
Assume both prisoners are only interested in minimising their personal sentence 
without regard for their accomplice, their preferred option would be to testify (defect 
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against their accomplice).  They will then each receive nine years, this being the full 
ten year sentence less their one year reduction.  Whereas, if both prisoners had 
remained silent (cooperated with their accomplice), the prosecutors only had 
sufficient evidence to jail them for one year each.  An alternative scenario would be 
for one prisoner to testify and the other to remain silent, in which case the defector 
would go free whilst the cooperator would serve ten years; this is either the best or the 
worst scenario depending on which prisoner you happen to be. 
 
These examples illustrate the dilemmas faced during most cooperative endeavours.  
We benefit by participating in them but gain more by cheating them.  Thus evolution 
must secure cooperation. 
 
2.2.3 Altruism and secular punishment 
 
Human societies function because of the cooperative commitments of individuals 
(Nesse 2001).  These commitments are advantageous to the societies in which they’re 
adopted because these societies will be more successful than those in which 
cooperative strategies are less prevalent (Richerson & Boyd 2005).  Even Darwin 
himself observed that a group of altruistic animals will dominate a group of non-
altruistic animals (Darwin 1871).  Individuals within cooperative societies also benefit 
(Schelling 1960), not only by being a member of a successful collective, but also by 
reaping the personal benefits which result from a long term altruistic regard for others 
(Post 2007), such as a return of one’s altruistic sentiments and a positive outlook on 
life. 
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There are two forms of cooperation that are necessary for a society to function 
effectively.  The first is kinship cooperation which is universal to all societies 
(Steadman & Palmer 1995), that is, cooperation between members of the same 
immediate family.  The second is large scale cooperation between persons who are 
not close relatives (Richerson & Boyd 2005).  The social skills necessary to include 
those outside of one’s immediate family in one’s peer group are acquired by humans 
and other mammals around the time of puberty (Sachser, Durschlag, & Hirzel 1998).  
We observe that humans have evolved to cooperate with the social group to which 
they belong and to refrain from cooperation with the social groups that their group is 
in competition with (Sosis 2003).  I proceed with a discussion of how altruism 
evolved. 
 
Jeffrey Schloss (2008) outlines the manner in which the universal beliefs and 
behaviours identified in section 2.2.1 function to resolve cooperation dilemmas.  
Throughout this section I explain Schloss’s model using taxation as my example. 
 
Suppose Dave Henderson5 refuses to pay his taxes.  He benefits by using the goods 
that are secured through taxation, without contributing to their production.  In this 
scenario, Henderson is a cooperation free rider or a first order defector.  An agent 
from the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) can audit Henderson and force him to pay 
via the court system, threatening him with imprisonment unless he cooperates.  Thus 
cooperation free riding can be resolved via social punishment. 
 
                                                 
5
 Dave Henderson is the author of the 1999 book Be very afraid: One man’s stand against the IRD, 
which inspired the 2007 movie We’re here to help.  In the book he recounts his four year battle with 
New Zealand’s Inland Revenue Department, during which he was audited 27 times and sued for 
$924,341. 
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Punishment has been shown to be an effective method of social control (Boyd & 
Richerson 1992).  It has also been shown to be more powerful than offering rewards 
as a means to motivate behaviour (Johnson & Bering 2006).  Further, despite the 
personal cost often associated with the act of punishing others, people will often 
engage in punishing behaviour (Fehr & Gachter 2002). 
 
However, suppose that Henderson’s IRD agent chooses not to incur the time costs 
associated with auditing Henderson.  The IRD officer will be paid regardless, and 
since all of her colleagues are hard working, they will function as a sufficient 
deterrent to prevent cooperation free riders.  However, if every case officer behaved 
this way, Henderson could successfully evade taxation.  In this scenario, Henderson’s 
case officer is a punishment free rider or a second order defector (Hauert, Traulsen, 
Brandt, Nowak, & Sigmund 2007). 
 
One solution would be for another IRD representative to supervise the work of 
Henderson’s IRD agent.  The supervisor could then punish Henderson’s agent, 
perhaps by issuing written warnings of dismissal if she is not performing her duties 
correctly.  This solution could work, unless the supervisor is also a punishment free 
rider, in which case he would also require supervision.  This line of reasoning 
becomes somewhat ridiculous, as it leads to an infinite regress (Colman 2006).  If we 
punish those who do not punish, then we may have to punish those who do not punish 
those who do not punish, and so on.  A body of literature examines possible solutions 
to the problems of punishing (see Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson 2003; Fowler 
2005; Henrich & Boyd 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd 2004).  I now turn to a discussion 
of one biological tool that can be used to overcome this difficulty. 
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2.2.4 The handicap principle 
 
The theory of evolution appears to predict that natural selection should universally 
minimise cost and maximise gain.  To illustrate, imagine two organisms in 
competition, all things being equal, the creature capable of surviving whilst incurring 
the smallest cost to its reproductive fitness will have the highest probability of 
parenting the next generation. 
 
However, supernatural expertise and altruism are not the only examples of behaviours 
that contradict this prediction.  One classic textbook example is that of stotting.  When 
a herd of gazelles are being stalked by a predator, we could intuit that the gazelles’ 
most biologically rational option would be to run or hide.  However, it is common for 
the gazelles to advertise their location to the predator by stotting, the action of 
exhausting oneself by leaping frequently into the air.  This behaviour could be 
interpreted as an act of altruism; if one gazelle martyrs themselves by drawing the 
attention of a pack of predators, they’re group as a whole will incur less damage than 
if all the gazelles were to remain stationary.  However, this hypothesis is inconsistent 
with the observation that predators rarely chase stotting gazelles. 
 
The biologically rational strategy for the predator is to chase those who are so weak 
that they must preserve all of their energy for the impending chase.  A predator is able 
to identify these individuals as they will not stot, instead they may immediately flee or 
conceal themselves underneath vegetation in an attempt to avoid predation.  Thus our 
initial intuition concerning a gazelle’s biologically rational strategy was incorrect; it is 
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in the gazelles’ biological interests to stot if they are able.  Even though stotting 
gazelles are ordinarily capable of escaping predators, it is better to stot and not be 
chased than not to stot and be chased. 
 
This evolutionary anomaly is known as the handicap principle (Grafen 1990; Zahavi 
1975; Zahavi & Zahavi 1997).  This principle states that biologically costly traits and 
behaviours can evolve for the purpose of signalling specific qualities of the signaller 
(Gintis, Smith, & Bowles 2001; Grafen 1990; Zahavi & Zahavi 1997).  In the above 
example, by stotting a gazelle signals its ability to evade predation, preventing 
predators from pursuing it.  I call these traits Zahavian handicaps, after the two people 
who theorised the principle. 
 
Three criteria are required to be met before a trait can be considered a Zahavian 
handicap (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997).  Here I explain these criteria using stotting as an 
example.  First, the signal must be costly; stotting is costly to gazelles in that it 
prohibits hiding as an option and depletes energy reserves that are required for 
escaping.  Second, the cost must be contextually linked to the quality it signals; 
stotting cannot be performed unless a gazelle is in a fit condition and possesses strong 
and well-built leg muscles, the very traits necessary to evade a predator giving chase.  
Third, the cost must burden a dishonest communicator more so than an honest one; 
hypothetically if an unfit gazelle stotted, its chance of escaping a predator, should its 
stotting action be ignored, would be exceptionally lower than if it had not stotted, 
whereas a fit gazelle would be able to escape a predator regardless. 
 
 43 
Before the third criterion can be met, a signal’s cost to an honest communicator must 
be lower than the benefit they stand to gain by producing the signal, resulting in a net 
gain; whereas the cost to a dishonest communicator should be greater than that 
benefit, resulting in a net loss.  This ensures that signals can be preformed by honest 
communicators, but still remain reliable by preventing dishonest communicators from 
imitating them.  For example, the benefit a fit gazelle gains from stotting is that 
predators wisely choose not to chase them.  However, the cost associated with stotting 
is relative.  By stotting, gazelles capable of outrunning a predator lose little.  
However, if gazelles incapable of outrunning were to stot, they would quickly tire and 
their fatigue would be apparent to predators in the corresponding deterioration of their 
stotting performance.  Predators would be able to judge that an unfit gazelle is 
attempting to falsely imitate the behaviour of a fit gazelle, enabling the predator to 
identify and chase the unfit gazelle.  We see that the net gain to a fit stotting gazelle is 
substantial; whereas the risk to an unfit stotting gazelle is too great, resulting in a net 
loss. 
 
An example of a handicap in human beings is hair length.  Humans have much longer 
hair than other primates, which is not only an inconvenience but it can become very 
dirty and unclean.  Most of us spend a great deal of time and resources grooming 
ourselves daily to prevent this.  Occasionally we may encounter a person who does 
not self-groom, such as a homeless person who likely does not possess the resources 
necessary to allow thorough grooming.  When we encounter these people, their poorly 
groomed state allows us to immediately recognise their situation and we may pity 
them or develop a low opinion of them.  Even though hair length is an inconvenience, 
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it is a handicap that allows us to immediately acquire sometimes very detailed 
information about another person (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997). 
 
It should be noted that every species of animal possesses a variety of strategic 
handicaps used for communication (Maynard Smith & Harper 1995; Gintis, Smith, & 
Bowles 2001; Grafen 1990).  While each of these handicaps may exist to 
communicate different information, in some animals, such as some species of bird and 
humans, the overall effect for these handicaps is accumulative.  Organisms that can 
perform a variety of handicaps well, acquire a high level of prestige, with those failing 
to do so acquiring a low level of prestige.  This can lead to conflicts for status (Zahavi 
& Zahavi 1997).  During these conflicts organisms may compete by consciously 
handicapping themselves (Cronk 1994). 
 
2.2.5 Costly signalling in humans 
 
In order to secure the cooperation of others, humans signal intent to a given set of 
moral norms (Alexander 1987).  These signals involve both voluntary and involuntary 
handicaps.  One example of a voluntary handicap includes bodily scarring.  People 
may tattoo or pierce their bodies, and in some cases remove body parts such as the 
foreskin, to signal commitment to their group (Boehm 1999).  These markings 
sometimes foster in-group commitments that are so strong they can lead to warfare 
against groups that do not possess the same markings (Sosis, Kress, & Boster 2007).  
Another manner in which the quality of a signal to moral norms can be voluntarily 
enhanced is by signalling to a large group of people.  If the signaller does not adhere 
to their moral commitments, they lose prestige by exposing themselves as a fraud and 
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arouse suspicion among all those who witnessed their signal.  Signalling to a group is 
stronger because of the higher risk involved (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997). 
 
Among the most reliable involuntary signals are emotions (Frank 1988, 2001).  Used 
by humans and some other animals (Lazarus 1991; Maynard Smith & Harper 2003), 
emotions are effective in signalling commitment (Frank 1988; Hirschleifer 1987) as 
they are processed outside the brain’s neocortex (Ramachandran 1997) and are hard to 
fake (Frank 1988).  For this reason, empathy plays a role in human communication 
(Escalas & Stern 2003; Wispe 1986) and is important in the coordination of 
cooperative endeavours (Levinson 2003). 
 
Emotions, desires and goals influence the manner in which the brain processes 
information (Kunda 1999).  This enables emotions to influence the quality of a signal 
by identifying the precommitments of the signaller (Darwin 1872/1965; Frank 1988, 
2001).  For example, emotions such as guilt can be detectable when a person attempts 
to lie.  For this reason, the most effective liars are those who believe that they’re 
telling the truth (Hirstein 2005; Trivers 1971).  The most efficient means to deceive 
somebody else is to first deceive oneself in the same manner (Trivers 1971).  Thus 
people often attribute negative events to external agents as opposed to themselves 
(Morewedge 2009).  By not holding oneself responsible when bad things happen, a 
person can develop a high opinion of themselves, which is useful when persuading 
others that they’re reliable. 
 
This presents a problem in which emotions act as involuntary signals which persons 
subconsciously attempt to overcome through self-deception.  This results in the need 
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to track reputation (see Leary 1999).  Humans constantly try to predict the behaviours 
of other people (Leslie, German, & Polizzi 2005; Wellman & Miller 2006) and 
knowledge of a person’s past behaviours can increase the accuracy of these 
predictions.  For example, after a person has cheated you once, you will remember 
this and you’ll be less likely to cooperate with her in the future.  For this reason, 
humans are constantly searching for other agents and their behaviours (Wegner 2005).  
We all possess a need to know about other people and this is illustrated by the practice 
of divination techniques (Dennett 2006), and the results of ink blot tests (Wood, 
Nezworski, & Garb 2003).   
 
The benefit of our ability to track reputation is enhanced by psychological 
mechanisms which allow us to recognise faces.  Facial recognition mechanisms are 
linked to emotional systems (Gobbini, Leibenluft, Santiago, & Haxby 2004; Paller, 
Ranganth, Gonsalves, LaBar, Parrish, Gitelman, et al. 2003; Shah, Marshall, Zafaris, 
Schwab, Zilles, Markowitsch, et al. 2001).  Therefore, certain emotional responses 
can be invoked when we identify certain persons.  For instance, if you see someone 
who has cheated you in the past, you may feel upset or angry.  Negative emotions 
such as these stimulate alertness (Hattfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson 1994; Levenson 
1999), thus we are more likely to notice counter-cooperative behaviour from those to 
whom we attribute a bad reputation.  An example of reputation mechanisms in action 
was observed in an experiment in which participants were asked to wear a jumper that 
they were told had been worn by an immoral person.  Most participants refused to 
wear the jumper (Frazer 1994).  This demonstrates that people actively try not to 
associate themselves with the negative reputations of others. 
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2.2.6 Supernatural causality 
 
In religious studies and evolutionary psychology, costly signalling theory is the 
hypothesis that religion is an adaptation that evolved as a hard to fake signal of 
cooperation (Alexander 1987; Bulbulia 2004a; Cronk 1994; Irons 1996a, 2001; Roes 
& Raymond 2003; Schloss 2004, 2005; Sosis 2000, 2003, 2005; Sosis & Bressler 
2003; Sosis & Ruffle 2003).  It is a part of a wider body of investigation which argues 
that religion functions to promote altruism and social cohesion (see Atran & 
Norenzayan 2004; Johnson 2005; Johnson & Bering 2006; Johnson & Kruger 2004; 
Wilson 2002, 2005).  Costly signalling theory is supported by data collected in several 
recent empirical experiments (Bubulia & Mahoney 2008; Sosis 2000; Sosis & Alcorta 
2003; Sosis & Ruffle 2004), such as an experiment in which participants primed with 
supernatural agent concepts were observed to behave more altruistically (Shariff & 
Norenzayam 2007). 
 
It has been shown that belief can provide an individual with a competitive advantage 
(Waitley 1979; Wind, Crook, & Gunther 2005).  Central to the advantage of religion 
is the belief in deities or forces that monitor the manner in which humans beings 
interact and that require fair cooperation between persons (Bering 2005).  This is 
arguably a pan-human religious universal.  These supernatural sanctions reinforce the 
power of one’s moral conscience (Bering & Johnson 2005; Johnson & Bering 2006).  
The fact that some supernatural beings are assumed to be omnipotent heightens their 
moralising effect (Johnson 2005).  Data supporting the view that a belief in 
supernatural beings promotes cooperation was collected in one experiment in which 
participants who were primed with the idea of a ghost were less likely to cheat when 
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playing a competitive game (Bering, McLeod, & Shackelford 2005).  We observe that 
a belief in supernatural sanctions is a good solution to cooperation dilemmas (Johnson 
& Kruger 2004; Roes & Raymond 2003; Wilson 2002). 
 
The exact nature of the supernatural agents that a society believes in differs depending 
upon the type of society.  One example of a supernatural agent concept is ancestor 
representations.  For example, in small tribal societies where most individuals are 
related, ancestor worship is common, as this promotes cooperation among kin 
(Steadman, Palmer, & Tilley 1996).  In larger societies consisting of non-kin, gods 
that perform a more explicit moralising function are revered (Roes & Raymond 
2003).  One example is the judgemental nature of the Christian God, a concept which 
strongly emphasises reward and punishment (Malley 2004).  These god concepts 
perform the advantageous social function of restricting negative social behaviours.  
For instance, many deities impose heavy sanctions on incestuous practices (Durham 
1991).  For this reason, humans have evolved cognitive mechanisms to prevent us 
from doubting the existence of the gods that our religious group believes in (Bulbulia 
2004a). 
 
Let us now return to the hypothetical example of Dave Henderson and his IRD audit.  
Costly signalling theory predicts that an effective solution to both cooperation and 
punishment free riders is a belief in supernatural causation.  If the IRD officer is 
convinced that he will reap unfavourable consequences in the afterlife by defecting, 
he will be motivated to audit Henderson. 
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In fact if everyone held these beliefs, then everyone would pay their taxes, and the 
auditing process could be eliminated as it would be unnecessary.  However, suppose 
that Henderson is the only person who doesn’t believe in an afterlife.  All of his peers 
would be paying their taxes, but he wouldn’t.  In this scenario, Henderson is an 
unbeliever or a third order defector.  The issue of unbelief can be resolved if believers 
are required to signal their commitment.  Suppose all those who believe were to 
communicate their beliefs to one another.  The IRD could then be re-established with 
the charter to audit unbelievers only. 
 
However, Henderson can overcome this safeguard by falsely identifying himself as a 
believer, thus avoiding an audit.  In this scenario, Henderson is a hypocrite or a fourth 
order defector.  Costly signalling theory maintains that this problem can be solved via 
another religious universal, specifically the many religious behaviours which conflict 
with our biological interests.  Committed afterlife enthusiasts could engage in a 
variety of signals to indicate their commitment, such as prayer, fasting, monogamy, 
etc.  I now turn to a discussion of this solution. 
 
2.2.7 Religious signalling 
 
Religious behaviour typically involves the performance of a number of biologically 
costly rituals (see Atran 2002).  There has, historically, been some theological 
speculation as to the relationship between ritual displays and religious commitment 
(Edwards 1741/2007; Edwards 1746/1982; Wesley 1766/2006; Wilberforce 1997).  
More recently, in evolutionary psychology, a distinction is being drawn between what 
is practical and what is adaptive (Wilson 2002).  Something which seems impractical 
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may be adaptive.  This can help to explain religious rituals and sacrifice.  According 
to costly signalling theory, religious costs function as signals of both solidarity 
(Bulbulia 2004a; Irons 1996a, 1996b) and commitment (Frank 1988; Sosis 2003; 
Sosis & Ruffle 2003) to a belief in supernatural causality, so as to prevent cooperative 
defectors from entering a group (Sosis 2004).  This hypothesis is supported by 
evidence that group rituals are essential to both the construction and preservation of 
social connections (Durkheim 1915/1995). 
 
However, for religious signals to be reliable they must be Zahavian handicaps; that is, 
they must be configured in such a way so as to prevent non-believers from mimicking 
them.  By applying the three criteria identified by the handicap principle, we can 
assess whether religious signalling is reliable.  First, the signals are costly; for 
example, prostrating and fasting contradicts our biological interest to preserve energy.  
Second, these costs are contextually linked to an afterlife belief in that believers hold 
that prayer and monogamy will be rewarded in the afterlife along with cooperation.  
Third, these signals must be perceived as more costly by the non-believing Henderson 
than by his believing peers.  However, whether or not this is the case as regards 
religious costs is difficult to determine. 
 
To illustrate, the Islamic practice of zakat, the annual act of giving 2.5% of one’s 
wealth to the poor, costs committed Muslims just as much as it would cost somebody 
pretending to be a Muslim.  However, Richard Sosis (2003) has argued that there is a 
perceptual difference in the manner in which both believers and sceptics assess the 
severity of religious costs.  A committed afterlife enthusiast may perceive 2.5% as a 
small price to pay for an eternity in heaven, performing zakat clearly results in a net 
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gain from this perspective.  Failing to perform zakat will result in a substantial loss if 
the sinner will be punished in hell.  Thus, a believer’s interest is to pay the tax with 
enthusiasm.  On the other hand, a person pretending to be a Muslim without 
possessing the relevant beliefs will recognise only the immediate utilitarian gains and 
losses.  Zakat is clearly a loss from this perspective so the interests of a sceptic would 
be to avoid paying if he can.  I suggest that these interests manifest in the quality of 
religious activity.  A believer pays with enthusiasm, a sceptic may still pay but will do 
so with more hesitation.  In this regard, the additional cost that Henderson perceives 
religious activity to carry enables his believing peers to assess his degree of 
commitment. 
 
Bulbulia (2004a) has demonstrated that these conditions are true for religious 
emotional displays, just as Sosis (2003) has demonstrated that these conditions are 
true for religious rituals.  Schloss (2008) has shown how costly pan-human religious 
universals solve the problem of cooperation dilemmas.  First, a belief in supernatural 
causation prompts religious persons to misunderstand the payoffs of a prisoner’s 
dilemma situation, in that cooperating is understood to be the most beneficial option.  
Second, a tendency to engage in costly actions contextually linked to this belief 
enables cooperators to accurately identify each other.  Thus, religious communities 
comprised of persons who are conditioned to cooperate can easily be formed. 
 
2.2.8 Religious signalling strategies 
 
The costly signalling model explains religious behaviours as public displays which 
enable religionists to assess the extent of each other’s group commitment.  The model 
 52 
does not explain private religious activities which one’s fellow religionists will never 
witness.  Sosis (2003) has argued that private rituals function to enhance public 
displays.  For example, prayer is a common religious activity practiced in both public 
and private.  Prayer requires both a degree of creativity and uniformity in the phrases 
that are spoken and in specific bodily postures that must be adopted at very precise 
moments whilst a certain emotional composure is induced.  Further, the manner in 
which prayer is mandated differs between religious groups.  An evangelical Christian 
may be required to bow their head, creatively mix and match a variety of supernatural 
phrases, whilst smiling or occasionally even laughing.  A Muslim will be required to 
prostrate in a very specific manner, recite very specific words, whilst adopting a calm, 
devotional and submissive mindset.  Prayer is a very difficult task. 
 
Prayer must be performed accurately in public for one’s fellow religionists to reliably 
assess one’s commitment.  However, given the difficulty associated with the 
performance of prayer, significant quantities of practice are required before accurate 
public performance can occur.  Truly, practice makes perfect.  In this regard, we can 
observe that although private rituals are not religious signals in themselves, they do 
function as preparatory measures for the performance of those signals.  This model 
predicts that private rituals impact upon the quality of the performance of public 
rituals in some manner. 
 
Although individuals may buy into religious belief and practice for a number of 
reasons, such as to avoid punishments imposed by their group for not doing so 
(Johnson 2005), religion brings a number of advantages to both individuals and the 
group as a whole.  Specifically, the expression of religious belief provides a 
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mechanism by which members of a group can monitor commitment (Iannaccone 
1994; Irons 2001; Sosis 2003).  This mechanism is significant as religious ritual is 
more effective at securing cooperation than secular ritual (Irons 2001; Sosis 2004).  
Once considerable energy has been invested into signalling commitment to one’s 
group and monitoring the signals of group members, suspicion of other groups whose 
signals have not been monitored follows (Bulbulia 2004a).  This helps to explain why 
religious commitment increases during war (Boyer 2001), why societies which 
engage in war more frequently also engage in more costly rituals, and why those 
societies often practice more intense rites of passage among adolescents (Sosis, Kress, 
& Boster 2007). 
 
The reason why religiosity may increase during times of warfare is because of greater 
threats to fitness and resource shortages during war.  To illustrate, it has been shown 
that there is a relationship between the cost of religious ritual and both threats to the 
fitness of a religious group (Boyer & Lienard 2006) and the pressure on individuals 
within the group to defect from cooperative endeavours (Sosis, Kress, & Boster 
2007).  When the pressure to defect increases, perhaps because of a resource shortage, 
the cost of religious rituals increase (Boyer 2005).  For example, it is known that 
religiosity increases in response to terrorist attacks (Schuster, Stein, Jaycox, Collins, 
Marshall, Elliot, et al. 2001; Sosis 2007).  For this reason, religious groups that 
impose strict rules on their members generate higher levels of cooperation among 
those members (Iannaccone 1994). 
 
One interesting signalling strategy used in most religious groups is the expression of 
emotion.  It is known that there is a relationship between emotion and religion 
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(Pyysiäinen 2001, 2003, 2004a), as neurofunctional activities in the brain during 
religious experience are associated with emotional effects (Newberg & d’Aquili 
1998).  According to costly signalling theory, religious emotion signals commitment, 
in the same manner as costly ritual (Alcorta & Sosis 2005; Bulbulia 2004a). 
 
The main reason that emotional signalling is used is because emotions are generated 
outside of conscious control, thus they are both hard to fake and cheap to produce.  
Displaying emotions does not incur the same cost to fitness as lengthy rituals.  In 
other words, emotions generate a reliable signal at a low cost (Chen 2003).  The same 
emotions are often experienced during a religious ritual by participants.  This helps to 
create a strong sense of group identity and cohesion (Durkheim 1915/1995; Turner 
1990).  This view is supported by evidence collected during an experiment in which 
participants reported a higher level of fondness toward persons with whom they 
believed they shared a subjective experience than toward persons with whom they 
believed they did not (Pinel, Long, Landau, Alexander, & Pyszczynski 2006).  Rituals 
transform our emotions (Sosis 2003; Sosis & Alcorta 2003) to make us fond of each 
other.  Emotion also functions to enforce cooperation through guilt (Shariff & 
Norenzayam 2007).  Guilt is a disadvantage associated with defection (Bulbulia 
2004a) and falsifying religious commitments (Pargament, Koenig, Tarakeshwar, & 
Hahn 2001), further ensuring that religiosity functions to secure cooperation. 
 
There is much evidence supporting the view that ritual signals solidarity (Sosis 2000; 
Sosis & Bressler 2003; Sosis & Ruffle 2003).  One example is the fact that trust 
among Pentecostal communities, in which strong emotions are frequently experienced 
during collective ritual, is stronger than other neighbouring religious communities 
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(Pew 2006).  One well known series of studies which support costly signalling theory 
focused on Israeli kibbutz.  Members of religious kibbutz have been found to be more 
cooperative than members of secular kibbutz (Sosis & Ruffle 2003).  This explains 
why secular communes do not last as long as religious communes which impose more 
rituals and taboos on their members (Sosis & Bressler 2003). 
 
Although there is evidence that religion is supportive of morality (Norenzayan & 
Shariff 2008; Sosis 2003), it should be noted that costly signalling theory does not 
imply that all religious people will be saints.  The existence of paedophile priests and 
some dishonest televangelists testify to this.  The notion that religion is an adaptation 
which secures cooperation merely indicates that throughout the evolutionary history 
of our species, religion has more often than not been successful at the task it was 
selected to achieve.  Costly signalling theory does not predict that in the modern 
world all religious persons will behave in a highly altruistic manner (Cronk 1994). 
 
2.2.9 Supernatural expertise as a handicap 
 
To determine whether costly signalling theory is sufficient to explain the discrepancy 
between supernatural interests and the evolutionary paradigm, we must examine 
supernatural expertise in terms of the three criteria characteristic of Zahavian 
handicaps.  Unfortunately, expressions of complex supernatural knowledge do not 
appear to conform to the first criterion as they are not hard to fake signals in and of 
themselves.  If a Buddhist were to state: “I believe that the current Dalai Lama is the 
thirteenth human incarnation of Avalokitesvara”, the act of articulating this claim 
does not entail any fitness or opportunity costs beyond the few seconds it takes to 
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pronounce this sentence.  This statement is insufficient to prove cooperative intent, as 
a fourth order defector can easily make this claim.  We observe that personal 
expressions of religiosity are easier to cheat than tangible costly displays (Trivers 
2000).  In this regard Zahavi and Zahavi (1997), the initial proponents of the handicap 
principle, have concluded that “verbal language does not contain any component that 
ensures reliability in signalling.”  Henderson’s claim to be religious does not prove 
that he is religious any more than his claim to be an honest tax payer proves that he is 
an honest tax payer.  It follows that verbal assertions of supernatural commitment can 
neither conform to the second nor third Zahavian criteria as these foremost require 
that there be a cost.  Nevertheless, it is interesting that often more time and investment 
is dedicated to the expression of supernatural belief, than is invested in believing the 
beliefs (Dennett 2006). 
 
It is worthwhile to note that in Tibetan Buddhism the current Dalai Lama is actually 
believed to be the fourteenth human incarnation of Avalokitesvara, and not the 
thirteenth as was suggested above.  Thus a Buddhist listening to the above statement 
would be able to determine that the speaker is not very familiar with Buddhist beliefs.  
Systems of supernatural belief can be complex, thus they require a significant 
investment of time to memorise.  It is this investment that entails opportunity costs.  
The expression of accurate supernatural knowledge, although not costly in itself, 
signals a history of prior investment undertaken in public or private.  In this regard, 
the private acquisition of supernatural knowledge can be understood as preparatory 
behaviour for its public expression. 
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However, it seems that some statements of supernatural belief require a greater 
investment than others if they are to be understood accurately.  Compare the 
children’s Sunday school song lyric: “Jesus loves me, this I know, for the Bible tells 
me so”, with the opening verse to the gospel of John: “In the beginning was the Word, 
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.”  This latter statement is derived 
from a greater number of supernatural speculations, and therefore requires a greater 
degree of investment before its canonical interpretation can be expressed. 
 
From this perspective, we see that expressions of supernatural knowledge conform to 
the first criterion.  The acquisition of complex supernatural knowledge entails 
numerous opportunity costs in terms of the sheer time and effort that it takes to 
acquire this knowledge.  Supernatural expertise likewise conforms to the second 
criterion in that there is a contextual association between religious commitment and 
the expression of complex knowledge surrounding that commitment.  However, 
whether or not supernatural expertise conforms to the third criterion remains to be 
identified.  It seems just as easy for a gentile to learn Biblical Hebrew as it is for a 
Jew.  Thus a comprehensive theory of supernatural expertise must account for the 
manner in which specific units of supernatural information are difficult to acquire, so 
that any difference in acquisition difficulty between believers and non-believers can 
be determined. 
 
2.2.10 Conclusion 
 
Costly signalling theory can explain supernatural expertise when the acquisition of 
complex supernatural knowledge is understood as a private ritual that is necessary for 
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the public expression of that knowledge.  However, the theory can only explain 
supernatural expertise in terms of its cost and the contextual association between that 
expertise and supernatural commitment.  Costly signalling theory falls short of 
explaining the manner in which the costs of supernatural expertise burden a fourth 
order defector more so than a genuine religionist. 
 
2.3 Sexual selection 
 
Sexual selection theory attempts to account for evolutionary phenomena that are 
produced as a product of sexual reproduction.  Below I describe sexual selection 
before discussing the manner in which it may have impacted upon the evolution of 
cognitive capacities necessary for supernatural expertise.  I proceed to explain the 
ratchet effect, an evolutionary process that can enhance sexual selection to the point 
of producing highly bizarre non-utilitarian traits.  I examine the ratchet effect in 
context of both the sexual selection and costly signalling theories of supernatural 
expertise. 
 
2.3.1 Evolution by sexual selection 
 
In The Origin of Species Darwin (1859/1968) contrasted natural selection with human 
selection.  The human selection of domesticated animals for breeding purposes was a 
process that was known to produce observable evolutionary change.  With this 
analogy, Darwin described natural selection as the selective processes that occur 
arbitrarily in nature.  The fittest animals survive and pass their genes onto the next 
generation. 
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This form of natural selection is not the only process that drives evolutionary change.  
Sexual reproduction causes some interesting phenomena which result from an 
animal’s choice of mate.  It is useful to analyse sexual selection as a separate 
phenomenon than natural selection due to the mechanical differences between the 
conventional understanding of natural selection as the survival of the fittest, and the 
sometimes highly non-utilitarian traits that develop through sexual selection. 
 
Sexual selection is known to occur as variations in the mating strategies of a given 
group of animals have been shown to impact the animals’ social ecology (Crook & 
Crook 1988; Orians 1969).  The importance of sexual partners as a resource may 
explain why mate poaching is common during war (Buss 2002; Goldstein 2003).  
Further, sexual selection theory is useful as it is known to be empirically testable 
(Miller 2007). 
 
One example of a trait that has been produced via sexual selection is the peacock’s 
tail.  Peacocks have very long tails.  The tail is so big and bulky that it cannot help the 
peacock to balance, as the short and nimble tails of many mammals do.  A peacock’s 
tail adds unnecessary weight to the peacock’s body, slowing the peacock and making 
it hard for him to manoeuvre.  Further, a predator can easily grab hold of the tail, 
immobilising the peacock.  Surely a peacock would have a better chance of survival 
without a tail.  The tail appears to serve no utilitarian function.  If natural selection, as 
understood in the conventional sense, had been the only factor influencing peacocks’ 
evolution, they would not have evolved long tails. 
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It is even more perplexing that peacocks appear to show pride in their non-utilitarian 
appendage by frequently lifting their bulky tails off the ground and spreading them 
wide.  This behaviour in itself is highly costly as it wastes vital energy reserves.  
However, it is worthwhile noting that if as few as five of the 150 features in a 
peacock’s tail are removed, the peacock will noticeably attract fewer mates. 
 
Peahens will prefer not to mate with peacocks that have damaged tails, as this damage 
is likely to have resulted during a close call with a predator.  A peahen has an interest 
in giving birth to offspring that will be able to evade predation.  For this reason, 
peahens historically chose to mate with peacocks that displayed perfect tails.  
Peacocks without tails did not win any mates as they had no way of signalling their 
ability to steer well clear of predators.  Those peacocks that did not display their tails 
also did not win any mates, as no peahen could know for sure what the state of their 
tail was.  In this regard, we can see how peacocks’ characteristic of growing and 
displaying tails evolved via the necessity for peahens to choose mates with good 
genes (Kokko, Brooks, & Jennions 2003; Kokko, Jennions, & Brooks 2006; Kotiaho, 
Simmons, & Tomkins 2001; Miller 2000; Tomkins, Radwan, Kotiaho, & Tregenza, 
2004).  This is evolution by sexual selection. 
 
However, it should be noted that a tail of a few centimetres in length would suffice as 
a reliable signal.  A tail of over a meter in length increases a peacock’s susceptibility 
to predation much more than is necessary to signal their ability to evade predation.  It 
is possible that this cost of being more susceptible to predation outweighs the benefit 
of producing a small signal of fitness.  Somehow during evolutionary history, the 
peacock’s tail grew to the point that the cost associated with maintaining the signal 
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may not justify the signal’s use.  The manner in which a sexually selected trait can 
gradually become exaggerated beyond utilitarian necessity is examined below in 
section 2.3.3. 
 
Sexual selection has been shown to have impacted on human evolution.  For instance, 
females are known to invest more heavily in offspring than males.  Because of this, 
women are adapted to seek men with strong family values, that is, men who have a 
strong interest in raising children (Buss 2003).  Women are able to assess a man’s 
commitment by observing his moral behaviours, as moral values signal the presence 
of genes that code for particular mental traits (Miller 2000).  Women generally have a 
stronger theory of mind than men, meaning they are more empathic and better able to 
understand the intentions of others (Baron-Cohen 2003) (for a full description of 
theory of mind, see section 3.2.1).  This allows them to better assess the moral 
behaviours of potential mates.  This has lead to a level paternal investment by human 
males, which is greater than that of other mammals.  Interestingly, the characteristics 
to which a woman is attracted will change depending upon her stage of development, 
with women near peak fertility preferring creative partners as opposed to wealthy 
partners (Haselton & Miller 2006).  This ensures their offspring inherit the good genes 
which code for favourable mental traits.  Even mental traits which are disadvantages 
can be preserved by sexual selection.  For example, schizophrenia can be selected if 
the genes which cause schizophrenia in some people increase the courtship potential 
of others (Shaner, Miller, & Mintz 2004). 
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2.3.2 Sexual selection for cultural phenomena and supernatural expertise 
 
There are many cultural phenomena that may result from sexual selection.  Here I 
discuss three cultural examples, before considering supernatural expertise.  One 
example is music (Miller 2000).  Music may be sexually attractive as musical ability 
signals good hearing and voice control skills, as well as a good sense of timing and 
the patience to practice musical rhythms.  This may explain why music is so popular 
among teenagers (Olsen 2006). 
 
A second example is human moral traits.  Human children are dependant on their 
parents for up to two or more decades.  Thus it is in the interest of a parent to find a 
mate who will remain with the children long term.  Moral behaviours such as 
kindness, loyalty, and fairness can function as reliable signals of a potential mate’s 
intent to invest heavily in their offspring.  The reason that humans are adapted to find 
these traits sexually attractive is because people who select partners possessing these 
traits gain a substantial reproductive benefit.  Moral values signal genes that code for 
moral traits (Miller 2001, 2007).  People possessing these genes are therefore more 
likely to find a partner, thus they will have more children who will inherit those 
genes. 
 
Finally, a third example is religion (Dennett 2006).  Participation within a religious 
group is a useful way to find a mating partner (Irons 2001).  Indeed, men who out 
compete their peers in religious rituals, in terms of performing the rituals more 
precisely or in a more costly fashion, may have greater reproductive success (Miller 
2001).  This is due to the fact that ritual behaviours result from the sexual selection of 
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costly displays (Miller 2000).  Further, it may be the case that the frequency of male 
initiation rituals is positively correlated to the presence of inter-group conflict or 
warfare (Sosis, Kress, & Boster 2007). 
 
I now discuss whether the human capacity to acquire complex supernatural 
knowledge may be the result of sexual selection.  Supernatural experts must possess a 
high degree of intelligence.  Further, the acquisition of vast quantities of supernatural 
knowledge requires an excellent memory.  Additionally, the ability to resolve 
supernatural dilemmas requires strong problem solving skills.  These are traits that 
humans not only desire in their offspring but also find attractive in a partner.  The 
expression of complex supernatural knowledge may signal these capacities, making 
supernatural experts more attractive to the opposite sex.  Supernatural experts would 
therefore have had more descendents who would have inherited the genes that code 
for the cognitive capacities necessary for supernatural expertise. 
 
However, the fact that many supernatural experts claim to be celibate presents a 
problem for this particular application of sexual selection theory.  Within the broader 
scope of our species’ evolution, celibacy may be a very recent phenomenon.  
However, I note that there is little to no evidence for the authenticity of celibacy 
claims.  Indeed, there are supernatural experts who claim to be able to levitate or 
perform spontaneous healings and other miraculous feats, but there is very little 
evidence for the authenticity of these claims either.   
 
What matters, from an evolutionary perspective, is not the number of immediate 
children you have, but rather the number of descendants that you have throughout 
 64 
history.  Religionists who identify as celibate may have fewer children on average 
than other religionists, but this wouldn’t constitute a net cost to their inclusive fitness 
unless celibate religionists have on average fewer descendents than non-celibate 
religionists.  Further, although there may be genuinely celibate religionists, this would 
only present a problem for a sexual selectionist account of supernatural expertise if it 
could be shown that, on average, supernatural experts have less inclusive fitness than 
lay people. 
 
2.3.3 The ratchet effect 
 
A ratchet is a mechanical tool that allows linear motion to occur in one direction only.  
In an evolutionary sense, the ratchet effect is the process by which a trait continually 
increases in intensity.  When applied to religion, the ratchet effect is known as the 
bower bird hypothesis (Dennett 2006).  Below I explain how traits preferred by 
mating partners can become more elaborate (Kokko, Brooks, & Jennions 2003; 
Kokko, Jennions, & Brooks 2006; Kotiaho, Simmons, & Tomkins 2001). 
 
Male bowerbirds exhibit an extraordinary mating behaviour.  In order to attract 
females, they build highly elaborate structures of sticks and leaves, often with a raised 
structure in the centre shaped like a walkway or a hut.  The bird then collects and 
decorates this bower with blue objects such as shells, feathers, flowers, berries, and 
stones.  In human settlements, the birds will also add blue glass, bottle tops, pegs, and 
other plastic objects.  Once complete, the male will dance in his bower.  Females will 
study the available bowers and observe the mating dances, before selecting the most 
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elaborate bower and mating with its creator.  Aside from attracting mates, a bower 
serves no utilitarian purpose. 
 
Interestingly, the degree of elaboration of a bower is inversely proportionate to the 
brightness of the plumage of the species to which the bird that built it belongs.  The 
most elaborate bowers are created by birds belonging to a species that have a dull 
plumage, whereas the least elaborate bowers are created by birds with a bright 
plumage.  It almost seems that by building a bower, a bird is trying to compensate for 
poor plumage.  This being the case, it is hard to imagine how the tendency to build 
bowers evolved. 
 
Evidently, this trait is the product of sexual selection.  Females select males that build 
the most elaborate bowers and their male offspring inherit the genes that condition the 
behaviour of bower building.  If we imagine a primordial species of bower bird that 
did not build bowers, the females may have had a tendency to mate with the males 
that displayed the brightest plumage; such individuals would have stood out from the 
crowd, and thus could have been selected as mating partners arbitrarily.  A male 
lacking in this area may have been able to create the illusion that his plumage was 
brighter by placing a small blue object in his nest.  If the bird was successful in his 
deception, he would have won many mates and the resulting offspring would inherit 
the genes that conditioned that behaviour.  Thus, our figurative evolutionary ratchet 
has turned one notch.  At the second generation, the birds have a slightly duller 
plumage as well of the tendency to adorn their nest with a small blue object.  Again, a 
bird with duller plumage than his peers could attract a female by adorning his nest 
with two objects, making himself look brighter than his peers who are only using one 
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object.  If successful, the third generation will again be duller, but carry the genes for 
slightly more elaborate bower building.  Our figurative ratchet has moved two 
notches.  After several thousand generations, the ratchet has moved to the point of the 
highly elaborate bowers we observe today.  This hypothetical scenario accounts both 
for the evolutionary origin of bower building behaviour as well as the inverse 
relationship between bower elaboration and plumage quality. 
 
The ratchet effect can also help to explain peacocks’ enormous tails.  A tail of a few 
centimetres long is sufficient to signal a peacock’s ability to evade predation.  
However, longer tales will be more visible to a peahen, giving peacocks with slightly 
longer appendages an advantage in attracting a mate.  As the evolutionary ratchet 
turns, peacocks evolve longer and longer tails.  The tails may become so long that 
they unnecessarily increase a peacock’s susceptibility to predation, imposing a huge 
biological cost on the peacock.  However, once peahens have evolved an attraction to 
long tailed peacocks, the mating benefit gained by long tailed peacocks outweighs this 
increased susceptibility.  We see how the ratchet effect can gradually increase the 
intensity of both adaptive and arbitrarily non-utilitarian traits. 
 
There are examples of the ratchet effect occurring within our own species.  One 
example is brain size, which has been increasing gradually in hominids over the past 
two million years, despite the fact that brains require very high energy costs.  There is 
evidence to suggest that the invention of cooking was the catalyst which prompted the 
ratchet effect to act on brain size, as cooking reduced the amount of energy required 
for digestion, freeing more energy for brain development (Aiello & Wheeler 1995; 
Wrangham, Jones, Laden, Pilbeam, & Conklin-Brittain 1999).  It is also known that 
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the ratchet effect can act upon religious costs, increasing the intensity of costs over 
time (Sterelny 2007). 
 
2.3.4 The ratchet effect and supernatural expertise 
 
There are two ways in which the ratchet effect may have enhanced the cognitive 
capacities necessary for supernatural expertise.  The first assumes that the human 
potential to acquire supernatural knowledge is the product of sexual selection for 
intelligence, memory, and problem solving skills.  Once a population finds these traits 
attractive, selection will target them.  When these traits are common throughout the 
population, those individuals that possess them to a slightly greater degree than their 
peers will have a greater chance of winning a mate; resulting in a second generation 
with a greater potential to acquire supernatural knowledge.  As the figurative 
evolutionary ratchet turns, intelligence and memory for supernatural knowledge 
would increase. 
 
However, this is an example of sexual selection acting upon the cognitive potential for 
a person to acquire supernatural knowledge.  Sexual selection cannot act upon the 
content of supernatural belief systems, as this content is transmitted culturally, not 
biologically.  If the supernatural knowledge base utilised by a religious group is 
sufficiently complex, a person will be able to judge the desired cognitive capacities of 
prospective mates by assessing the degree to which they’ve been able to familiarise 
themselves with the complex canon of supernatural concepts. 
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One objection to this application of sexual selection theory is that an increase in the 
human potential to manage complex supernatural knowledge may not be a sufficient 
cause for an increase in the complexity of supernatural belief systems.  Without a 
reasonable level of complexity in supernatural concepts to illustrate the difference 
between those with strong cognitive capacities for the acquisition of complex 
supernatural knowledge and those without, there is no way a person can accurately 
judge a partner’s cognitive potential for acquiring complex supernatural knowledge.  
Thus, there is nothing for sexual selection to target.  Therefore, the application of 
sexual selection theory to supernatural expertise requires an explanation of the origin 
and sustainability of the complexity of supernatural belief systems. 
 
My second application of the ratchet effect assumes that the expression of 
supernatural knowledge is a costly signal of commitment to supernatural causation.  
Those engaging in the acquisition and expression of supernatural knowledge meet the 
criteria for inclusion in a reciprocally altruistic community.  Once everybody is 
engaging in this practice, those few who are able to express a greater degree of 
supernatural knowledge will earn a greater degree of prestige in their community.  
This will create an incentive for others to likewise acquire more supernatural 
knowledge. 
 
One objection to the second application is that the handicap principle maintains that, 
for a signal to be reliable, a person’s ability to display the signal must be contextually 
linked to the trait that the signal represents.  If supernatural expertise is to function as 
a signal of cooperative commitment, it must be configured so that only the genuinely 
committed will engage in the acquisition and expression of supernatural knowledge.  
 69 
Thus, only some people will be capable of participating in the act of acquiring and 
expressing supernatural knowledge, with the strongly committed displaying a high 
level of knowledge and the weakly committed displaying a low level of knowledge.  
Therefore, the costly signalling theory of supernatural expertise predicts that the 
complexity of one’s supernatural beliefs will increase or decrease proportionately 
with one’s cooperative intent. 
 
This is not a valid application of the ratchet effect for two reasons.  First, an 
evolutionary ratchet will only move in one direction, with the effect typically 
referring to an increase in a trait’s intensity.  Second, the ratchet effect is used to 
describe situations in which a trait increases in intensity without any connection to 
another trait.  For example, peacocks’ long tails are not connected to any biological 
utility such as the ability to run faster or glide further.  However, the costly signalling 
theory of supernatural expertise predicts that the complexity of one’s supernatural 
knowledge will change in proportion with one’s overall cooperative intent.  Therefore 
supernatural knowledge is strictly dependent upon another trait.  The ratchet effect 
cannot be applied to a costly signalling model of supernatural expertise without 
considerable revision of the model. 
 
2.3.5 Conclusion 
 
Sexual selection is useful for understanding the cognitive capacities necessary for 
supernatural expertise, and in understanding how these cognitive capacities may have 
become elaborated over time.  However, it does not help to explain the complexity of 
supernatural belief systems.  Further, the ratchet effect cannot be directly applied to 
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the costly signalling model of supernatural expertise.  Therefore, if the costly 
signalling model is to be used to account for the complexity of supernatural belief 
systems, a reconciliation between the sexual selectionist and costly signalling models 
is necessary. 
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Chapter 3. Spandrelism 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
A spandrel is the horizontal moulding between two archways.  In cathedrals and 
elsewhere, spandrels are often decorated with artwork.  An architectural layperson, 
admiring the artwork, may assume that the architect designed the spandrel and placed 
it deliberately for artistic purposes.  This layperson would be wrong.  A spandrel may 
appear to be a part of a building’s design, but it is actually a side effect caused when 
two archways are placed side by side.  It is an accidental byproduct of a structure with 
a purposeful design (Gould & Lewontin 1979). 
 
In biology, a spandrel is any physiological or psychological trait, the design for which 
has not been targeted by natural selection, but which is a byproduct of adaptations that 
are the product of natural selection.  To illustrate, human beings today have almost the 
exact same genes as our ancestors did one hundred years ago, yet we behave in 
radically different ways.  There is much evidence to suggest that human religiosity 
may be a spandrel instead of an adaptation (see Atran 2002; Boyer 2001; Kirkpatrick 
1999, 2005, 2006; Whitehouse 2004).  It is unlikely that religion is the byproduct of a 
single psychological mechanism (Kirkpatrick 2005).  It is more likely the byproduct 
of several mechanisms which evolved prior to the origin of religion (Boyer 2001; 
Kirkpatrick 2004, 2006; Mithen 1996). 
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3.2 Cognitively optimal theory 
 
Originally theorised by Pascal Boyer (1993), cognitively optimal theory focuses 
primarily on why people believe in supernatural agents (Barrett & Keil 1996).  The 
theory maintains that religion is a byproduct of cognitive mechanisms that endow 
humans with innate knowledge about the world.  It opens by identifying the kinds of 
information that are easiest for human beings to recall, known as cognitively optimal 
information (Boyer 2001; Whitehouse 2004) or minimally counter intuitive 
information (Boyer 2001).  This form of information possesses a greater appeal than 
other forms because of the manner in which it is contrastable to our innate knowledge.  
The theory is supported by data collected in several empirical experiments (Barrett & 
Nyhof 2001; Boyer & Ramble 2001; Norenzayan, Atran, Faulkner, & Schaller 2006).  
This section overviews the theory before concluding with a discussion about the 
extent to which cognitively optimal theory is helpful in explaining supernatural 
expertise. 
 
3.2.1 Evolved intuitions 
 
There are numerous examples of animals that are born with innate intuitions about the 
world.  One example is Monarch butterflies.  In August, before winter besets the 
Northern hemisphere, Monarchs begin to migrate south, arriving in central Mexico by 
November.  Monarchs will hibernate in Mexico before breeding in February so that 
their offspring can migrate north for the spring.  As an active adult Monarch will 
normally live three or four weeks, this nearly three month migration cannot be 
undertaken by a single individual.  As a species, Monarchs never fail to make this 
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migration.  However, given that their migration is completed four generations after it 
began, they cannot learn where and when to travel by following a parent.  
Additionally, as there is no contact between parent and child, no information 
regarding the migration process can be intergenerationally transmitted.  This 
knowledge must be inherited.  Monarchs are born with an innate intuition about where 
and when to travel to ensure the survival of their offspring. 
 
Experiments conducted on young children confirm that humans are also born with 
innate intuitions.  For example, children as young as three understand that every cow 
in the world will have the same internal properties, that even a cow disguised as a 
horse still has the same internal properties as a cow, but that computers do not 
necessarily have the same internal properties (Boyer 2001).  This latter statement is 
surprisingly more accurate than the assumption that many adults may make, as two 
computers that are externally identical can be comprised of different internal 
components; a fact some adults may not intuit.  Additionally, six month old infants 
display surprise when they witness magic tricks in which objects disappear, or in 
which multiple solid objects combine into one (Boyer 2001). 
 
Humans are born with an innate understanding of the biological and physical laws 
that govern our environment.  This adaptation makes good evolutionary sense.  The 
more innate universal knowledge an organism is born with, the less the organism has 
to learn.  Humans are born only with innate knowledge that was universal to most of 
the environments that our Pleistocene ancestors would have occupied. 
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Innate human intuitions have been grouped into broad categories (Atran 1995).  For 
instance, folk physics is the common understanding of how physical objects behave.  
Humans display an innate knowledge of gravity and the fact that one object can only 
be in one place at one time.  Folk biology provides us with an understanding of how 
living things behave.  For example, humans are instinctively aware that there are 
specific and fixed types of living things, and that a cow cannot become a horse for 
instance (Boyer 2001).  Folk psychology (Atran 2002; Boyer 1994) endows us with 
the knowledge that other agents are driven by their own desires and motivations, or 
essentially that other agents have minds. 
 
This understanding that everything in the environment belongs to a different kind or 
type is known as essentialism (Spinosa & Dreyfus 1996).  Essentialist thinking is an 
example of a human universal (Bloom 2004).  From a young age, people possess an 
intuitive understanding of the basic essences possessed by different concepts (Medin 
& Ortony 1989) within the biological and social domains (Haslam 1998; Hirschfeld 
1994).  Humans acquire knowledge about the world via essentialist thinking 
(Hirschfeld 1998), and the same universal understanding of essences are possessed by 
persons of different cultures (Atran 1990).  For example, different cultures often share 
the same taxonomic knowledge (Berlin 1992).   
 
From a young age, essentialist thinking motivates children to identify possible 
functions of objects.  Children will interpret animals, clouds, rocks and other objects 
as existing for a purpose (Kelemen 2004).  This skill endows even young children 
with an ability to engage in teleological reasoning (Kelemen & DiYanni 2005).  This 
 75 
predisposition toward teleology can motivate particular religious beliefs, such as a 
belief in creationism (Evans 2001; Kelemen 2004). 
 
One experiment designed to test for essentialist thinking found that participants would 
refuse to eat chocolate which looked like dog faeces (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley 
2000).  This result illustrates that, like other animals, humans identify objects via their 
surface properties (Medin & Ortony 1989).  We ascribe essences to objects based on 
these properties, such as feeling disgust when looking at chocolate merely because 
this particular chocolate possesses the surface properties of a disgusting object. 
 
Our innate knowledge of categories and their essential elements endows humans with 
the ability to distinguish between objects that move on their own accord and objects 
that are moved by an external force (Rochat, Morgan, & Carpenter 1997).  This skill 
endows people with the ability to differentiate between agents and objects from five 
months of age (Karmiloff-Smith 1992; Kuhlmeier, Bloom, & Wynn 2004).  One 
experiment involved participants being asked to describe the movement of dots on a 
computer screen.  Participants spoke about the movement by referring to the dots 
using human pronouns and other anthropomorphic descriptions (Wegner 2005). 
 
Once we have detected an agent, our innate knowledge of folk psychology endows us 
with the ability to ascribe minds to other agents.  This skill is known as theory of 
mind (Fodor 1983), an ability that is fully developed in humans by age three (Schjodt 
2005).  It is of interest to note that autistic people have trouble attributing beliefs and 
emotions to others (Frith 1989), indicating that their theory of mind is somehow 
impaired.  Of relevance to religion is the fact that our theory of mind endows us with 
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the ability to believe in the existence of supernatural agents (Lawson & McCauley 
1990). 
 
We attribute mental states to these agents.  For example, children will ascribe 
omniscience to God (Barrett, Richert, & Driesenga 2001; Bering & Bjorklund 2004; 
Kelemen 2004).  Our theory of mind allows us to differentiate between the mind and 
the body.  Thus humans are intuitive dualists (Bloom 2004, 2007), this may help to 
explain a belief in a soul.  Even young children will presume that a soul survives 
death, this presumption occurs due to the human inability to represent the absence of 
mental states (Bering 2002, 2006a; Bering & Bjorklund 2004; Gilbert 2001; Nichols 
2007).  Empirical work has shown that priming participants with thoughts of death 
will increase their supernatural belief (Norenzayan & Hansen 2006). 
 
The problem with believing in an afterlife is that, if one prefers the next world to this 
world, one might be a little too keen to get to the next world.  Thus, evolution must 
endow people with the desire to remain within this world, in spite of the belief that the 
afterlife may be better.  Interestingly, people regard corpses to be more dangerous 
than they really are (Fisher 2005; Morgan & Fisher 2004; PAHO 2003; Wisner & 
Adams, Eds. 2002), which helps to foster a fear of dying.  This reaction to corpses is 
cross culturally universal (Metcalf & Huntington 1991).  Looking forward to an 
afterlife is a product of our theory of mind, whereas a fear of death prevents us from 
wanting to go there too soon.  This is an example of the notion that people can possess 
different skills relevant to contradictory worldviews (Spinosa & Dreyfus 1996). 
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3.2.2 Counter intuitive information 
 
The bulk of the information humans encounter conforms to our intuitive 
understanding of the world.  If I were to tell you that “I jumped in the ocean and went 
for a swim,” this would be a wholly intuitive statement.  The statement conforms to 
your intuitive understanding of folk physics, in that a low-density body (such as 
myself) should float in water; as well as your understanding of folk biology, in that 
swimming is what you would expect an animal to do if they voluntarily jumped in the 
ocean; and also folk psychology, in that swimming is the most likely motivation for 
my jumping into water.  This statement makes perfect sense, there is nothing 
surprising or unusual about it.  Most people hearing this would take the obviousness 
of the statement for granted, and never give it a second thought. 
 
A small proportion of the information that we encounter violates our intuitive 
understandings (Boyer 2001).  If I were to tell you that “I jumped in the ocean, landed 
on Venus, walked around inside my kidneys where I conjured a blue rose that turned 
into a dead yeti who later became the monarch of the New American Republic,” this 
would be a maximally counter intuitive statement.  It does not in anyway conform to 
any of the behaviours or outcomes that you would expect to result when a body, 
animal, or conscious being jumps into water.  The statement is confusing, to say the 
least, and very cognitively difficult to comprehend and remember.  Maximally 
counter intuitive statements are cognitively difficult to process (Boyer 2001) and 
quickly forgotten. 
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However, if I were to tell you that “I jumped in the ocean and held my breath for 
twenty four hours,” this is an example of a minimally counter intuitive statement.  It 
conforms to your understanding of folk physics in that I am underwater, the very 
place that you would expect me to be if I jumped into the ocean.  Further, it largely 
conforms to your understanding of folk biology, in that a land animal cannot breathe 
underwater.  It even conforms to folk psychology, in that anyone who is underwater 
without a breathing apparatus would be motivated to hold their breath.  The statement 
does, however, violate one minor folk biological intuition; no land mammal can hold 
their breath for twenty four hours.  The statement is largely intuitive, therefore it is 
comprehensible; but as it is not entirely intuitive, it is not taken for granted.  It is a 
fully comprehensible statement which raises an eyebrow.  Of the three statements 
discussed, this statement is the most likely to be remembered and hence the most 
likely to be retold.  Minimally counter intuitive information is easy to recall (Boyer 
2001).  We can therefore say it is cognitively optimal (Barrett 2004b). 
 
According to the cognitively optimal theory of religion, religious belief consists of 
minimally counter intuitive information (Atran 2002; Barrett 2004b; Boyer 2001).  
This makes religious information easy to remember (Whitehouse 2000), so religious 
beliefs spread in populations (Boyer 2001; McCauley & Lawson 2002).  For example, 
counter intuitive agent concepts are memorable and spread easily (Barrett 2000, 
2004b; Pyysiäinen 2003). 
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3.2.3 Supernatural knowledge as cognitively optimal 
 
The ability to represent supernatural beings requires theory of mind (Boyer 1999; 
Mithen 1996).  Cognitively optimal theory predicts that a belief in such beings results 
from the human tendency to acquire minimally counter intuitive information (Boyer 
1994, 2001).  These tendencies are obvious from a young age.  Children detect what 
they believe to be invisible agents by age 4, and this contributes to the intuitive 
theistic knowledge that children possess (Kelemen 2004).  This may also contribute to 
the intuitive teleology that children possess (Kelemen & DiYanni 2005), in that they 
perceive all objects as serving a purpose (Kelemen 2004).  This inference of an order 
in reality is motivated by the same psychology that motivates many to conclude that 
the world is the product of an intelligent creator (Bering 2003; Kelemen 2004; 
Pyysiäinen 2005).  Supernatural beliefs are counter intuitive.  I now turn to a 
discussion as to whether cognitively optimal theory can explain the supernatural 
knowledge associated with such beings. 
 
There are three main problems associated with employing cognitively optimal theory 
to explain complex supernatural knowledge.  First, the theory would suggest that a 
given supernatural concept will become a component within a supernatural belief 
system if it is memorable.  However, there are countless memorable concepts, 
including numerous supernatural concepts, which are not found in any supernatural 
belief system.  One example would be Santa Claus (Barrett 2008; Johnson 2005).  
Santa can fly and is familiar with the quality of your overall behaviour.  These are 
counter intuitive properties that have been attributed to him.  Yet, very young children 
will quite rationally and independently determine that Santa’s existence is impossible 
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without making the same determination about God.  Thus there must be other 
conditions surrounding the nature of God that are beyond His counter intuitiveness, 
which prompt people to believe in Him. 
 
Another example of a supernatural concept no one believes in is the Flying Spaghetti 
Monster.  The concept of the Flying Spaghetti Monster was conceived by Bobby 
Henderson as a means to illustrate his view regarding the Kansas School Board’s 
decision to teach intelligent design along with evolution.  He argued that they should 
also teach the view that the Flying Spaghetti Monster created the universe after an all 
day drinking session, and that the imperfections in creation are a result of his 
drunkenness.  This is of course a joke.  The notion that spaghetti created the world is 
counter intuitive, but unbelievable.  Thus it would appear that the minimally counter 
intuitive nature of many supernatural concepts is a necessary, but insufficient, cause 
for their becoming supernatural concepts. 
 
My second objection to cognitively optimal theory is that even successful 
supernatural concepts are only accepted by a select group.  It is counter intuitive that 
Buddha was a bodhisattva in a past life, and it is evidently believable as so many 
people do believe this.  However, most people do not.  It is counter intuitive and 
evidently believable that Jesus survived crucifixion but most people disbelieve this 
also.  A complete theory of supernatural expertise must entail an explanation of the 
sufficient causes for supernatural belief, as well as the reasons as to why concepts 
meeting these criteria are not universally accepted. 
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Third, the notion that all supernatural knowledge is minimally counter intuitive is 
actually wrong.  Some supernatural concepts are moderately or even maximally 
counter intuitive, and therefore difficult to understand and recall (Boyer 1994, 2001).  
A lot of the information used to describe supernatural beings is likewise difficult to 
remember (Barrett 2004b; Boyer 2003).  The modern Abrahamic perception of God 
as an omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient and omnibenevolent being violates 
numerous folk intuitions.  For example, God’s omnipotence counters our intuitive 
understanding of folk biology which suggests that agents will be limited in the actions 
that they can perform.  The concept of an omnipotent God can only be comprehended 
with much time consuming conscious thought (Barrett & Keil 1996).  God’s 
omnipresence is contrary to our understanding of folk physics which informs us that 
an agent can only exist in one place at one time.  God’s omniscience violates our 
understanding of folk psychology which suggests that an agent will be limited in the 
information it has access to.  Folk psychology also suggests that agents will, at least 
sometimes, be motivated by selfish intentions, but this is violated by the notion of 
God’s omnibenevolence.  In spite of the maximally counter intuitive nature of God, 
this deity is the primary subject of worship for over half the world’s population. 
 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that humans cannot cognitively represent 
the counter intuitive properties of the gods that they believe in, but instead will 
possess two concepts of god, an intuitive one and a theologically correct one.  For 
example, people have difficulty processing their belief that God is able to help two 
people simultaneously (Barrett & Keil 1996).  Furthermore, 63% of Americans have 
experienced anger toward God (Davis, Smith, & Marsden 2005), indicating that they 
do not always take a belief in God’s omnibenevolence seriously. 
 82 
 
These are examples of a difference between explicit and implicit belief.  Other 
empirical data has also been collected to demonstrate this (Shariff & Norenzayam 
2007).  Whereas psychological surveys typically only measure people’s theologically 
correct representations of God (Barrett & Keil 1996), intuitive concepts of God can 
sometimes differ (Pyysiäinen 2004b).  Cognitively optimal theory cannot account for 
this.  A complete treatment of supernatural expertise must resolve this objection by 
explaining why so many religionists possess knowledge that is moderately to 
maximally counter intuitive. 
 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
 
Cognitively optimal theory is useful in explaining supernatural expertise insofar as the 
content of supernatural belief systems consists of minimally counter intuitive 
information.  However, not all supernatural information is minimally counter 
intuitive, with some supernatural information being moderately or maximally counter 
intuitive.  Further, humans reject most of the counter intuitive information that they 
encounter in two ways.  First, many memorable concepts are not found in 
supernatural belief systems.  Second, humans possess a bias toward the counter 
intuitive beliefs of their immediate religious group. 
 
3.3 The modes theory 
 
The modes theory of religion was developed by Harvey Whitehouse to explain the 
cognitive basis for the cultural transmission of religions (Whitehouse 1995, 2000, 
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2004).  Central to the modes theory is the ritual form hypothesis (Barrett 2004a; 
Barrett & Lawson 2001; McCauley & Lawson 2002).  This hypothesis begins with the 
notion that our ability to conceive of supernatural beings is a product of our theory of 
mind.  This enables us to conceive of a supernatural being as either an actor or a 
patient within a religious ritual (Lawson & McCauley 1990), that is, we can 
understand them to be effecting a change through the ritual, or to be changing because 
of the ritual.  The ritual form hypothesis has been applied to the Pomio Kivung 
movement (McCauley & Lawson 2002), and is supported by data collected through 
observing the wedding rituals of monotheistic religions (Malley & Barrett 2003). 
 
The modes theory explains religion in terms of the cognitive memory systems (Klein, 
Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance 2002) and the social arrangements that human beings 
develop to facilitate the transmission of religious ideas (Boyer 2001; McCauley & 
Lawson 2002; Whitehouse 2000) such as experiential recollections which are 
remembered episodically (in the imagistic mode) or doctrinal information which is 
recalled semantically (in the doctrinal mode) (Whitehouse 2002).  The doctrinal and 
imagistic modes, as well as the acquisition and spread of cognitively optimal 
concepts, all heavily influence one another (Whitehouse 2004).  This section 
overviews the doctrinal mode.  It concludes by identifying the necessary revisions that 
must be applied to the modes theory before a complete account of supernatural 
expertise can be developed.   
 
Essential to the modes theory are the six different forms of memory identified by 
Endel Tulving (1972).  First, implicit memory refers to information we recall 
subconsciously, such as how to express our thoughts in our native language.  Second, 
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explicit memory refers to conscious knowledge which can be either short or long 
term.  Third, short term memory refers to information retained momentarily, such as a 
limerick.  Fourth is long term memory, which retains information for extended 
periods of time, and can be either semantic or episodic.  Fifth, semantic memory 
consists of information that we are aware of, but cannot recall where or how we learnt 
it, such as a religious doctrines.  Sixth, episodic memory is the recollection of 
information we can remember learning.  Episodic memory typically consists of 
recollections of particular events or episodes, such as a baptism. 
 
3.3.1 The doctrinal mode of religiosity 
 
As his starting point for the doctrinal mode of religion, Whitehouse (2004) observes 
that within doctrinal religions, religionists often engage in the frequent repetition of 
religious teachings.  This may take the form of the recitation of scripture, creeds, or 
religious lyrics.  Many ritual practices are also repeated, examples include saying 
grace before eating, meditating, or performing salat.  The frequency with which such 
practices are repeated has been likened to obsessive compulsive disorder (Boyer 2003, 
2005; Boyer & Lienard 2006). 
 
Whitehouse (2004) observes that frequent repetition causes two effects.  First, 
doctrinal information is remembered semantically.  That is, although specific 
doctrines are stored in memory, the precise occasion upon which those details were 
learnt becomes lost in a sea of the many memories for the occasions on which the 
information was recited.  After a religionist has recited a canonised creed one hundred 
times, there is no way he could identify which specific recitation resulted in that creed  
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being stored in his long term memory.  Second, the frequent repetition of rituals 
results in an implicit memory for ritual procedures.  That is, ritual procedures are 
recalled subconsciously without the participant being aware that any recollections are 
taking place.  A Catholic does not have to consciously concentrate on the precise 
manner in which she should position her hands when receiving a communion wafer 
from her priest.  However, this is no doubt information she frequently recalls as she 
holds her hands in the exact same position every time.  If she were to ever fail to 
Ritual 
exegesis 
Frequent repetition 
Need for 
orthodoxy checks 
Semantic memory for 
religious teachings 
Religious leaders 
(orators) 
Centralisation 
Anonymous 
communities 
Religion spreads 
widely 
Implicit memory 
for religious rituals 
Figure 1: The doctrinal mode Source: derived from fig 4.2 
in Whitehouse (2004) 
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adopt the accurate hand position, her priest may discriminate against her on this 
basis.6 
 
Further, Whitehouse (2004) observes that the fact that religious teachings are 
semantically remembered results in three effects.  First, some individuals will emerge 
as religious leaders.  Whitehouse describes these individuals as orators.  He speculates 
that the most charismatic individuals will assume leadership roles because their ability 
to articulate the religious teachings will exceed that of their peers.  Second, religious 
leaders are in a position to dictate a canonised body of doctrinal knowledge.  
Examples include the doctrine of the trinity or the Talmudic interpretations of the 
Torah.  Whitehouse observes that religious leaders perform orthodoxy checks to 
ensure that their teachings are universally accepted throughout the group.  Such 
orthodoxy checks require leaders to identify and suppress unauthorised innovation.  
Whitehouse speculates that these checks function to ensure the credibility of the 
religious tradition.  Third, as a means to quell innovation leaders must establish a 
canonised body of knowledge.  Thus leaders will perform the function of exegeting 
ritual procedures.  As rituals are performed automatically, having been stored in 
implicit memory, religionists will be unaware as to the reasons for their ritual 
behaviour.  Religious leaders are in a position to provide an interpretation for this 
behaviour. 
 
Whitehouse (2004) concludes that the doctrinal mode of religiosity creates three 
different social conditions.  First, the necessity for orthodoxy checks inevitably results 
in the centralisation of religion.  Heterodoxy is much easier to police if there is a 
                                                 
6
 Indeed, the author has a Protestant friend who once attended Catholic mass but was denied 
communion on the basis that their hands were positioned incorrectly. 
 87 
single authority from which all innovation is understood to originate.  This authority 
can then enforce the established doctrine and police unauthorised innovation.  One 
classic historical example was the council of Nicea, a fourth century Christian body 
that was established to determine an official belief system for the Christian church, 
which led to the persecution and ultimate annihilation of innovatory Gnostic 
movements.  Second, the semantic memory for religious teachings results in 
anonymous communities; that is, communities in which any one member will not 
know the majority of others.  As these memories are not episodic, the exact time, 
place, and people that a practitioner sat next to while learning the teachings is 
unimportant.  What is important is that the religious knowledge is common among a 
vast community of believers; resulting in communities whose members are largely 
unknown to one another.  Third, some religious leaders assume roles as missionaries 
or evangelists who travel for the sole purpose of spreading the religion to other 
regions and localities.  Thus the doctrinal mode of religiosity creates widespread 
anonymous communities with a centralised hierarchy.  
 
3.3.2 Discussion of the doctrinal mode 
 
I have four main concerns about Whitehouse’s model of the doctrinal mode.  First, 
Whitehouse’s initial observation is the fact that religionists engage in the frequent 
repetition of religious teachings.  It is correct that frequent repetition occurs and that it 
leads to the semantic memory for supernatural information which ultimately results in 
the social conditions elaborated above, but Whitehouse does not account for why 
frequent repetition occurs in the first place.  A complete explanation of the doctrinal 
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mode must explain both how frequent repetition began, and why it continues to persist 
as a central practice in doctrinal traditions. 
 
Second, by employing frequent repetition as his starting point, Whitehouse does not 
examine the content of supernatural belief systems as a separate category.  It is 
supernatural information that is subject to frequent repetition.  Thus, such information 
must exist before frequent repetition occurs.  In this respect, the content of 
supernatural belief systems could equally be considered the starting point for the 
doctrinal mode as opposed to the frequent repetition of that content.  However, this 
consideration would be problematic, as supernatural information is dictated by 
religious leaders.  Whitehouse himself observes that leaders dictate the belief system 
as well as performing the function of exegeting ritual procedure.  Therefore, religious 
leaders must come before supernatural information.  However, leaders cannot be 
considered a starting point for the model, as Whitehouse argues that leaders exist 
because semantic memory for religious teachings creates a social condition whereby 
some persons will be understood to possess a mastery over those teachings, thereby 
emerging as leaders.  Hence we observe that frequent repetition leads to the semantic 
memory for religious teachings, which causes leaders to emerge who dictate the 
supernatural information that is then frequently recited.  This is a purely cyclical 
process which has no starting point.  We find ourselves with a classic chicken/egg 
scenario.  A complete treatment of the doctrinal mode of religion must explain how 
this cyclical process began in the first place. 
 
Third, Whitehouse arbitrarily describes religious leaders as the orators.  For 
Whitehouse, the leaders are the persons who can articulate religious teachings the 
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best.  One need not look too far to identify counter examples of this assumption.  In 
Hinduism, religious leadership is predominantly hereditary.  Brahman priests inherit 
their elite positions from their parents.  In Tibetan Buddhism, new lamas are chosen 
on the basis of psychic intuition, astrological analysis, and testing procedures that, 
from the perspective of an outsider, produce seemingly insignificant results.  In both 
of these examples, communication skills have little or nothing to do with the selection 
process.  Clearly it is insufficient to explain religious leaders as the best orators.  This 
does not mean that semantic memory for religious teachings does not create a 
condition in which religious leaders will emerge.  However, it does mean that the 
personal and familial qualities which determine whether someone will hold a 
leadership position are more complex than Whitehouse proposes.  A better treatment 
of the doctrinal mode must provide a more complete analysis of the variety of 
conditions under which religious leaders will emerge.  These conditions may be as 
numerous as the many religions, if not more so.  However, a more complete analysis 
is possible. 
 
Fourth, the model does not address the issue of any social functionalities that may be 
performed by the doctrinal mode.  Whitehouse has suggested that, “the doctrinal 
mode … emerged when relatively large-scale patterns of cooperation became 
routinised, probably as a result of the seasonal rhythms associated with the 
domestication of animals and plants and the establishment of the first townships” 
(Whitehouse 2008).  However, Whitehouse only observes that a relationship exists 
between the necessity for large-scale cooperation and religious doctrine.  A complete 
examination of the doctrinal mode must arrive at an explanation as to the nature of 
this relationship.  Specifically, the link must be established between (a) the three 
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social conditions created by the doctrinal mode, these being centralisation, 
anonymous community, and widespread religion, and (b) the manner in which 
religious groups and societies solve large-scale cooperation problems. 
 
3.3.3 Conclusion 
 
The doctrinal model is incomplete because it does not account for the origin of 
frequent repetition, nor does it account for the origin of the cyclical process between 
the repetition of supernatural information and the religious leaders that dictate that 
information.  Whitehouse’s description of religious leaders as the best orators is 
insufficient and requires revision.  Lastly, although Whitehouse asserts that the 
doctrinal mode emerged alongside large-scale cooperation, an exploration as to the 
link between these two phenomena is required. 
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Chapter 4. Towards a reconciliation of the adaptationist and 
spandrelist paradigms 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I argue for an innovative theory of supernatural expertise that is 
consistent with the theories previously discussed.  However, my theory expands upon 
the theories previously discussed by addressing the many difficulties with each theory 
that are identified above.  I open by addressing the manner in which supernatural 
expertise can be more costly for non-religionists than religionists; I turn to cognitively 
optimal theory to provide this explanation.  I then demonstrate how the ratchet effect 
acting upon sexual selection has enhanced the quality and quantity of expressions of 
complex supernatural knowledge.  Lastly, I address the doctrinal mode of religiosity, 
demonstrating how cognitively optimal theory can better explain the cyclical process 
that is left unexplained by Whitehouse’s model.  In doing so I argue for a theory of 
supernatural expertise that is consistent with a variety of research in the fields of the 
cognitive science of religion and the evolutionary psychology of religion. 
 
4.2 The cost of complex supernatural knowledge 
 
As established in section 2.2, supernatural expertise appears costly in terms of the 
effort that is required to acquire complex supernatural knowledge.  In this regard, 
supernatural expertise conforms to the first criterion for a hard to fake signal.  
Likewise, it conforms to the second criterion in that there is a contextual association 
between religious commitment and the acquisition of supernatural beliefs surrounding 
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that commitment.  The third criterion requires that a signal is more costly for a 
genuine communicator than a false communicator.  Whether or not supernatural 
expertise conforms to this criterion remains to be identified. 
 
It is easy to understand how the examples of costly signals previously discussed 
conform to this criterion.  An unfit gazelle cannot stot and if it tried its physical 
weakness would be apparent in its poor stotting performance.  A peacock cannot 
display a perfect tail if it has had a brush with a predator.  So both stotting and 
peacocks’ tails are configured to prevent false communicators from imitating the 
signal.  However, as regards one’s familiarity with supernatural knowledge this does 
not appear to be the case.  For instance, even I am familiar with the supernatural 
beliefs of many religious systems that I don’t believe in. 
 
Given the highly competitive environment in which our species evolved, humans have 
developed a preference for information that improves our chance of survival (Tooby 
& Cosmides 1992).  Accordingly, our minds are designed to formulate explanations 
about the world which will benefit our survival potential (Stark 1999; Stark & 
Bainbridge 1987).  Nevertheless, many people seem to be interested in religious 
information, even if such information is not readily available.  For example, in 
religions where a particular form of prayer is required, people tend to pray in the same 
manner even if procedural instructions about how to pray are not made available 
(Barrett 2001).  This indicates an interest in religious information which is so strong 
that people will aspire to acquire even unspoken information.  The key to explaining 
the human interest in supernatural information is to understand how this information 
is useful in enhancing our chance of survival.  Humans possess a preference to 
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acquire only relevant information (Sperber 1985, 1996; Sperber & Wilson 1986), thus 
the relevance of supernatural information must be identified. 
 
I now turn to the cognitively optimal theory of religion and apply it to the third 
criterion for a Zahavian handicap.  This theory states that minimally counter intuitive 
(MCI) ideas are best configured to be memorable, thus the content of supernatural 
belief systems should consist of minimally counter intuitive information.  The 
difficulties with this theory are that the content of supernatural belief systems is 
sometimes maximally counter intuitive and that humans do not believe in every 
counter intuitive concept they encounter. 
 
Further, Justin Barrett (2004b) has noted that “some theological beliefs, more 
typically held by clergy than regular folk, do have a large number of counter intuitive 
features and do not fit the MCI label” and “if a person believes in an MCI god, 
through rigorous theological instruction they may be led to accept additional counter 
intuitive properties of the god.”  Barrett observes these facts merely because they are 
true.  However, he does not attempt to reconcile cognitively optimal theory with the 
fact that he observes supernatural experts to be more concerned with maximally 
counter intuitive supernatural information than lay persons. 
 
What is more perplexing is the observation, not only that supernatural experts 
memorise maximally counter intuitive information, but that they concern themselves 
with specific pieces of counter intuitive information.  A supernatural expert 
expressing the example belief suggested in section 2.2.9, that the Dalai Lama is the 
thirteenth incarnation of Avalokitesvara, when the Dalai Lama is in fact believed to be 
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the fourteenth, has expressed a theologically incorrect belief.  Both of these 
statements are counter intuitive, but only one is theologically correct.  Theological 
incorrectness (Slone 2004) can be a problem in some religious traditions, where 
practitioners are expected to hold theologically correct beliefs. 
 
This leads to a dilemma in which the beliefs that religionists often explicitly express 
do not correspond to the implicit beliefs they display.  For example, non-theist 
Buddhists sometimes behave in a way that is consistent with a theistic belief system 
(Slone 2004), and people who verbally deny a belief in magic and superstition will 
sometimes act as if they do believe in magic (Subbotsky & Quinteros 2005).  These 
apparent contradictions are possible in that humans have the ability to simultaneously 
possess different skills that can be applied to multiple worldviews (Spinosa & Dreyfus 
1996).  It has been shown that linguistically based supernatural beliefs are 
fundamental to the acquisition of religion (Bering 2004) as religious beliefs are often 
maintained because people feel obligated to express specific beliefs (Burris & Navara 
2002; Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellott 2002).  This indicates 
that explicit beliefs are an essential part of religion even though they sometimes 
contradict implicit beliefs evidenced through behaviour.  Any explanation of 
supernatural expertise requires an account of both its maximally counter intuitive 
nature, and the fact that this counter intuitive information is not always evidenced in 
the behaviours of some supernatural experts. 
 
I have previously demonstrated that complex supernatural knowledge is costly to 
acquire in terms of the time and effort that must be invested into its acquisition.  The 
proposition I now advance is that the reason complex supernatural knowledge 
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requires so much time and effort is because it is not minimally counter intuitive.  I 
accept that our minds are configured to find minimally counter intuitive information 
memorable.  I also accept that maximally counter intuitive information is not 
memorable in this respect.  I likewise accept that the acquisition of maximally counter 
intuitive supernatural beliefs requires considerable effort.  Given that much 
supernatural knowledge is maximally counter intuitive, this analysis clarifies precisely 
how the acquisition of complex supernatural knowledge is costly. 
 
This analysis resolves the three difficulties with the application of cognitively optimal 
theory and costly signalling theory to supernatural expertise.  First, so much 
supernatural knowledge is maximally counter intuitive because if this were not so, 
supernatural expertise would not perform a costly signalling function.  The presence 
of maximally counter intuitive systems of supernatural belief secures cooperation via 
the costly signalling function performed by the expression of complex supernatural 
knowledge. 
 
Second, this analysis finally allows us to apply the third criterion for a Zahavian 
handicap to supernatural expertise, which requires that a signal be more costly for a 
dishonest communicator.  As discussed in section 2.2.7, the cost of ritual investment 
is perceived differently by a believer and a sceptic, preventing the uncommitted from 
achieving the same quality of ritual performance as believers.  When the acquisition 
of complex supernatural knowledge is understood in terms of a private ritual for the 
acquisition of maximally counter intuitive information, we can understand why 
complex supernatural knowledge is more costly for sceptics than religionists.  
Sceptics perceive a greater cost (and ultimately a net loss) associated with the 
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acquisition of knowledge that they recognise as being false and non-strategic, whereas 
believers perceive a net gain associated with the acquisition of information they 
perceive as being accurate strategic information about the universe.  The greater cost 
to a non-believer is a perceptual one.  Thus religionists will experience a greater 
motivation to acquire supernatural knowledge than sceptics. 
 
Third, we recognise why humans do not believe in every counter intuitive concept 
they encounter.  It is in our immediate biological interest to invest in the acquisition of 
the systems of supernatural knowledge belonging to the religious group of which we 
are a member.  If we were to believe in all counter intuitive concepts, we would be 
motivated to acquire all supernatural knowledge, an impossible task that would 
significantly detract from opportunity costs that could be invested into acquiring the 
systems of supernatural knowledge possessed by one’s immediate religious group.  
Thus it is advantageous for humans to be sceptical concerning the beliefs of other 
groups. 
 
Further, given that the beliefs that people claim to hold do not always correspond with 
their implicit beliefs (Barrett 1998, 1999; Barrett & VanOrman 1996), supernatural 
expertise is costly in another respect.  It requires further effort for a person to act as if 
their supernatural beliefs are true.  For example, the belief that God can perform two 
acts simultaneously is an intellectual belief, but not one that affects the manner in 
which people implicitly think about God (Barrett & Keil 1996).  Humans possess two 
meaning subsystems which correspond to intellectual and affective belief (Barnard & 
Teasdale 1991).  I suggest that these correspond to two different forms of knowledge 
that human beings can possess, this being schematic knowledge and experiential 
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knowledge (James 1890).  For a supernatural expert to implicitly behave as if God can 
perform two acts simultaneously, her experience of her concept of God must be 
consistent with her intellectual beliefs about God so that her experience will affect her 
behaviour.  This requires a very high level of familiarity with the maximally counter 
intuitive beliefs of one’s religion. 
 
The expression of complex supernatural knowledge evidences the costly commitment 
that one has invested into the acquisition of that knowledge.  Costly signalling theory 
predicts that this functions as a signal of commitment to one’s religious group through 
the ideal of supernatural causation.  This requires that supernatural experts be 
motivated to acquire and express information which is theologically correct within the 
context of their religious beliefs.  Therefore, humans possess the motivation to 
minimise religious doubt (Edwards & Hall 2003). 
 
In addition to signalling commitment, supernatural expertise functions as what I call 
an epistemological adornment.  That is, supernatural experts adorn their knowledge 
base with complex supernatural information.  Adornment signalling is common, even 
among our own species.  For example, humans grow much longer hair than other 
primates.  Those of us who possess the time and the resources to invest in grooming, 
signal that we possess a surplus of resources (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997).  Accordingly, 
those able to express complex supernatural information evidence that they have the 
time to waste on the acquisition of that information. 
 
It should also be noted that some supernatural experts will express their supernatural 
knowledge in front of a large audience of witnesses.  Examples include a Catholic 
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priest delivering a sermon or a Buddhist monk giving a dharma talk.  If the 
supernatural expert were to express a theologically incorrect statement, this would be 
witnessed by the entire audience, incurring a huge cost to the reputation of the expert.  
This risky behaviour may seem perplexing, however, it is worthwhile to note that 
signalling to a group is a stronger signal precisely because the signaller incurs a larger 
cost if the signal is false (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997).  By incurring this greater risk, the 
supernatural expert signals confidence in his mastery over his group’s system of 
supernatural belief.  Members of his group can infer his mastery from the confidence 
evidenced and can accordingly deduce his high degree of commitment to the group.  
This explains why some supernatural experts are motivated to express their beliefs to 
large groups. 
 
4.3 Sexual selection for the cognitive capacities necessary for supernatural 
expertise 
 
Sexual selection is the process by which traits are selected because they are attractive 
to a mate and not necessarily because they serve a utilitarian function.  The ratchet 
effect is the process by which sexually selected traits are enhanced over time.  
Although there is evidence that hard-to-acquire aspects of religion can be caused by 
the ratchet effect (Tomasello 1999), we established in section 2.3.4 that a sexual 
selectionist account for supernatural expertise is problematic in that sexual selection 
theory cannot account for the complexity of supernatural belief systems.  Thus, 
without complexity in supernatural beliefs, sexual selection for the cognitive ability to 
manage that complexity cannot occur.  Likewise, the ratchet effect cannot be applied 
directly to the costly signalling model of supernatural expertise because it is only 
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applicable to situations in which a trait continually increases in intensity.  By way of 
contrast, the costly signalling model discussed in section 2.2 predicts that the 
complexity of a religionist’s supernatural knowledge will increase or decrease in 
rough proportion to their cooperative intent. 
 
However, for the sake of conjecture, let us assume both theories to be true.  The 
individuals in a religious community who express the most supernatural knowledge 
would be engaging in a signal that communicates two very different traits.  First, they 
communicate their cooperative intent.  Second, they communicate that they possess 
genes which code for a high intelligence, good memory and problem solving skills; 
abilities which are necessary to manage complex supernatural information.  The 
former message is beneficial in that it ensures their membership in a reciprocally 
altruistic community.  The latter message is beneficial in that it increases their sexual 
attractiveness.  This model predicts that, at least historically, supernatural experts 
would have won mates more easily than their peers.7 
 
I now present an example of sexual selection for the cognitive capacities for 
supernatural knowledge that can perform a costly signalling function.  Assume at 
generation n, there are a variety of cognitive capacities within a population, which 
endow individuals with varying levels of the ability to acquire supernatural 
knowledge.  Assume each individual in the population inherits the cognitive 
capacities of their parent with only minor variation.  Assume that the majority of 
individuals in the population acquire some degree of supernatural knowledge in an 
attempt to signal cooperative intent.  Those with elite cognitive capacities may or may 
                                                 
7
 Note that the cultural invention of celibacy may or may not hinder this process in some societies.  See 
section 2.3.2 for a discussion of celibacy. 
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not acquire a complex level of supernatural knowledge depending upon the degree of 
their cooperative intent.  Those that do acquire a complex level of supernatural 
knowledge exhibit a higher degree of sexual attractiveness.  Therefore, at generation 
n+1 the number of individuals who have inherited elite cognitive capacities is higher 
than the number of individuals who inherited non-elite capacities.  Thus the average 
cognitive capacities of the population have increased.  Further, minor variations in the 
inherited capacities would result in some children of supernatural experts possessing 
greater cognitive capacities than their parents.  Hence the spread of cognitive 
variability at generation n+1 is about the same as it was at generation n.  Persons 
attempting to signal cooperative intent now have the potential to acquire a greater 
degree of supernatural knowledge than their forebears.  Thus, in order to remain one 
step ahead of the masses, the most altruistic individuals must compensate for the 
population’s increased cognitive potential by expressing a more complex level of 
supernatural knowledge than would have been necessary had they lived at generation 
n.  Again, the supernatural experts signal not only their cooperative intent, but also 
certain genetic qualities.  This increases their sexual attractiveness, resulting in higher 
average cognitive capacities at generation n+2. 
 
We see that the ratchet effect can be applied to supernatural expertise by utilising 
costly signalling theory to account for the complexity of supernatural belief systems.  
This model resolves the difficulty associated with applying sexual selection theory to 
supernatural expertise in that the necessary cause for the complexity of supernatural 
belief is the costly signalling function it performs.  The model likewise resolves the 
difficulty of applying the ratchet effect to a costly signalling model in that the 
variations in expressions of supernatural knowledge that are predicted by the model 
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are necessary to highlight variability in cognitive capacities so that sexual selection 
can occur.  We see that costly signalling theory and the ratchet effect acting upon 
sexual selection can complement one another; and indeed must complement each 
other if the origin of the complexity in supernatural belief is to be understood. 
 
4.4 The functionality of the doctrinal mode 
 
Here I employ my previous critiques of costly signalling theory, cognitively optimal 
theory, and sexual selection theory as a means to resolve my three concerns with 
Whitehouse’s model of the doctrinal mode (2004).  First, I examine the question of 
what came first: religious leaders who acquire complex supernatural information or 
the supernatural information that is dictated by religious leaders.  Second, I address 
the fact that Whitehouse employs the frequent repetition of supernatural information 
as his starting point without discussing how frequent repetition began.  Third, I 
discuss how the need for “large-scale patterns of cooperation” can create a 
requirement for the social conditions generated by the doctrinal mode. 
 
Whitehouse’s doctrinal model (2004) leaves unanswered a classic chicken/egg 
scenario.  Although Whitehouse does not identify the content of supernatural belief 
systems as a separate category, it is this content which is the subject of frequent 
repetition.  Therefore, frequent repetition leads to semantic memory for religious 
teachings which leads to some religionists emerging as leaders who dictate the content 
of the belief system which is the subject of frequent repetition.  Thus Whitehouse’s 
doctrinal mode has no beginning.  For this cyclical process to begin, at least one of 
these four processes would need to have originated independently of the model.
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During my discussion of costly signalling theory in section 2.2, I demonstrated how 
supernatural expertise can perform a costly signalling function if the acquisition and 
expression of supernatural knowledge is linked to supernatural causation.  Further, in 
my application of the ratchet effect to sexual selection in section 4.3, I argued that the 
ratchet effect acting upon cognitive capacities for the acquisition of supernatural 
information can increase the complexity of supernatural belief systems if a costly 
signalling function is being performed.  In this scenario, supernatural knowledge 
represents one factor which determines a person’s sexual attractiveness as well as 
their suitability as an exchange partner.  Thus, although the most altruistic individuals 
will likely acquire more supernatural knowledge than their peers, many people will be 
attempting to acquire supernatural knowledge in an attempt to gain the same 
advantages that it brings to those individuals.  This results in memory for supernatural 
information. 
 
Thus supernatural information begins with the semantic memory for religious 
teachings.  These memories originate when sexual selection acts upon the cognitive 
capacities for the acquisition of supernatural knowledge in an environment where 
complex supernatural knowledge can perform a costly signalling function.  Semantic 
memory then leads to the emergence of religious leaders.8  The leaders are in a 
position to contribute to the increasingly complex pool of supernatural knowledge by 
exegeting ritual procedures and constructing new analyses of supernatural 
information.  These behaviours allow supernatural experts to assert their prowess as 
                                                 
8
 For the purposes of this thesis, religious leaders are assumed to be those who are best at acquiring 
complex supernatural knowledge.  While this assumption is more helpful than Whitehouse’s arbitrary 
assertion that the religious leaders are the “orators”, it is by no means a complete analysis of the 
emergence of religious leadership.  Religious leaders are appointed for a variety of reasons, such as the 
social status of their family.  A more complete treatment of religious leadership is required. 
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acquirers of supernatural knowledge and ultimately maintain their elite social 
positions.  A prestige bias, that is, the motivation to imitate successful individuals 
(Richerson & Boyd 2005), prompts lay religionists to familiarise themselves with the 
canon of supernatural concepts dictated by the leaders.  Established and new doctrines 
are frequently repeated by many religionists as a means to increase their status as 
acquirers of supernatural knowledge.  Frequent repetition then acts as a low arousal 
ritual which further encapsulates supernatural information in semantic memory and 
increases the willingness of religionists to accept the orthodoxy dictated by religious 
leaders (Whitehouse 2004).  The doctrinal mode has begun. 
 
This analysis resolves the first two objections that I intended to address.  First, it is 
neither religious leadership nor supernatural information that came first.  Rather, it 
was semantic memory for maximally counter intuitive information.  Second, the 
doctrinal mode does not begin with frequent repetition; rather, the doctrinal mode 
began with semantic memory for supernatural information which resulted in the social 
conditions that led to frequent repetition. 
 
Lastly, I wish to address the issue of why the doctrinal mode emerged alongside 
large-scale patterns of cooperation.  Although Whitehouse (2008) identifies that this is 
the case, he does not address the relationship between the doctrinal mode and the need 
for large-scale cooperation.  It may be the case that one caused the other, or that both 
conditions are symbiotically dependent. 
 
Cooperative techniques are required to solve competition problems.  Competition 
increases for a variety of reasons, such as resource depletion or population increase.  
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An increase in population density will typically result in a need for more advanced 
cooperation techniques.  For example, imagine a group of nomadic tribes who only 
consume plants and animals which thrive naturally within the environment.  If the 
tribes’ populations continue to increase, they will eventually reach a point at which 
there will not be a sufficient quantity of food for the tribes to consume.  This will 
result in greater competition, both inter- and intra-tribally.  This competition can be 
resolved if the nomadic tribes adopt agricultural techniques to extract a greater 
quantity of resource from their environment.  Agriculture comes at a great cost in that 
(a) it requires more organisation and cooperation between individuals, (b) those 
practising it are more susceptible to repetitive strain injuries, and (c) switching from a 
nomadic to an agricultural lifestyle entails a reduction in the variety of one’s diet.  In 
spite of these disadvantages, agriculture was adopted around 12,000 years ago, quite 
possibly to solve competition problems associated with an increasing human 
population. 
 
Whitehouse likewise identifies that the doctrinal mode emerged alongside conditions 
of population increase, specifically “as a result of the seasonal rhythms associated 
with the domestication of animals and plants and the establishment of the first 
townships” (Whitehouse 2008).  Increasing population would have undoubtedly 
resulted in increased competition.  Yet religions which have spread throughout 
multiple towns, cities, and even nations have been successful in promoting wide scale 
cooperation (Wilson 2002).  While it has been argued that religious change led to the 
origins of agriculture (Cauvin 2000), I suggest that it was agriculture which led to the 
origins of the doctrinal mode.  Here I discuss the three social conditions which result 
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from the doctrinal mode and explore whether supernatural expertise is a cultural 
technology which, at least historically, resolved competition problems. 
 
First, as established in section 2.2, complex supernatural knowledge can perform a 
costly signalling function.  However, this analysis alone did not address the extent to 
which this costly signalling function can spread.  Complex supernatural knowledge 
may not be sufficient to resolve the competition problems that would result from “the 
establishment of the first townships.”  However, as part of the doctrinal mode, 
Whitehouse (2004) observes that the semantic memory for religious teachings 
produces anonymous communities.  That is, communities which are not formed on the 
basis of the common association of their members, but are bound by a common sense 
of identity which is ground in a common system of supernatural knowledge.  A 
member belonging to an anonymous community, in which complex supernatural 
knowledge performs the function of costly signalling cooperative intent, can judge a 
stranger’s reliability as an exchange partner by assessing the extent of her 
supernatural knowledge.  Ordinarily, one would have to rely upon their knowledge of 
another’s reputation to make this judgement.  However, in large settlements in which 
it is not possible to track the behaviour of each individual, a shared system of 
supernatural knowledge provides a means for individuals to solve this problem. 
 
Therefore, supernatural expertise functions via the assessment of cultural capital (see 
Bourdieu 1986).  Fellow supernatural experts, who are able to assess each other’s 
familiarity with the relevant non-utilitarian cultural information, will be able to 
determine the quantity of time and resource that each has invested into the acquisition 
of this cultural capital.  Where the acquisition of such information is contextually 
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dependent upon a belief in supernatural causation, the altruistic intent of a fellow 
supernatural expert can be inferred via the expression of their supernatural 
knowledge.  The most devout experts will semantically store the correct cultural 
capital in a theologically correct manner.  For example, one belief that is central in 
evangelical Christianity is the notion of a personal relationship with God.  
Experiments involving evangelical Christians have found that participants store 
supernatural information about God in a manner consistent with such a relationship 
(Gibson 2005).  My explanation of supernatural expertise predicts that such Christians 
should be able to express their supernatural knowledge in a manner that is consistent 
with this fundamental belief.  This prediction is confirmed by the results of an 
experiment in which evangelical Christians were able to produce faster reaction times 
than non-evangelicals when attributing traits to God (Gibson 2006).  This is an 
example in which a consistency has been achieved in both one’s intellectual and 
experiential knowledge, a feat of perfection in supernatural expertise that requires a 
great deal of effort as explained in section 4.1.  The strive toward perfection can be 
adaptive (Flett & Hewitt, Eds. 2002), because perfection earns prestige for those 
striving to familiarise themselves with the complex supernatural knowledge of their 
religious leaders and because the degree of prestige that an individual possesses can 
perform a costly signalling function (Zahavi & Zahavi 1997). 
 
Second, Whitehouse (2004) further observes that the presence of religious leaders 
causes religions to become widespread as some of the leaders assume missionary 
roles.  This increases the size of the anonymous community.  A religionist may be 
able to traverse a large geographical area and still regularly encounter persons 
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belonging to his own religion, enabling him to find reliable exchange partners as he 
travels.  This can facilitate trade and communication between settlements. 
 
Third, Whitehouse (2004) notes that the necessity for orthodoxy checks results in the 
centralisation of religions.  These centralised authorities perform the function of 
policing innovation.  Novelty results from creativity (Reuter, Panksepp, Schnabel, 
Kellerhoff, Kempel, & Hennig 2005) and revelation which is often stimulated by high 
arousal religious activities (Richert, Whitehouse, & Stewart 2005), thus creating the 
need for orthodoxy checks.  For example, ethnographic studies of the Pomio Kivung 
movement demonstrate that high arousal rituals prompt conscious reflection as to the 
significance of the rituals which generate exegetical knowledge (Whitehouse 1995, 
2000; Whitehouse & Laidlow 2004). 
 
Another example is the practice of firewalking which often begins as a costly ritual 
without a supernatural justification (Xygalatas, in press).  Prior to the introduction of 
an official supernatural explanation for firewalking, any exegetical innovation would 
need to be carefully policed via the use of orthodoxy checks to ensure that it is 
theologically correct.  A central religious authority enables the possibility of 
orthodoxy checks by establishing a canon of supernatural concepts.  This aids 
religionists in their assessment of each other’s supernatural knowledge.  Dedicated 
religionists, who are familiar with the official canon, can compare the supernatural 
knowledge base of potential exchange partners against that canon. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
I opened this thesis by proposing the question, “Why do people have religion?”  I 
identified the acquisition and expression of complex supernatural knowledge as a 
particular area of interest.  In this chapter I have argued for an innovative theory for 
supernatural expertise.  I have shown that the acquisition of maximally counter 
intuitive knowledge will perform a costly signalling function where that knowledge is 
contextually linked to a belief in supernatural causation.  It does this because of the 
cognitive difficulty associated with the acquisition of complex supernatural 
knowledge.  The complexity of supernatural belief systems increases over time to 
compensate for an average increase in cognitive capacities for the acquisition of 
supernatural knowledge which are targeted by sexual selection.  Supernatural 
expertise enables the construction of widespread anonymous communities with 
canonised supernatural belief systems.  These systems enable religionists to identify 
each other’s cooperative intent, thereby providing a solution to cooperation problems 
in dense human settlements.  In this regard, we can view complex supernatural 
knowledge as an adaptive technology, selected because of the social conditions that it 
generates which aided human organisation and cooperation.  This is the reason why 
supernatural expertise evolved, and this is part of the reason why people have 
religion. 
 
As discussed in section 1.12, the value of this thesis is in its critique of the body of 
literature within the evolutionary psychology of religion for purposes of developing a 
general model to account for the acquisition and expression of complex supernatural 
knowledge.  This thesis was limited to the development of this model alone, without 
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applying the model to any specific case studies of supernatural experts or examples of 
complex supernatural belief.  As explained in section 1.12, arguing for the model by 
applying it to selected examples would have confounded the thesis due to the 
possibility of bias in the selection of examples.  It was therefore necessary to argue for 
the model with a critique of the literature within the field of the evolutionary 
psychology of religion, without reference to specific examples.  Despite this 
limitation, this thesis is valuable in that the model which it argues for is confirmed 
through its critique of the literature. 
 
Nevertheless, now that the model has been developed, scope for future research via 
empirical testing of the model is now possible.  For the reasons discussed, testing the 
model via its application to examples is problematic.  Examples or case studies which 
are found to confirm the model would only weakly support it, as the possibility of 
selectivity in examples exists.  However, if examples or case studies could be found 
which disconfirm the model this would constitute strong confounding evidence. 
 
One method of overcoming the objection of selectivity when choosing examples 
would be to select examples randomly.  David Wilson (2005) has used this method by 
selecting page numbers at random from an encyclopaedia, and assigning 
undergraduate students the task of assessing whether the religions described on the 
random pages support his theory of group selection.  Should other researchers wish to 
adopt this method to test the model developed herein, they would have to overcome 
the problem that the model maintains that complex supernatural knowledge is 
configured in such a way so as to only be acquirable by the genuinely committed. 
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To illustrate, if a researcher was to randomly select a religious system that they don’t 
personally believe in, this thesis predicts that he could neither acquire nor express the 
complex supernatural concepts which perform a costly signalling function within that 
religious system.  Therefore, he would not be able to assess how specific supernatural 
concepts are precisely configured so that only the genuinely committed can acquire 
them.  Indeed, during the research for this thesis the author spent a great deal of time 
attempting to study randomly selected examples as a means of testing the model.  
After three months of researching twentieth century American Jewish theology, a 
religious tradition that had been selected using the random method explained above, 
the author found he could say little other than that he could not understand the 
complexities of the supernatural belief system being studied.  This outcome is 
predicted by the theory advanced here. 
 
Although it was not appropriate, in this thesis, to argue for the model through the use 
of examples for the reasons explained, the door remains open for future researchers to 
further test the model by applying it to examples.  These researchers would have to 
overcome the difficulties associated with the possibility of selectivity in choosing 
their examples, perhaps through the use of the same method employed by Wilson 
(2005).  They would also have to overcome the problem that the very theory they are 
testing predicts they should not be capable of acquiring complex supernatural 
concepts to the level that would be necessary to test the model.  I leave the 
development of a method to overcome this latter difficulty to future research. 
 
To summarise, this thesis has contributed the following advancements to the field of 
the evolutionary psychology of religion: 
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• I have identified a gap in the literature in that, prior to the completion of this 
thesis, no specific account for supernatural expertise had been developed. 
• I have shown that, at face value, supernatural expertise has no apparent utility; 
therefore a major critique of the literature was required to develop an evolutionary 
model to account for its continued existence. 
• I have advanced costly signalling theory by demonstrating that the acquisition of 
supernatural expertise involves the investment of time and opportunity costs, 
providing a framework through which expressions of supernatural knowledge can 
be accurately identified as reliable signals of commitment; a fact that had 
previously been dismissed. 
• I have controversially combined cognitively optimal theory and costly signalling 
theory, explaining the cost of acquiring supernatural knowledge in terms of the 
maximally counter intuitive nature of complex supernatural concepts; 
demonstrating that adaptationist and spandrelist theories of religion can 
complement each other. 
• I have combined costly signalling theory and sexual selection theory to account 
for the emerging complexity of supernatural belief systems, in that the motivation 
for individuals to employ more costly signals necessitates the development of 
more complex supernatural concepts, which are necessary to continually highlight 
variation in cognitive capacities. 
• I have resolved the paradox associated with the cyclical perpetuation of the 
doctrinal mode of religion by identifying that the doctrinal mode originated as a 
result of maximally counter intuitive concepts becoming linked to supernatural 
causation, and of their ability to signal the presence of genes which code for 
cognitive capacities desirable in offspring. 
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• Lastly, I have demonstrated that the doctrinal mode can be recognised as an 
adaptive technology in that the social conditions which result from the doctrinal 
mode aid in enabling large scale cooperation. 
 114 
Bibliography 
 
Agid, Y., Javoy-Agid, M., & Ruberg, M. 1987. Biochemistry of neurotransmitters in 
Parkinson’s disease. In C.D.M.S. Fahn, Ed., Movement disorders 2, 166-230. London, 
UK: Butterworth. 
 
Aiello, L., & Wheeler, P. 1995. The expensive-tissue hypothesis: The brain and the 
digestive system in human and primate evolution. Current Anthropology, 36, 199-
221. 
 
Alcorta, C., & Sosis, R. 2005. Ritual, emotion, and sacred symbols: The evolution of 
religion as an adaptive complex. Human Nature, 16 (4), 323-359. 
 
Alexander, R. 1987. The biology of moral systems. New York, NY: Aldine de 
Gruyter. 
 
Andrews, P.W., Gangestad, S.W., & Matthews, D. 2002. Adaptationism – how to 
carry out an exaptationist program. Behavioral & Brain Sciences, 25, 489-553. 
 
Appleton, J. 1975. The experience of landscape. London, UK: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Atran, S. 1990. Cognitive foundations of natural history: Towards an anthropology of 
science. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
 115 
Atran, S. 1995. Causal constraints on categories and categorical constraints on 
biological reasoning. In D. Sperber, D. Premack, & A.J. Premack, Eds., Causal 
cognition: A multidisciplinary debate, 205-233. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Atran, S. 2002. In gods we trust: The evolutionary landscape of religion. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Atran, S. 2006. The cognitive and evolutionary roots of religion. In P. McNamara, 
Ed., Where God and science meet: How brain and evolutionary studies alter our 
understanding of religion, Vol. 1, 181-207. Westport, CT and London: Praeger 
Publishers. 
 
Atran, S., & Norenzayan, A. 2004. Religion’s evolutionary landscape: 
Counterintuition, commitment, compassion, communion. Behavioral & Brain 
Sciences, 27 (6), 730-70. 
 
Azari, N.P., Nickel, J.P., Wunderlich, G., Niedeggen, M., Hefter, H., Tellmann, L., et 
al. 2001. Neural correlates of religious experience. European Journal of 
Neuroscience, 13, 1649-1652. 
 
Balling, J.D., & Falk, J.H. 1982. Development of visual preference for natural 
environments. Environment & Behavior, 14, 5-28. 
 
 116 
Barnard, P.J., & Teasdale, J.D. 1991. Interacting cognitive subsystems: A systematic 
approach to cognitive-affective interaction and change. Cognition & Emotion, 5 (1), 
1-39. 
 
Baron-Cohen, S. 2003. The essential difference: The truth about the male and female 
brain. New York, NY: Basic Books.  
 
Barrett, H.C. 2005. Adaptations to predators and prey. In D.M. Buss, Ed., The 
handbook of evolutionary psychology, 200-223. New York, NY: Wiley. 
 
Barrett, J.L. 1998. Cognitive constraints on Hindu concepts of the divine. Journal for 
the Scientific Study of Religion, 37, 608-619. 
 
Barrett, J.L. 1999. Theological correctness: Cognitive constraint and the study of 
religion. Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, 11, 325-339.  
 
Barrett, J.L. 2000. Exploring the natural foundations of religion. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 4 (1), 29-34. 
 
Barrett, J.L. 2001. How ordinary cognition informs petitionary prayer. Journal of 
Cognition & Culture, 1 (3), 259-269.  
 
Barrett, J.L. 2004a. Bringing data to mind: Empirical claims of Lawson and 
McCauley’s theory of religious ritual. In B.C. Wilson & T. Light, Eds., Religion as a 
 117 
human capacity: A festschrift in honor of E. Thomas Lawson, 265-288. Leiden, 
Netherlands: Brill. 
 
Barrett, J.L. 2004b. Why would anybody believe in God? Walnut Creek, CA: 
AltaMira Press. 
 
Barrett, J.L. 2008. Why Santa Claus Is Not a God. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 
8 (1), 149-161.  
 
Barrett, J.L., & Keil, F.C. 1996. Conceptualizing a non-natural entity: 
Anthropomorphism in God concepts. Cognitive Psychology, 31, 219-247.  
 
Barrett, J.L., & Lawson, E.T. 2001. Ritual intuitions: Cognitive contributions to 
judgments of ritual efficacy. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 1 (2), 183-201. 
 
Barrett, J.L., & Nyhof, M. 2001. Spreading non-natural concepts: The role of intuitive 
conceptual structures in memory and transmission of cultural materials. Journal of 
Cognition & Culture, 1 (1), 69-100. 
 
Barrett, J.L., & VanOrman, B. 1996. The effects of image use in worship on God 
concepts. Journal of Psychology & Christianity, 15 (1), 38-45. 
 
Barrett, J.L., Richert, R.A., & Driesenga, A. 2001. God’s beliefs versus mother’s: The 
development of nonhuman agent concepts. Child Development, 72 (1), 50-65.  
 
 118 
Beauregard, M., & Paquette, V. 2006. Neural correlates of a mystical experience in 
Carmelite nuns. Neuroscience Letters, 405, 186-190. 
 
Benson, H. 1976. The relaxation response. New York, NY: William Morrow & 
Company, Inc. 
 
Bering, J.M. 2002. Intuitive conceptions of dead agents’ minds: The natural 
foundations of afterlife beliefs as phenomenological boundary. Journal of Cognition 
& Culture, 2, 263-308. 
 
Bering, J.M. 2003. Towards a cognitive theory of existential meaning. New Ideas in 
Psychology, 21, 101-120. 
 
Bering, J.M. 2005. The evolutionary history of an illusion: Religious causal beliefs in 
children and adults.  In B.J. Ellis & D.F. Bjorklund, Eds., Origins of the social mind: 
Evolutionary psychology and child development, 411-437. New York, NY: Guilford 
Press.  
 
Bering, J.M. 2006a. The cognitive psychology of belief in the supernatural: A by-
product of the ability to reason about the minds of others may offer evolutionary 
advantage. American Scientist, 94, 2, 142-149. 
 
Bering, J.M. 2006b. The folk psychology of souls. Behavioural & Brain Sciences, 29, 
453-498.  
 
 119 
Bering, J.M., & Bjorklund, D.F. 2004. The natural emergence of reasoning about the 
afterlife as a developmental regularity. Developmental Psychology, 40 (2), 217-233. 
 
Bering, J.M., & Johnson, D.D.P. 2005. ‘Oh Lord, you perceive my thoughts from 
afar’: Recursiveness in the cognitive evolution of supernatural agency. Journal of 
Cognition & Culture, 5, 118-142. 
 
Bering, J.M., McLeod, K.A., & Shackelford, T.K. 2005. Reasoning about dead agents 
reveals possible adaptive trends. Human Nature, 16, 360-381. 
 
Berlin, B. 1992. Ethnobiological classification: Principles of categorization of plants 
and animals in traditional societies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Berridge, K., & Robinson, T. 1998. What is the role of dopamine in reward? Brain 
Research Reviews, 28, 309-369. 
 
Bloom, P. 2004. Descartes’ baby: How the science of child development explains 
what makes us human. New York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
Bloom, P. 2007. Religion is natural. Developmental Science, 10, 147-151. 
 
Boehm, C. 1999. Hierarchy in the forest. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Boehm, C. 2000. Conflict and the evolution of social control. Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, 7, 79-183. 
 120 
 
Bookstein, F., Fieder, M., & Huber, S. 2008. Spouses age at the same rate: reply to H. 
Kokko, ‘Human parental age difference and offspring count: a comment on Fieder et 
al.’. Biology Letters, 4, 261. 
 
Bourdieu, P. 1986. The form of capital. In J. Richardson, Ed., Handbook of theory 
and research in education, 241-258. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
 
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P.J. 1992. Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or 
anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology & Sociology, 13, 171-195.   
 
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P.J. 2003. The evolution of altruistic 
punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 100 (6), 3531-
3535. 
 
Boyer, P. 1993. Cognitive aspects of religious symbolism. In P. Boyer, Ed., Cognitive 
aspects of religious symbolism, 4-47. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Boyer, P. 1994. The naturalness of religious ideas: A cognitive theory of religion. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Boyer, P. 2001. Religion explained: Evolutionary origins of religious thought. New 
York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
 121 
Boyer, P. 2003. Religious thought and behavior as by-products of brain function. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 119-124. 
 
Boyer, P. 2005. A reductionist model of distinct modes of religious transmission. In 
H. Whitehouse & R.N. McCauley., Eds., Mind and religion: Psychological and 
cognitive foundations of religiosity, 3-29. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. 
 
Boyer, P., & Liénard, P. 2006. Why ritualized behaviour? Precaution systems and 
action-parsing in developmental, pathological and cultural rituals. Behavioral & Brain 
Sciences, 29 (6), 595-650. 
 
Boyer, P., & Ramble, C. 2001. Cognitive templates for religious concepts: Cross-
cultural evidence for recall of counter-intuitive representations. Cognitive Science, 25, 
535-564. 
 
Brown, D.E. 1991. Human universals. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.  
 
Bulbulia, J. 2004a. Religious costs as adaptations that signal altruistic intention. 
Evolution & Cognition, 10, 19-39. 
 
Bulbulia, J. 2004b. The cognitive and evolutionary psychology of religion. Biology & 
Philosophy, 18, 655-686. 
 
Bulbulia, J. 2007. Evolution and religion. In R. I. Dunbar & L. Barrett, Eds., Oxford 
handbook of evolutionary psychology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 122 
 
Bulbulia, J. 2009. Religiosity as mental time travel: cognitive adaptations for religious 
behavior. In J. Schloss & M. Murray, Eds., The Believing Primate: Scientific, 
Philosophical and Theological Perspectives on the Evolution of Religion. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bulbulia, J., & Frean, M. (in press). Coordination by sacred cues. Journal of the Study 
of Religion, Nature, & Culture. 
 
Bulbulia, J., & Mahoney, A. 2008. Religious Solidarity: The Hand Grenade 
Experiment. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 8 (3), 295-320. 
 
Bulbulia, J., Sosis. R., Harris, E., Genet, R., Genet, C., & Wyman, K. 2008. The 
evolution of religion: Studies, theories, & critiques. Santa Margarita, CA: Collins 
Foundation Press. 
 
Buss, D. 2002. Human mate guarding. Neuroendocrinology Letters, 23, Suppl. 4, 23-
29. 
 
Buss, D. 2003. The evolution of desire: Strategies of human mating, Reprint ed. New 
York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
Cauvin, J. 2000. The birth of the gods and the origins of agriculture. T. Watkins, 
Trans. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Original work published 1994. 
 
 123 
Chen, D. 2003. Economic distress and religious intensity: Evidence from Islamic 
resurgence during the Indonesian financial crisis. MIT: Mimeo. 
 
Chesswas, A. (unpublished). Evaluating the case for meta-atheism: Evolutionary 
psychology, religion & the narrow path. Retrieved April 26, 2011, from 
<http://reocities.com/SouthBeach/keys/8485/Evaluatingthecaseformetaatheism.doc> 
 
Clark, A. 1997. Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
 
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D.J. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis, 58, 10-23.  
 
Colman, A. 2006. The puzzle of cooperation. Nature, 44, 744-745.   
 
Comings, D.E., Gonzales, N., Saucier, G., Johnson, J.P., & MacMurray, J.P. 2000. 
The DRD4 gene and the spiritual transcendence scale of the character temperament 
index. Psychiatric Genetics, 10 (4), 185-189.  
 
Covey, S.R., Merrill, A.R., & Merrill, R.R. 1994. First things first. New York, NY: 
Simon and Schuster.  
 
Cronk, L. 1994. Evolutionary theories of morality and the manipulative use of signals. 
Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science, 29, 81-101.  
 
 124 
Crook, J.H., & Crook, S.J. 1988. Tibetan polyandry: Problems of adaptation and 
fitness. In L. Betzig, M. Borgerhoff-Mulder, & P. Turke, Eds., Human reproductive 
behaviour: A Darwinian perspective, 97-114. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
D’Onofrio, B.M., Eaves, L.J., Murrelle, L., Maes, H.H., & Spilka, B. 1999. 
Understanding biological and social influences on religious affiliation, attitudes, and 
behaviors: A behaviour genetic perspective. Journal of Personality, 67 (6), 953-984.  
 
Damasio, A. R. 1999. The feeling of what happens: Body, emotion and the making of 
consciousness. London, UK: Vintage.  
 
Darwin, C. 1871. The descent of man, Vol. 1. New York, NY: Penguin Classics.  
 
Darwin, C. 1965. The expression of the emotions in man and animals. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press. Original work published 1872.  
 
Darwin, C. 1968. The origin of species. London, UK: Penguin Books. Original work 
published 1859. 
 
Davis, J.A., Smith, T.W., & Marsden, P.V. 2005. General Social Surveys, 1972-2004. 
[CUMULATIVE FILE] [Computer file]. Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research 
Center. Retrieved April 26, 2011, from 
<http://sda.berkeley.edu/D3/GSS04/Doc/gs040048.htm> 
 
 125 
Dawkins, R. 2006. The god delusion. London, UK: Bantam Press. 
 
Deacon, T. 1997. The symbolic species: The co-evolution of language and the human 
brain. London, UK: Penguin: Allen Lane.  
 
Dennett, D.C. 1995. Darwin’s dangerous idea: Evolution and the meanings of life. 
New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.  
 
Dennett, D.C. 2006. Breaking the spell: Religion as a natural phenomenon. New 
York, NY: Viking.  
 
Dow, J.W. 2006. The evolution of religion: Three anthropological approaches. 
Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, 18, 67-91. 
 
Dunbar, R. 2004. The human story: A new history of mankind’s evolution. London, 
UK: Faber and Faber Ltd.  
 
Durham, W.H. 1991. Coevolution: Genes, culture, and human diversity. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press.  
 
Durkheim, E. 1995. The elementary forms of religious life. New York, NY: Free 
Press. Original work published 1915.  
 
Edis, T. 2002. The ghost in the universe: God in light of modern science. Amherst: 
Prometheus.  
 126 
 
Edis, T. 2004. Chance and necessity – And intelligent design? In M. Young & T. 
Edis, Eds., Why intelligent design fails: A scientific critique of the new creationism, 
139-152. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.  
  
Edwards, J. 1982. A treatise concerning religious affections. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Books. Original work published 1746.   
 
Edwards, J. 2007. The distinguishing marks of a work of the spirit of God, applied to 
that uncommon operation that has lately appeared on the minds of the people of New 
England: With a particular consideration of the extraordinary circumstances with 
which this work is attended. Cornwall, UK: Diggory Press. Original work published 
1741.   
 
Edwards, K.J., & Hall, T.W. 2003. Illusory spiritual health: The role of defensiveness 
in understanding and assessing spiritual health. In T.W. Hall & M. R. McMinn, Eds., 
Spiritual formation, counselling, and psychotherapy, 261-275. Hauppauge, NY: Nova 
Science Publishers. 
 
Epstein, S. 1994. Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious. 
American Psychologist, 49 (8), 709-724. 
 
Escalas, J.E., & Stern, B.B. 2003. Sympathy and empathy: Emotional responses to 
advertising dramas. Journal of Consumer Research, 29, 566-578.  
 
 127 
Evans, E. M. 2001. Cognitive and contextual factors in the emergence of diverse 
belief systems: Creation versus evolution. Cognitive Psychology, 42, (3), 217-266.  
 
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. 2002. Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137-140.  
 
Fessler, D. 2006. A burning desire: Steps toward an evolutionary psychology of fire 
learning. Journal of Cognition & Culture, 6, 429-451. 
 
Fieder, M., & Huber, S. 2007. Parental age difference and offspring count in humans. 
Biology Letters, 3, 689-691. 
 
Fieder, M., Huber, S., Bookstein, F. 2008. Reply to Lindqvist et al. ‘Does parental age 
difference affect offspring count in humans: comment on Fieder and Huber’. Biology 
Letters, 4, 80-81. 
 
Fisher, J. 2005. Disposal of dead bodies in emergency conditions. World Health 
Organization Technical Notes for Emergencies No.8. 
 
Flett, G., & Hewitt, P., Eds. 2002. Perfectionism: Theory, research, and treatment. 
Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.  
 
Fodor, J. 1983. The modular theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
 
Foley, R. 1995. Humans before humanity. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.  
 
 128 
Foster, K., & Kokko, H. 2009. The evolution of superstitious and superstition-like 
behaviour. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B., 276, 31-37. 
 
Fowler, J. 2005. Human cooperation: Second-order free-riding problem solved? 
Nature, 437, E8.  
 
Frank, R.H. 1988. Passions within reason: The strategic role of the emotions. New 
York, NY: Norton and Company.  
 
Frank, R.H. 2001. Cooperation through emotional commitment. In R.M. Nesse, Ed., 
Evolution and the capacity for commitment, 57-77. New York, NY: Russel Sage 
Foundation. 
 
Frazer, G. 1994. The golden bough Abridged ed. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Frecska, E., & Kulcsar, Z. 1989. Social bonding in the modulation of the physiology 
of ritual trance. Ethos, 17, 70-87. 
 
Freud, S. 1938. Totem and taboo. A.A. Brill, Trans. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin 
Books. Original work published 1913. 
 
Freud, S. 1964. The future of an illusion. In J. Strachey, Ed. and Trans. New York, 
NY: Norton and Company. Original work published 1927. 
 
 129 
Frith, U. 1989. Autism: Explaining the Enigma. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Gibson, N.J.S. 2005. The experimental investigation of religious cognition. 
Unpublished doctorial dissertation. Cambridge University, Cambridge, England. 
 
Gibson, N.J.S. 2006. The experimental investigation of religious cognition. 
Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Cambridge, UK. Retrieved April 26, 
2011, from 
<http://www.prrg.org/prrg/people/staff/staff.acds?context=1609849&instanceid=1609
850>  
 
Giedd, J., Blumenthal, J., Jeffries, N.O., Catellanos, F.X., Liu, H., Zijdenbos, A., et al. 
1999. Brain development during childhood and adolescence: A longitudinal MRI 
study. Nature Neuroscience, 2, 861-863. 
 
Gilbert, D.T. 2001. Why economists are not afraid to die. Paper presented at the First 
International Conference on Experimental Existential Psychology, Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands, August 2-4, 2001. 
 
Gintis, H., Smith, E., & Bowles, S. 2001. Costly signalling and cooperation. Journal 
of Theoretical Biology, 213, 103-119.  
 
Gobbini, M. I., Leibenluft, E., Santiago, N., & Haxby, J. V. 2004. Social and 
emotional attachment in the neural representation of faces. NeuroImage, 22, 1628-
1635.  
 130 
 
Goldstein, J. 2003. War and gender: How gender shapes the war system and vice-
versa, New ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Gould, S.J., & Lewontin, R.C. 1979. The spandrels of San Marco and the panglossian 
paradigm: A critique of the adaptationist program. Proceedings of the Royal Society 
of London, Series B, 205 (1161), 581-598.  
 
Grafen, A. 1990. Biological signals as handicaps. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 
144, 517-546.  
 
Greenfield, S. 2000. The private life of the brain. London, UK: Penguin.  
 
Greenwald, A.G., Banaji, M.R., Rudman, L.A., Farnham, S.D., Nosek, B.A., & 
Mellott, D.S. 2002. A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, 
and self-concept. Psychological Review, 109, 3-25.  
 
Hamer, D. 2004. The God gene. How faith is hardwired into our genes. New York, 
NY: Anchor Books.  
 
Hare, R. 1999. Without conscious: The disturbing world of psychopaths among us. 
New York, NY: Guilford Press.   
 
 131 
Harrar, G., & Harrar, H. 1977. Music, emotion, and autonomic function. In M. 
Critchley & R. A. Henson, Eds., Music and the brain: Studies in the neurology of 
music, 202-216. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.  
 
Harrison, J.E. 1909. The influence of Darwinism on the study of religion. In A.C. 
Seward, Ed., Darwin and modern science: Essays in commemoration of the centenary 
of the birth of Charles Darwin and of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the 
origin of species, 494-511. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Haselton, M.G., & Miller, G.F. 2006. Women’s fertility across the cycle increases the 
short-term attractiveness of creative intelligence. Human Nature, 17 (1), 50-73. 
  
Haslam, N.O. 1998. Natural kinds, human kinds, and essentialism. Social Research, 
65 (2), 291-314. 
 
Hattfield, E., Cacioppo, J.T., & Rapson, R.L. 1994. Emotional contagion. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M.A., & Sigmund, K. 2007. Via 
freedom to coercion: The emergence of costly punishment. Science, 316 (5833), 
1905-1907.  
  
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. 2001. Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist 
transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. 
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 208 (1), 79-89. 
 132 
 
Henry, J.L. 1982. Possible involvement of endorphins in altered states of 
consciousness. Ethos, 104, 394-408.   
  
Herzog, T.R., Herbert, E.J., Kaplan, R., & Crooks, C.L. 2000. Cultural and 
developmental comparisons of landscape perceptions and preferences. Environment & 
Behavior, 32, 323-346. 
 
Hill P.C. 1995. Affective theory and religious experience. In R.W. Hood, Jr., Ed., 
Handbook of religious experience, 353-377. Birmingham, AL: Religious Education 
Press.  
 
Hill, P.C. 2005. Measurement assessment and issues in the psychology of religion and 
spirituality. In R.F. Paloutzian & C.L. Park, Eds., Handbook of the psychology of 
religion, 43-79. New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
 
Hill, P.C., & Hood, R.W., Jr. Eds. 1999a. Measures of religiosity. Birmingham, AL: 
Religious Education Press.  
 
Hill, P.C., & Hood, R.W., Jr. 1999b. Affect, religion, and unconscious processes. 
Journal of Personality, 67, 1015-1046. 
 
Hill, P.C., & Pargament, K.I. 2003. Advances in the conceptualization and 
measurement of religion and spirituality: Implications for physical and mental health 
research. American Psychologist, 58, 64-74. 
 133 
 
Hirschfeld, L.A. 1994. Is the acquisition of social categories based on domain specific 
competence or on knowledge transfer? In L.A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman, Eds., 
Mapping the mind: Domain specifity in cognition and culture, pp. 201-233. New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Hirschfeld, L.A. 1998. Natural assumptions: Race, essence, and taxonomies of human 
kinds. Social Research, 65 (2), 331-349. 
 
Hirschleifer, J. 1987. On the emotions as guarantors of threats and promises. In J. 
Dupré, Ed., The latest on the best: Essays in evolution and optimality, 307-326. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 
Hirstein, W. 2005. Brain fiction: Self-deception and the riddle of confabulation. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
 
Horvitz, J. 2000. Mesolimbocortical and nigrostriatal dopamine responses to salient 
non-reward events. Neuroscience, 96, 651-656. 
 
Hume, D. 1776. Dialogues concerning natural religion. London, UK: Penguin 
Classics. 
 
Hutchins, E. 1995. Cognition in the wild. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
 
 134 
Iannaccone, L.R. 1994. Why strict churches are strong. American Journal of 
Sociology, 99 (5), 1180-1211.  
 
Irons, W. 1996a. In our own self image: The evolution of morality, deception, and 
religion. Skeptic, 4, 50-61. 
 
Irons, W. 1996b. Morality, religion, and evolution. In W.W.W.M. Richardson, Ed., 
Religion and science: History, method, and dialogue, 375-399. New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
 
Irons, W. 2001. Religion as a hard-to-fake sign of commitment. In R.M. Nesse, Ed., 
Evolution and the capacity for commitment, 292-309. New York, NY: Russel Sage 
Foundation. 
 
James, W., 1890. Principles of psychology, Vol. 1. New York, NY: Henry Holt.  
 
James, W. 2003. Pragmatism. New York, NY: Barnes and Noble. Original work 
published 1907.  
 
Johnson D.D.P., & Bering, J.M. 2006. Hand of God, mind of man: Punishment and 
cognition in the evolution of cooperation. Evolutionary Psychology, 4, 219-233.  
 
Johnson, D.D.P., & Krüger, O. 2004. The good of wrath: Supernatural punishment 
and the evolution of cooperation. Political Theology, 52, 159-176. 
 
 135 
Johnson, D.D.P. 2005. God’s punishment and public goods. A test of the supernatural 
punishment hypothesis in 186 world cultures. Human Nature, 16 (4), 410-446.  
 
Kaplan, R., & Kaplan, S. 1989. The experience of nature: A psychological 
perspective. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Kaplan, S. 1992. Environmental preference in a knowledge-seeking, knowledge-using 
organism. In J.H. Barkow, L. Cosmides & J. Tooby, Eds., The adapted mind: 
Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture, 581-598. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Kapur, S. 2003. Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 160, 13-23. 
 
Karmiloff-Smith, A. 1992. Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on 
cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
 
Kelemen, D. 2004. Are children “intuitive theists”? Reasoning about purpose and 
design in nature. Psychological Science, 15 (5), 295-301. 
 
Kelemen, D., & DiYanni, C. 2005. Intuitions about origins. Journal of Cognition & 
Development, 6 (1), 3-31. 
 
 136 
Kenrick, D.T., Maner, J.K., Butner, J., Li, N.P., Becker, D.V., & Schaller, M. 2002. 
Dynamic evolutionary psychology: Mapping the domains of the new interactionist 
paradigm. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 6, 347-356. 
 
Kirkpatrick, L.A. 1999. Toward an evolutionary psychology of religion and 
personality. Journal of Personality, 67, 921-952. 
 
Kirkpatrick, L.A. 2004. Attachment, evolution, and the psychology of religion. New 
York, NY: Guilford Press. 
 
Kirkpatrick, L.A. 2006. Religion is not an adaptation. In P. McNamara, Ed., Where 
God and science meet: How brain and evolutionary studies alter our understanding of 
religion, Vol. 1, 159-179. Westport, CT and London: Praeger Perspectives. 
 
Klein, S., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., & Chance, S. 2002. Decisions and the evolution of 
memory: Multiple systems, multiple functions. Psychological Review, 109, 306-329. 
 
Koenig, L.B., & Bouchard, T.J., Jr. 2006. Genetic and environment influences on the 
traditional moral values triad – authoritarianism, conservatism, and religiousness – as 
assessed by quantitative behaviour generic methods. In P. McNamara, Ed., Where 
God and science meet: How brain and evolutionary studies alter our understanding of 
religion, Vol. 1, 31-60. Westport, CT and London: Praeger Perspectives.  
 
Kokko, H. 2008a. Males, females and the value of toy models: a commentary on 
Bookstein et al. (2008). Biology Letters, 4, 349-350. 
 137 
 
Kokko, H. 2008b. Human parental age differences and offspring count: and we still 
don’t know what men or women want. Biology Letters, 4, 259-260. 
 
Kokko, H., Brooks, R., & Jennions, M.D. 2003. The evolution of mate choice and 
mating biases. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 270, 653-664. 
 
Kokko, H., Jennions, M.D., & Brooks, R. 2006. Unifying and testing models of 
sexual selection. Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, & Systematics, 37, 43-66. 
 
Kolb, B., Forgie, M., Gibb, R., Gorny, G., & Rontree, S. 1998. Age, experience and 
the changing brain. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 22, 143-159. 
 
Korpela, K.M., Klemettilä, T., & Hietanen, J.K. 2002. Evidence for rapid affective 
evaluation of environmental scenes.  Environment & Behavior, 34, 634-650. 
 
Kotiaho, J.S., Simmons, L.W., & Tomkins, J. 2001. Towards a resolution of the lek 
paradox. Nature, 410, 684-686.  
 
Kuhlmeier, V., Bloom, P., & Wynn, K. 2004. Do 5-month-old infants see humans as 
material objects? Cognition, 94 (1), 95-103. 
 
Kunda, Z. 1999. Social cognition: Making sense of people. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press.  
 
 138 
Lawson, E.T., & McCauley, R.N. 1990. Rethinking religion: Connecting cognition 
and culture. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Lazar, S.W., Bush, G., Gollub, R.L., Fricchione, G.L., Khalsa, G., & Benson, H. 
2000. Functional brain mapping of the relaxation response and meditation. 
NeuroReport, 11 (7), 581-1585. 
 
Lazarus, R. 1991. Emotion and adaptation. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
 
Leary, M.R. 1999. Making sense of self-esteem. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 8, 32-35. 
 
Leslie, A.M., German, T.P., & Polizzi, P. 2005. Belief-desire reasoning as a process 
of selection. Cognitive Psychology, 50, 45-85. 
 
Levenson, R.W. 1999. The intrapersonal functions of emotion. Cognition & Emotion, 
13 (5), 481-504. 
 
Levenson, R.W. 2003. Blood, sweat and fears: the autonomic architecture of 
emotions. In P. Ekman, J.J. Campos, R.J. Davidson, & F.B.M. de Waal, Eds., 
Emotions inside out, 348-366. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 
1000. New York: New York Academy of Sciences.  
 
Levinson, S. 2003. Space in language and cognition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 139 
 
Lindqvist, E., Cesarini, D., & Wallace, B. Does parental age difference affect 
offspring count in humans? Comment on Fieder and Huber. Biology Letters, 4, 78-79. 
 
Lutkehaus, N.C., & Roscoe, P.B., Eds. 1995. Gender rituals: Female initiation in 
Melanesia. London, UK: Routledge.  
 
Macalister, A. 1882. Evolution in church history. Dublin, Ireland: Hodges, Figgis. 
 
Mahoney, A. 2008. Theological expressions as costly signals of religious 
commitment. In Bulbulia, J., Sosis. R., Harris, E., Genet, R., Genet, C., & Wyman, 
K., The evolution of religion: Studies, theories, & critiques, 161-166. Santa Margarita, 
CA: Collins Foundation Press. 
 
Malley, B. 2004. How the Bible works: An anthropological study of American 
Biblicism. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.  
 
Malley, B., & Barrett, J.L. 2003. Does myth inform ritual? A test of the Lawson-
McCauley hypothesis. Journal of Ritual Studies, 17 (2), 1-14. 
 
Marangella, J. 1998. Announcement to the Baha’i world from the guardian of the 
faith. Retrieved April 26, 2011, from 
<http://members.iinet.net.au/~guardian/announcement.html>  
 
Marett, R.R. 1909. The threshold of religion. London, UK: Methuen & Co. 
 140 
 
Marett, R.R. 1912. Anthropology. London, UK: Williams & Norgate.  
 
Marx, K., & Engels, F. 1976. Manifesto of the Communist party. In K. Marx & F. 
Engels, Eds., Collected works. Vol. 6, 476-519. New York, NY: International 
Publishers. Original work published 1888.  
 
Maynard Smith, J. 1982. Evolution and the theory of games. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Maynard Smith, J., & Harper, D. 1995. Animal signals: Models and terminology. 
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 177, 305-311. 
 
Maynard Smith, J., & Harper, D. 2003. Animal signals. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Mayr, E. 2001. What evolution is. New York, NY: Basic Books.  
 
McCauley, R.N., & Lawson, E.T. 2002. Bringing ritual to mind: Psychological 
foundations of religious forms. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
McNamara, P., Durso, R., Brown, A., & Harris, E. 2006. The chemistry of religiosity: 
Evidence from patients with Parkinson’s disease. In P. McNamara, Ed., Where God 
and science meet: How brain and evolutionary studies alter our understanding of 
religion, Vol. 2, 1-14. Westport, CT and London: Praeger Perspectives. 
 141 
 
Medin, D., & Ortony, A. 1989. Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. 
Ortony, Eds., Similarity and analogical reasoning, 179-195. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Metcalf, P., & Huntington, R. 1991. Celebrations of death: The anthropology of 
mortuary ritual, 2nd ed. Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Miller, G. 2000. Evolution of human music through sexual selection. In N.L. Wallin, 
B. Merker, & S. Brown, Eds., The origins of music, 329-360. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
Miller, G. 2001. The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolution of human 
nature. New York, NY: Anchor Books.  
 
Miller, G. 2007. Sexual selection for moral virtues. Quarterly Review of Biology, 82 
(2), 97-126.  
 
Mithen, S. 1996. The prehistory of the mind. London, UK: Phoenix.  
 
Monod, J. 1971. Chance and necessity: An essay on the natural philosophy of modern 
biology. New York, NY: Knopf. 
 
 142 
Morewedge, C.K. 2009. Negativity bias in attribution of external agency. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General.  
 
Morgan, O., & Fisher, J. 2004. Infectious disease risk from dead bodies following 
natural disasters. Revista Panamericana Salud Pública / Pan American Journal of 
Public Health, 15 (5), 307-312. 
 
Morris, P. 2010. Personal communication. 
 
Murdock, G.P. 1965. Culture and society. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press.  
 
Murdock, G.P., & White, D.R. 1969. Standard cross-cultural sample. Ethnology, 8, 
329-369.  
 
Nesse, R. M. Ed. 2001. Evolution and the capacity for commitment. New York, NY: 
The Russel Sage Foundation. 
 
Newberg, A.B., & d’Aquili, E. 1998.  The neuropsychology of spiritual experience. In 
H.G. Koenig, Ed., Handbook of religion and mental health, pp. 75-94. San Diego, 
CA: Academic Press.  
 
Newberg, A.B., Alavi, A., Baime, M., Pourdehnad, M., Santanna, J., & d’Aquili, E. 
2001. The measurement of regional cerebral blood flow during the complex cognitive 
 143 
task of meditation: A preliminary SPECT study. Psychiatric Research, Neuroimaging, 
106, 113-122. 
 
Nichols, D.E., & Chemel, B.R. 2006. The neuropharmacology of religious 
experience: Hallucinogens and the experience of the divine. In P. McNamara, Ed., 
Where God and science meet: How brain and evolutionary studies alter our 
understanding of religion, Vol. 3, 1-33. Westport, CT and London: Praeger 
Perspectives.  
 
Nichols, S. 2007. Imagination and immortality: Thinking of me. Synthese, 159 (2), 
215-233.  
 
Norenzayan, A., & Hansen, I. 2006. Belief in supernatural agents in the face of death. 
Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 174-187. 
 
Norenzayan, A., & Heine, S.J. 2005. Psychological universals: What are they and 
how can we know? Psychological Bulletin, 131, 763-784. 
 
Norenzayan, A., & Shariff, A. 2008. The origin and evolution of religious 
prosociality. Science, 322 (58), 58–62. 
 
Norenzayan, A., Atran, S., Faulkner, J., & Schaller, M. 2006. Memory and mystery: 
The cultural selection of minimally counterintuitive narratives. Cognitive Science, 30, 
531-553. 
 
 144 
Olsen, S. 2006. Teens and media: a full-time job. Retrieved April 26, 2011, from 
<http://news.com.com/2100-1041_3-6141920.html> 
 
Orians, G.H. 1969. On the evolution of mating systems in bird and mammals. 
American Naturalist, 103, 589-603. 
 
Orians, G.H., & Heerwagen, J.H. 1992. Evolved responses to landscapes. In J. H. 
Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby, Eds., The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology 
and the generation of culture, 555-579. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Pan American Health Organization. PAHO. 2003. Unseating the myths surrounding 
the management of cadavers, Disaster Newsletter, NO. 93, October 2003. PAHO, 
USA. 
 
Paller, K. A., Ranganath, C., Gonsalves, B., LaBar, K.S., Parrish, T.B., Gitelman, 
D.R., et al. 2003. Neural correlates of person recognition. Learning & Memory, 10, 
253-260. 
 
Paloutzian, R.F., & Kirkpatrick, L.A., Eds. 1995. Religious influences on personal 
and societal well-being. Journal of Social Issues, 512. 
 
Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R. 2004. Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation 
without the second-order free rider problem. Nature, 432, 499-502. 
 
 145 
Pargament, K.I., Koenig, H.G., Tarakeshwar, N., & Hahn, J. 2001. Religious struggle 
as a predictor of mortality among medically ill elderly patients. Archives of Internal 
Medicine, 161 (10), 1881-1884. 
 
Persinger, M.A. 1987. Neuropsychological bases of God beliefs. New York, NY: 
Praeger Publishers.  
 
Pew. 2006. Spirit and power: A 10-country survey of Pentecostals. The Pew Forum 
on Religion and Public Life. 
 
Pinel, E.C., Long, A.E., Landau, M.J., Alexander, K., & Pyszczynski, T. 2006.  
Seeing I to I: A pathway to interpersonal connectedness. Journal of Personality & 
Social Psychology, 90, 243-257. 
 
Pinker, S. 1995. The Language Instinct. New York, NY: HarperPerennial. 
 
Pinker, S., & Bloom, P. 1990. Natural language and natural selection. Behavioral & 
Brain Sciences, 13, 707-727. 
 
Post, S. 2007. Altruism and health: Perspectives from empirical research. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press.  
 
Prince, R. 1982. Shamans and endorphins: Hypothesis for a synthesis. Ethos, 104, 
409-423. 
 
 146 
Pyysiäinen, I. 2001. Cognition, emotion, and religious experience. In J. Andresen, 
Ed., Religion in mind: Cognitive, perspectives on religious belief, ritual, and 
experience, 70-93. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Pyysiäinen, I. 2003. How religion works: Towards a new cognitive science of 
religion. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill. 
 
Pyysiäinen, I. 2004a. Magic, miracles, and religion: A scientist’s perspective. Walnut 
Creek, CA: AltaMira Press.  
 
Pyysiäinen, I. 2004b. Intuitive and explicit in religious thought. Journal of Cognition 
& Culture, 4 (1), 123-150. 
 
Pyysiäinen, I. 2005. God: A brief history with a cognitive explanation of the concept. 
Temenos, 41 (1), 77-128. 
 
Ramachandran, V. 1997. The evolutionary biology of self-deception, laughter, 
dreaming and depression: Some clues from anosognosia. Medical Hypotheses, 47, 
347-362. 
 
Reuter, M., Panksepp, J., Schnabel, N., Kellerhoff, N., Kempel, P., & Hennig, J. 
2005. Personality and biological markers of creativity. European Journal of 
Personality, 19, 83-95. 
 
 147 
Reynolds, V., & Tanner, R. 1985. The effects of religion on human biology. In J. 
Durant, Ed., Darwinism and divinity, 131-153. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.  
 
Richerson, P.J., & Boyd, R. 2005. Not by genes alone: How culture transformed 
human evolution. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Richert, R.A., Whitehouse, H., & Stewart, E. 2005. Memory and analogical thinking 
in high-arousal rituals. In H. Whitehouse & R.N. McCauley, Eds., Mind and religion: 
Psychological and cognitive foundations of religiosity, 127-145. Walnut Creek, CA: 
AltaMira Press.  
 
Robinson, J., Ed. 1990. The Nag Hammadi Library. New York, NY: HarperCollins. 
 
Rochat, P., Morgan, R., & Carpenter, M. 1997. Young infants’ sensitivity to 
movement information specifying social causality. Cognitive Development, 12, 441-
465. 
 
Roes, F.L., & Raymond, M. 2003. Belief in moralizing gods. Evolution & Human 
Behavior, 24, 126-135. 
 
Rowlands, M. 2003. Externalism: Putting mind and world back together again. 
Chesham, Buckinghamshire: Acumen Publishing Ltd. 
 
 148 
Rozin, P., Haidt, J., & McCauley, C. 2000. Disgust: The body and soul emotion. In 
M. Lewis & J.M. Haviland-Jones, Eds., Handbook of emotions, 2nd ed., 637-653. New 
York, NY: Guilford Press.  
 
Rozin, P., Kurzer, N., & Cohen, A.B. 2002. Free associations to “food”: The effects 
of gender, generation, and culture. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 419-441. 
 
Sachser, N., Durschlag, M., & Hirzel, D. 1998. Social relationships and the 
management of stress. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 23, 891-904. 
 
Sapolsky, R.M. 2006. Social cultures among nonhuman primates. Current 
Anthropology, 47 (4), 641-656. 
 
Schelling, T. 1960. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.  
 
Schjødt, U. 2005. Homøostasis & religiøs adfoerd: Om kognitivismens 
begroensninger og simulationsteoriens forklaringskraft i et religionsvidenskabeligt 
perspektiv “Homeostasis and Religious Behavior: on the Limits of Cognitivism and 
the Explanatory Power of Simulation Theory from the Perspective of the Study of 
Religion”. Master’s thesis, University of Aarhus, Aarhus, Denmark. 
 
Schloss, J. P. 2004. Evolutionary ethics and Christian morality: Surveying the issues. 
In P. Clayton & J. Schloss, Eds., Evolution and ethics: Human morality in biological 
and religious perspective, 1-24. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. 
 149 
 
Schloss, J. P. 2005. Hath Darwin suffered a prophet’s scorn? Evolutionary theory and 
the scandal of unconditional love. In C. Harper, Ed., Spiritual information, 291-299. 
Philadelphia, PA: Templeton Press. 
 
Schloss, J. P. 2008. He who laughs best: Involuntary religious affect as a solution to 
recursive cooperation defection. In Bulbulia, J., Sosis. R., Harris, E., Genet, R., Genet, 
C., & Wyman, K., The evolution of religion: Studies, theories, & critiques, 197-207. 
Santa Margarita, CA: Collins Foundation Press. 
 
Schuster, M., Stein, B., Jaycox. L., Collins, R., Marshall. G., Elliot, M., et al. 2001. A 
national survey of stress reactions after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. New 
England Journal of Medicine, 345, 1507-1512. 
 
Shah, N., Marshall, J.C., Zafiris, O., Schwab, A., Zilles. K., Markowitsch, H.J., et al. 
2001. The neural correlates of person familiarity: A functional magnetic resonance 
imaging study with clinical implications. Brain, 124, 804-815. 
 
Shaner, A., Miller, G., & Mintz, J. 2004. Schizophrenia as one extreme of a sexually 
selected fitness indicator. Schizophrenia Research, 70, 101-109. 
 
Shariff, A.F., & Norenzayan, A. 2007. God is watching you: Supernatural agent 
concepts increase prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game. Psychological 
Science, 18, 803-809. 
 
 150 
Sharpe, E.J. 1986. Comparative religion: A history. London, UK: Duckworth Press. 
Original work published 1975.  
 
Silverman, I., & Choi, J. 2005. Locating places. In D. M. Buss, Ed., The handbook of 
evolutionary psychology, 177-199. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Slone, D.J. 2004. Theological incorrectness: Why religious people believe what they 
shouldn’t. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
 
Smith, J.Z. 1982. Imagining religion. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Sosis, R. 2000. Religion and intragroup cooperation: Preliminary results of a 
comparative analysis of utopian communities. Cross-Cultural Research, 34 (1), 77-
88. 
 
Sosis, R. 2003. Why aren’t we all Hutterites? Costly signaling theory and religious 
behavior. Human nature, 14 (2), 91-127. 
 
Sosis, R. 2004. The adaptive value of religious ritual. American Scientist, 92, 166-
172. 
 
Sosis, R. 2005. Does religion promote trust? The role of signaling, reputation, and 
punishment. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research and Religion, 1, 1-30. 
 
 151 
Sosis, R. 2007. Psalms for safety: Magico-religious response to threats of terror. 
Current Anthropology, 48 (6), 903-911. 
 
Sosis, R., & Alcorta, C. 2003. Signaling, solidarity, and the sacred: The evolution of 
religious behavior. Evolutionary Anthropology, 12, 264-274. 
 
Sosis, R., & Bressler, E. 2003. Co-operation and commune longevity: A test of the 
costly signaling theory of religion. Cross-Cultural Research, 372, 11-39. 
 
Sosis, R., & Ruffle, B.J. 2003. Religious ritual and cooperation: Testing for a 
relationship on Israeli religious and secular kibbutzim. Current Anthropology, 44, 
713-722. 
 
Sosis, R., & Ruffle, B.J. 2004. Ideology, religion and the evolution of cooperation: 
Field tests on Israel kibbutzim. Research in Economic Anthropology, 23, 89-117. 
 
Sosis, R., Kress, H., & Boster, J. 2007. Scars for war: Evaluating alternative 
signalling explanations for cross-cultural variance in ritual costs. Evolution & Human 
Behavior, 28, 234-247. 
 
Spear, L.P. 2000. The adolescent brain and age-related behavioral manifestations. 
Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 24, 417-463. 
 
Sperber, D. 1985. Anthropology and psychology: Towards an epidemiology of 
representations. The Malinowski Memorial Lecture, 1984. Man N.S., 20, 73-89. 
 152 
 
Sperber, D. 1996. Explaining culture: A naturalistic approach. Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell Publishers.  
 
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. 1986. Relevance: Communication and cognition. Oxford, 
UK: Basil Blackwell. 
 
Spinosa, C., & Dreyfus, H.L. 1996. Two kinds of antiessentialism and their 
consequences. Critical Inquiry, 22 (4), 735-763. 
 
Stark, R., & Bainbridge, W.S. 1987. A theory of religion. New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press.  
 
Stark, R. 1999. Micro foundations of religion: A revised theory. Sociological Theory, 
17, 264-289. 
 
Steadman, L.B., & Palmer, C.T. 1995. Religion as an identifiable traditional behavior 
subject to natural selection. Journal of Social & Evolutionary Systems, 18 (2), 149-
164. 
 
Steadman, L.B., Palmer, C.T., & Tilley, C.F. 1996. The universality of ancestor 
worship. Ethnology, 35 (1), 63-76. 
 
Sterelny, K. 2007. SNAFUS: An evolutionary perspective. Biological Theory, 2 (3), 
1-11. 
 153 
 
Strier, K.B. 2002. Beyond the apes: Reasons to consider the entire primate order. In 
F.B.M. de Waal, Ed., Tree of origin: What primate behavior can tell us about human 
social evolution, 2nd ed., 69-93. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Subbotsky, E., & Quinteros, G. 2005. Do cultural factors affect causal beliefs? 
Rational and magical thinking in Britain and Mexico. British Journal of Psychology, 
93, 519-543. 
 
Tiele, C.P. 1897. Elements of the science of religion. 2 volumes. Edinburgh, Scotland: 
William Blackwood and Sons.  
 
Tomasello, M., & Carpenter, M. 2005. Intention reading and imitative learning. In S. 
Hurley & N. Chater, Eds., Perspectives on imitation: From neuroscience to social 
science, Vol. 2, 133-148. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.  
 
Tomasello, M. 1999. The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press.  
 
Tomkins, J.L., Radwan, J., Kotiaho, J.S., & Tregenza, T. 2004. Genic capture and 
resolving the lek paradox. Trends in Ecology & Evolution, 19 (6), 323-328. 
 
Tooby, J., & Cosmides. L. 1988. The evolution of war and its cognitive foundations. 
Institute for Evolutionary Studies Technical Report No. 88-1. Presented at the 
Evolution and Human Behavior Meetings, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 1988. 
 154 
 
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. 1990. On the universality of human nature and the 
uniqueness of the individual: The role of genetics and adaptation. Journal of 
Personality, 58, 17-67. 
 
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. 1992. The psychological foundations of culture. In J. H. 
Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby, Eds., The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology 
and the generation of culture, 19-136. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. 2001. Does beauty build adapted minds? SubStance, 94, 6-
25. 
 
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. 2005. Conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology. 
In D.M. Buss, Ed., The handbook of evolutionary psychology, 5-67. Hoboken, NJ: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Tremlin, T. 2006. Minds and gods: The cognitive foundations of religion. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Trivers, R.L. 1971. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of Biology, 
46, 35-57. 
 
Trivers, R.L. 2000. The elements of a scientific theory of self-deception. Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences, 907 (1), 114-131. 
 
 155 
Turner, V.W. 1990. Drama, fields, and metaphors: Symbolic action in human society. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
 
Tulving, E. 1972. Episodic and semantic memory. In Tulving, E. & Donaldson, W., 
Eds. Organisation of memory, 382-402. New York, NY: Academic Press, Inc. 
 
Tylor, E.B. 1871. Primitive culture. London, UK: John Murray.  
 
Ulrich, R.S. 1983. Aesthetic and affective response to natural environment. In I. 
Altman & J.F. Wohlwill, Eds., Behaviour and the natural environment, 85-125. New 
York, NY: Plenum Press. 
 
de Waal, F.B.M. 1996. Good Natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and 
other animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Waitley, D. 1979. The psychology of winning. New York, NY: Berkley Books. 
 
Wallace, A.F.C. 1966. Religion: An anthropological view. New York, NY: Random 
House.  
 
Watts, F.N. 1996. Psychological and religious perspectives on emotion. International 
Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 6 (2), 71-87. 
 
Watts, F.N., & Williams, J.M.G. 1988. The psychology of religious knowing. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 156 
 
Weber, M. 1978. Economy and society, Vol. 1, G. Roth & C. Wittich, Trans. 
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Original work published 1923. 
 
Wegner, D. 2005. Who is the controller of controlled processes? In R. Hassin, J. 
Uleman, & J. Bargh, Eds., The new unconscious, 19-36. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Wellman, H.M., & Miller, J.G. 2006. Developing conceptions if responsive 
intentional agents. Journal of Cognition & Culture, 6 (1-2), 27-55. 
 
Wesley, J. 2006. Plain account of Christian perfection. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson 
Publishers. Original work published 1766. 
 
West-Eberhard, M.J. 2003. Developmental plasticity and evolution. Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Whitehouse, H. 1995. Inside the cult: Religious innovation and transmission in Papua 
New Guinea. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
 
Whitehouse, H. 2000. Arguments and icons: Divergent modes of religiosity. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.  
 
 157 
Whitehouse, H. 2002. Modes of religiosity: Towards a cognitive explanation of the 
socio-political dynamics of religion. Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, 14, 
293-315. 
 
Whitehouse, H. 2004. Modes of religiosity: A cognitive theory of religious 
transmission. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. 
 
Whitehouse, H. 2008. Cognitive evolution and religion; Cognition and religious 
evolution. In Bulbulia, J., Sosis. R., Harris, E., Genet, R., Genet, C., & Wyman, K., 
The evolution of religion: Studies, theories, & critiques, 31-42. Santa Margarita, CA: 
Collins Foundation Press. 
 
Whitehouse, H., & Laidlow, J. 2004. Ritual and memory: Toward a comparative 
anthropology of religion. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press. 
 
Wilberforce, W. 1997. Real Christianity: Discerning true faith from false beliefs. 
Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House Publishers. Original work published 1797. 
 
Williams, G.C. 1966. Adaptation and natural selection: A critique of some current 
evolutionary thought. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Wilson, D.S. 2002. Darwin’s cathedral: Evolution, religion, and the nature of society. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.  
 
 158 
Wilson, D.S. 2005. Testing major evolutionary hypotheses about religion with a 
random sample. Human Nature, 16 (4), 382-409.  
 
Wind, Y., Crook, C., & Gunther, R. 2005. The power of impossible thinking. 
Philadelphia, PA: Wharton School Publishing.  
 
Wisner, B., & Adams, J., Eds. 2002. Environmental health in emergences and 
disasters. World Health Organization Technical Notes for Emergencies. WHO, 
Geneva. 
 
Wispé, L. 1986. The distinction between sympathy and empathy: To call forth a 
concept, a word is needed. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 50 (2), 314-
321. 
 
Wood, J.M., Nezworski, M.T., & Garb, H.N. 2003. What’s wrong with the 
Rorschach? San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Wrangham, R., & Peterson, D. 1996. Demonic males: Apes and the origins of human 
violence. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company.  
 
Wrangham, R., Jones, J.H., Laden, G., Pilbeam, D., & Conklin-Brittain, N. 1999. The 
raw and the stolen: Cooking and the ecology of human origins. Current Anthropology, 
40, 568-594. 
 
 159 
Xygalatas, D. (in press). Firewalking in the Balkans: High arousal rituals and 
memory. In I. Czachesz, Ed., Changing minds: Religion and cognition through the 
ages. Leuven: Peeters. 
 
Zahavi, A. 1975. Mate selection: A selection for a handicap. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 53, 205-214. 
 
Zahavi, A., & Zahavi, A. 1997. The handicap principle. New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Zajonc, R.B. 1980. Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences. American 
Psychologist, 35, 151-175. 
 
